The Battle of Biazza Ridge

Operation Husky: Axis Forces in Sicily

In July 1943, the defenses of Sicily were as follows: there were between 200,000 and 300,000 Italian troops; and about 30,000 Germans on the island. The Italian forces were comprised of several divisions with troops spread thinly over the island’s coastal defenses, but they were poorly equipped and suffered from low morale. Most would surrender due to their hatred of the War and Mussolini. The supreme Axis commander for Sicily was General Alfredo Guzzoni. The Axis troops made up the Italian VI Army. It is widely recognized that although the German forces were part of the Italian VI Army, they were firmly under the control of Field Marshall Kesselring the top German commander in Sicily who reported directly to the German high command in Berlin.

 

Italian General Guzzoni

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 77. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-4.html

The German defenses were comprised of the 15^th Panzer Grenadier Division, stationed near Marsala and Trapani in the Western tip of Sicily and the Hermann Goring Panzer Division which was deployed inland behind the Gela beaches around Niscemi in the east and Biscari (now named Acate) in the west. See Map 1 below.

 

Map 1: Distribution of Axis and Allied Forces July 10, 1943

Source: “Sicily Campaign”, Birtle, Andrew J., 1993 U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved May 2, 2011, from http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/map1.JPG.

The Axis strategists knew they didn’t have enough armed forces to win against an Allied invasion of Sicily and realized that their only hope was to stop an invasion early by pushing the Allies back into the sea before they could gain any foot hold. There were two perceived landing areas, one on the beaches around Gela and the other in the West, near Marsala and Trapani. Field Marshall Kesselring saw the potential of an Allied landing near Marsala and shortly before the invasion convinced General Guzzoni to transfer the 15^th Panzer Grenadier’s from Gela to that area. Source: “Sicily Campaign”, Birtle, Andrew J., 1993, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Retrieved May 2, 2011, from http://www.45thdivision.org/CampaignsBattles/sicily.htm.

German Field Marshal Kesselring

Source: “United States Army in World War II European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command”, Pogue F. 1954, Page 212. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-11.html 

The 15^th Panzer Division was at full strength, and if they stayed near Gela the outcome could have been very different for the Allies. A “panzer” division is German for an armored division being composed of armored tanks, personnel carriers, infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft units, and signal corps, etc. Designed for Blitzkrieg, (which translates to “lightning war” in English) its units were mobile and mechanized.

The other main German force on Sicily, the Hermann Goring Panzer Division, had its roots as a Nazi police battalion created in 1933 by the then Minister of the Interior, Hermann Goring. It notoriously took part in part in the purge of Hitler’s enemies during the Night of Long Knifes, between June 30 and July 2, 1934. In 1935 it was designated the Regiment General Goring, a component of the Luftwaffe where it trained and served primarily as an anti-aircraft flak unit. In 1942 it was transformed into the Hermann Goring Division, which was composed of 5000 paratroops; the remains of several parachute outfits from campaigns fought on the Eastern Front and Crete. It was sent to Tunisia where after fighting with distinction, it surrendered in May 1943 with scant members escaping to Sicily. At the time of Operation HUSKY, the Hermann Goring Division was re-designated “Panzer-Division Hermann Goring” and was in the process of growing to the size of a true panzer division. Source: “Axis History Facebook”, M. Wendel, 2009. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=233

Later during the Italian campaign, the Hermann Goring Division was found to have committed atrocities:

“Evidence has been found to show that a large number of the atrocities in Italy was committed by the Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Division. Notable offenders also were l Parachute Division, 16 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and 114 Light Division.” Source: “Report of British War Crimes Section of Allied Force Headquarters on German Reprisals for Partisan Activities in Italy” Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VIII. USGPO, Washington, 1946/pp.572-582 S. Stein 1999. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/partisans1.htm.

Later in the War,  The Hermann Goring Division was sent to Poland where on August 4, 1944, it fought in Warsaw as one of the units carrying out  Hitler's orders to destroy the city:

“The Hermann Goering Armored Division advanced into the center of the city, driving civilians in front of its tanks as a protective shield and for the purpose of disassembling the barricades.” Source:  “For over two months...” Gessing, P., 2000, Polish Academic Information Center, University at Buffalo. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from http://info-poland.buffalo.edu/classroom/uprising.html.

Even if it had yet to commit these atrocities, one could reasonably surmise that the Division would be expected to be tough and ruthless with its roots as a Nazi police battalion bearing the name of one of the worst Nazi criminals of the War. After HUSKY, the name “Hermann Goring Division” was tantamount to describing a malevolent brutality that would endlessly sear the hearts and torment the minds of the men in the 505 who fought them at Biazza Ridge.

In June of 1943, the Division was being reorganized under the command of General Paul Conrath – the same man who led them in Tunisia. During HUSKY, its reorganization was still in progress so it was under strength and included some unproven personnel. Despite this the division was an inarguably powerful force, being composed approximately of:

• Over 100 tanks including a company of 17 Mark VI Tiger I heavy tanks from the 215th Tank Battalion,
• Mobile units of anti tank, anti aircraft, and artillery,
• Reconnaissance units,
• 2 infantry battalions, and the
• 3^rd and 4^th Fallschirmjager regiments from the 1st Parachute Division.

Sources: “On to Berlin” Gavin, J pp 36 – 38, 1978 and “Comando Supremo: Italy at War” (sic), Heddlesten, J. Retrieved May 2, 2011, from http://www.comandosupremo.com/Sicily.html

As reported in an earlier blog post, Preparing for Operation HUSKY – Invasion of Sicily the 505 leaders, except for General Omar Bradley  had no idea that the Hermann Goring Division was in the area.

 

General Paul Conrath Commander of the Herman Goring Division

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 80. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-4.html

Operation Husky: Allied Forces

An early plan called for the invasion of Sicily at two points simultaneously, one in the northwest corner around Marsala and Trapani and the other in the southeast corner of the island around Gela and Syracuse (see Map 1 above). In these locations there was a natural combination of good landing beaches, ports, and airfields. The Axis opposition to the invasion was expected to be strong because German troops had proved worthy opponents in Tunisia, and this would be the first time the Italians would be defending their own country. This led to General Eisenhower adopting a conservative plan which called for an invasion of Sicily at the Island’s southeastern corner.

The invasion would consist of seaborne landing troops supported by airborne infantry. The British 8^th Army under Montgomery was to land on beaches starting at the Pachino Peninsula and ending to the south near Syracuse. The British objectives included capturing the cities of Augusta, Catania, an airfield at Gerbini, and then Messina.

The US 7^th Army of which the 82^nd Airborne Division was a part was made up of 200,000 men under General Patton. It would land on beaches in the Gulf of Gela. The US 1^st Division would land on the beaches directly around Gela. Its job was to capture the adjacent airfields, then move into Niscemi. The 45^th Infantry Division would land to the right of the 1^st Division on the beaches west of Scoglitti. It was to capture Comiso and Ragusa where it would meet up with the British 8^th Army. The 82^nd Airborne Division's 505^th PIR and 504^th PIR 3^rd battalion objective was to take and hold the high ground north of the beaches in front of the 1^st Division. They were also to take and block the road leading south from Niscemi and the intersection at Piano Lupo called the “Y”. The 3^rd Division would land on the beaches around Licata. It was charged with the security of the left flank of the 1^st Division. The seaborne Allied invasion forces were to land simultaneously at 02:45am, July 10^th 1943. Source: “Sicily 1943”, Birtle A. J. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm

 

Gela Beach Looking East toward Scoglitti

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 90. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-4.html

 

The Sicilian Coastline looking West from Scoglitti

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 140. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

Upon reaching the early objectives of the invasion, the US forces were given somewhat ambiguous orders to support the British push toward Messina. The British general Alexander was the chief planner for the invasion, and he had chosen to leave the details of how to take the rest of the island until after early invasion objectives were reached. When it came time to make these decisions, the US forces were ordered to halt at Highway 124. It was deemed that this road was needed so that the British 8^th Army could drive up through the middle of the island. This would make the US 7^th Army defunct, a fact that upset the US brass, and in particular General Patton, who had assumed that once successful the US forces would continue to advance along side the British all the way to Messina. Unfortunately for Montgomery, Patton decided to take advantage of the situation by using some of his forces to attack the Germans in the north and west of the British, taking Trapani, Palermo and pushing on to liberate Messina, ultimately reaching the city before Montgomery.

The Axis Response

General Paul Conrath, with his Hermann Goring Panzer Division was in the best possible position to push Patton’s 7^th Army invasion force back into the sea on the night of July 9^th – 10^th. Recognizing the importance of the beaches around Gela and Scoglitti to an Allied invasion he had already deployed his division about 25 miles inland from the invasion beaches (See Map 1 above and Map 2 below). His forces were far enough back to be out of reach from naval guns, but close enough to strike quickly in the event of an amphibious invasion. There was also a road network which gave him two separate approaches to the invasion beaches. One was to the west leading from Niscemi to the beaches where the 1^st division was to land. The other was in the east and led from Biscari (Now named Acate) to the beaches where the 45^th division would land. Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978, pp. 35-36

Conrath took advantage of the road network and its close proximity to the beaches by dividing his forces into two battle groups, each one was called a “Kampfgruppe”. In the event of an Allied amphibious invasion, the Western Kampfgruppe would attack the beaches around Gela via the Niscemi road, while the Eastern Kampfgruppe would attack the beaches around Scoglitti via Biscari (now named Acate). On its way down to the beaches, the eastern group would pass through Biazza Ridge. Source: Ibid, page 35-36

Map 2:View The German Counter Offensive July 10 - 11th in a larger map

(Click on the lines and other icons for information about troop concentrations, positions, and movements.)

 News of the imminent  invasion had already reached General Guzzoni in his Axis 6^th Army Headquarters before any Allied troops landed. As soon as word reached General Conrath he wasted no time and at 10:00pm on July 9 while Bill’s C-47 was still over the Mediterranean, he alerted his command of the possible Allied invasion around Gela and Scoglitti. However, he quickly ran into problems. By the time subsequent communications were made, Bill had jumped and his fellow paratroopers from the 505 and 3^rd battalion of the 504^th PIR had cut the communication lines during the night of July 9 and early morning of the 10. Conrath was unable to communicate with any Axis forces including his own, resulting in failure of his units to receive orders. In addition, the 3^rd battalion of 504 had landed near its assigned DZ and was attacking columns of Conrath’s Western Kampfgruppe causing confusion and panic. Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978, pp. 35-36

The Axis counter offensive had suffered badly. In part because of the communications failure they missed their opportunity to reach the beaches and stop the landings at Gela. By 2:45am on July 10 the landings by the 1^st Infantry Division around Gela and those of the 45^th Division were well underway. The landings were a success due in large part to the heroic efforts of the troopers from 1st Battalion, 505. They were able to stop the advance of the counter attacks of the Western Kampfgruppe consisting of Mark IV Tiger tanks and other armor moving along the road from Niscemi towards the beaches around Gela. They also captured the “Y” - a vital road intersection allowing access to the beaches between Niscemi and Gela. Source: Ibid, page 38-41

The “Y” Road Junction Leading to the Invasion Beaches from Niscemi and Vittoria

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 137. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

 

Ponto Drillo, the Causeway over the Acate River – 5 miles from the “Y”. Seized by the 505 on July 10

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 118. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

Finally, Field Marshall Kesselring was able to get through to the 6^th Army, who relayed the orders for the Hermann Goring Division to continue their attack early on the morning of July 11.  As a result the final attack from the Western Kampfgruppe consisting of German tanks and armor was launched that morning from the Ponte Olivo airfield  - west and out of range of the formidable paratrooper positions - across open flat country toward the invasion beaches. It was stopped on the outskirts of Gela by the veteran 1st Infantry Division. Source: Ibid, page 38-41

Wrecked German Tanks on the Gela Plain after Their Defeat by the 1st Infantry Division

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 171. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

 

Typical Axis Defensive Positions on the Coast Road East of Licata

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 134. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

By the afternoon of July 10, the Eastern Kampfgruppe of the Herman Goring Division moved south toward the left and right flanks of the US 45^th division beachhead. The force consisted of the 1^st panzer Grenadier Regiment (consisting of 2 battalions), one armored artillery battalion, and one heavy panzer company, consisting of 17 Mark VI Tiger I heavy tanks each weighing sixty tons and mounting an 88mm main gun. Source: Ibid, page 35-36

This force amounted to 700 infantry, a battalion of self-propelled artillery, and a company of Tiger tanks. Source: “Sicily 1943”, Birtle A. J., U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm

By the early morning of July 11, the eastern Kampfgruppe was at Biazza Ridge as can be seen in Map 2 above. This is the force that Gavin was going to attack.

 The Battle of Biazza Ridge

Biazza Ridge is a place of honor, a place of respect. In Fort Bragg, there’s a housing development that bears it’s name. This is the place where the famous battle between the Hermann Goring Panzer Division and elements of the 505 took place.

After making a long trek from his actual drop zone, Col. Gavin arrived in Vittoria early on the morning of July 11, where he heard reports that there were paratroopers a few miles to the west. He headed in that direction to find the 3^rd Battalion getting organized. Col. Krause, the 3^rd Battalion commander, told Gavin that there were Germans between their position and Gela, where the 45^th Division was engaging them. Gavin took a platoon of 307^th combat engineers and headed west on the highway leading from Vittoria to Gela. Soon he heard gun fire and continued down the road. At this time it was about 8:30am. He reached a point where a railway crossed the road and saw Biazza Ridge in front of him about half a mile away and 100 feet high with a gradual slope to the east. The firing he had heard earlier was coming from the ridge and its intensity was increasing. The firing was from Germans of the Hermann Goring Division and the 180^th US Infantry. They had engaged each other on the west side of the ridge south of the highway. The Germans were occupying the ridge. Gavin deployed his platoon of engineers ordering them to take the ridge. He then sent for 3^rd battalion and they came. Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978 page 28

505 Troopers Advancing on Biazza Ridge, Morning July 11

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 166. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

“As Company G, 505^th, leading the 3^rd Battalion, swept across the ground in front of the ridge, pinned down engineers and headquarters troopers jumped to their feet and joined in the assault up the Eastern slope.” Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005, page 74

The ridge was soon captured because the German’s pulled back in front of the Company G attack that contained troopers from Regimental Headquarters Company. Source: Ibid page 74. Several riggers were also present in the initial attack and Bill could well have been one of them:

“The American Parachutists, a hodgepodge collection of engineers, cooks, orderlies, riggers, clerks, and riflemen, had no field guns, antitank guns or tanks and would be vastly outnumbered in the looming confrontation.”  Source: Breurer, W., “Drop Zone Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike, July 1943”, 1983, page 138

 

505 Troopers on top of Biazza Ridge, July 11

Image Source: The U.S. Army Military History Institute. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.carlisle.army.mil/AHEC/mediagallery/photoGallery.cfm?id=50

Credit: WWII Army Signal Corps

The troopers pushed the Germans over the top and down the western slope of the ridge. Fire intensified with mortars, artillery and machine guns. The Germans swiftly counterattacked, and the troopers were forced back over the ridge’s crest. At that point Company H took over the attack from Company G. They were ordered to fix bayonets and then charged over the ridge engaging the Germans in bloody hand to hand combat, killing many of them and forcing a German retreat. Sometime at this point the men on the ridge first heard the German tanks. The troopers on the ridge chased the Germans down the western side. The Germans counterattacked again, using tanks in addition to the infantry. The tanks were Mark VI Tiger tanks each equipped with an 88mm cannon. There were 17 of them. The tanks began firing at individual troopers with their 88mm cannons. Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005, page 74 - 75

“Sergeant Bill Bishop, with Company G, hadn’t had enough time to dig a slit trench, when one of the Mark VI tanks came up the gentle slope toward him, suddenly stopping close by. ‘Me and a fellow named Duke Boswell were laying within two or three feet from the tank treads in a small ditch. They would shoot at a single man with the 88’s they had on those tanks. They killed a bunch of people with that 88. They ran over one man’s legs. Of course he died from shock. His name was [Sergeant] Gerald Ludlam.’” Source: Ibid Page 76

Col. Gavin later commented on the power of a Tiger tank:

“A Tiger tank is an awesome thing to encounter in combat. Weighing more than 60 tons, armed with an 88 mm. gun and machine guns, it was far more formidable than anything we had ever seen, and we had nothing in our own armored forces to compare with it.” Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978 page  31

Mark VI “Tiger I” Heavy Battle Tank in Sicily, 1943

Source: Wikipedia Commons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J14953,_Sizilien,_Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg

A review of the Tiger VI technical specifications reveals its terrible power. The PzKpfw, Mark VI Tiger I Heavy Battle Tank, coded by the German Army as the “SdKfz 181”, commonly known as a “Tiger I” had a crew of 5 and was in service from 1942 - 1945. Boasting a 88mm gun mounted on its swiveling turret, the Tigers must have seemed like mobile artillery to the men of the Allied units who encountered them. They had two MG 34 792mm machine guns, one in the turret and the other on the front of the hull. The tank’s defensive armor was 1.02” thick (26mm) at its minimum and 4.33” (100mm) at its maximum. At 27 feet long (8.25m), 12’3” (3.73 m) wide, and 9’4” (2.85m) tall, the Tiger Mark VI was one of the most massive tanks of the entire war.

It weighed an enormous 121,253 lb (55,000 Kg) yielding a ground pressure of 14.8 lb/in² (1.04 Kg/cm²). But for all of its weight, the Tiger I was fast enough and had a long range. It boasted road speeds of 24 MPH (38 KM/h), cross country speeds of 12 MPH (20KM/h) and a maximum range of 62 miles (100 KM). The tank’s field agility was equally impressive, as it was able to drive over any reinforced vertical obstacle standing 2’7” (80cm high) and move through trenches as deep as 5’11” (1.8m). Its fording depth was 4’ (1.2m). Rounding out its agility, the weapon could tackle gradients as steep as 35 degrees. All these reasons made the  Tiger I one of the most fearsome Blitzkrieg weapons in the German arsenal. After the “King Tiger” manufactured in 1944 for the Russian Front it was the most powerful tank of WWII. It’s easy to see why the German tank crews driving them felt invincible. Source: “Tanks of the World”, Miller D., 2000, pp. 121-122

The 505 troopers were using bazooka teams to try and take out the tanks. A bazooka team consisted of two men. One loaded the shell into the bazooka and the other man took aim and fired. The operation took time to perform. From the time a bazooka team got into their position, loaded, aimed, and fired, they were exposed and vulnerable. The tanks took advantage of this by turning their 88mm cannons on the bazooka teams and blowing them away. The Tigers also had machine guns mounted and would use these with devastating effect on the pinned down troopers. Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005, pp. 76-77

At this point the German tanks and infantry couldn’t break through the 505 line. The tanks would run low of ammunition and needed to periodically fall back to supply teams to replenish. Moreover, the 505 held the high ground on the ridge making it difficult for the German infantry to take the hill even with the tank support.

As the battle progressed, wounded troopers were arriving in increasing numbers all telling of how the Tigers were firing at individuals with their 88s. German prisoners were coming back too:

“They said they were from the Hermann Goring Parachute Panzer Division. I remember one of them asking if we had fought with the Japanese in the Pacific; he said he asked because the paratroopers had fought so hard.” Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978, page 30

The Tiger supported infantry attacks continued until the afternoon of July 11. During the day small groups of troopers were arriving and as they came in they were sent to the front line to reinforce the men on the ridge.  Even with all the new arrivals, it wasn’t going to be enough because the 505 didn’t have any heavy weapons to deal with the Tigers and infantry alone couldn’t destroy them. Gavin was determined to hold the ridge. He resolved that if the tanks overran their position, they would remain on the ridge and engage the German infantry. The tanks would have continued on to the beach in an attempt to push the 45^th Division back into the sea. Source: Ibid page 77-78

In the letter to his sister, Bill writes:

“This all took place on one of those dark days that my battalion was fighting 13 “Mark 6” or “tiger tanks” with 30 caliber rifles an two 75 m.m Howitzers.” Source: William Clark, Letter to his Sister, Doris Clark, June 13^th 1945, page 2-3

Gavin had insisted on parachuting with two pack 75mm howitzers. These were the same weapons that Bill mentioned in his letter. At this point, Col. Gavin got the howitzers and placed them in camouflaged positions just underneath the eastern side of the ridge. When the tanks got to the top of the ridge they would have their softer undersides exposed. This is when the howitzers would open fire aiming at their underside, hopefully taking them out.

By the time the howitzers were in place, one tank had broken through the lines and was chewing up the troopers. One of the howitzer teams took shots at it, and it retreated. Due to the smoke and dust from the howitzer attack, it was unclear what, if any damage was sustained by the retreating Tiger.

A little later at about 4:00pm, the Tigers were advancing and had come to within 50 yards of Gavin’s command post. It looked like they were going to crest the ridge and overrun the 505 entirely. At that moment, Gavin’s men were able communicate with the Navy and they called in an artillery barrage from the 155 mm Naval guns. Following the intense bombardment, the Germans withdrew and regrouped about a mile away. By about 6:00pm word came that reinforcements were coming. They arrived around 7:00pm consisting of Sherman tanks from the 45^th Infantry Division and about 50 more paratroopers from Regimental Headquarters Company led by Lt. Swingler of the Service Company.

With the additional troopers and heavy artillery, Gavin decided to counterattack in order to strengthen their position in the event that the Germans decided to attack again. At around 8:30pm the 505 attacked with everyone that was present including:

“….regimental clerks, cooks, truck drivers, everyone who could carry a rifle or carbine was in the attack.” Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005 page 81

Although the troopers were under fierce fire from the Tigers, machine guns, mortars and small arms the attack was successful, and the Germans retreated thus ending the battle of Biazza Ridge. During the fight, Lt. Swingler came upon a Tiger sitting in the road with its crew outside. He dropped a grenade among them and the explosion killed all of them. It was the first Tiger captured during the battle.

In the aftermath, men were picked to dig graves and the fallen paratroopers were temporarily buried.

“Head bowed in prayer, Capt. Al Ireland peeked at the resolute regimental commander who stood looking down at the graves. There were tears in Colonel Gavin’s eyes.” Source: Breurer, W., “Drop Zone Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike, July 1943”, 1983, page 139

Col. Gavin (Right) at Biazza Ridge Morning of July 11

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 169. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

 

Below is a newspaper article from my collection that gives a good summary of the participation of paratroopers in the Sicily invasion. The way it reads, it’s certainly recounting the actions of the 505. The team commander referred to is Col. Gavin.

 

Newspaper Article summarizing the paratroopers’ participation in the invasion.

Source: Dayton Herald, circa July 12 1943

 

The next post will focus on establishing Bill’s presence and reconstructing his participation in the battle of Biazza Ridge.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.