William A. Clark and “Those Devils in Baggy Pants”

Unlike Sicily, Bill spoke very little at any time during or after the War about his involvement in the invasion of the Italian mainland. He told members of his family that he volunteered for the Salerno jump and he told his friend Herd Bennett some of his experiences during the invasion and subsequent liberation of Naples. Another source of information comes from the letter he wrote to his sister at the end of the War.

Even with these meager fragments, it’s quite surprising what can be deduced about Bill’s involvement in the events leading up to and including the jump into the Salerno Bay area of Italy, as well as the his stay in Naples. The next few posts will reconstruct this as much as possible and in the process reveal a story of astonishing heroism, resourcefulness, and adaptability by the men in the 82nd Airborne Division.

On June 13, 1945 Bill writes his sister:

“After Sicily we went back to Africa and then back to Sicily again. We were loaded in planes there to jump in the outskirts of Rome. Two hours before take off time our General who had went through the lines and worked his way to Rome Sent a message to cancel the jump. Because 5 German Panzer Divisions had moved into our ‘drop zone’.” Source: William Clark, letter dated June 13, 1945

Let’s start by taking a closer examination of the first sentence.

“After Sicily we went back to Africa and then back to Sicily again.” William A. Clark, June 13, 1945

Once the fighting in Sicily was finished, the 82nd Airborne performed occupation duty in Sicily before returning to the bases in Kairouan, Tunisia on August 19 - 20, 1943. The plan from that point was to train there with the  C-47 Troop Carrier Groups (TCGs) for the upcoming invasion of the Italian mainland; the main aim being to avoid a repeat of the misdrops, and friendly fire tragedy in Sicily.

To complicate matters further, while in North Africa the 504th and 505th were also burdened with the task of integrating much needed replacement paratroopers. The 505th had lost 195 men in Sicily (killed in action, missing in action, prisoners of war and wounded not returned to duty). The 504th had lost 281 men - 86 more than the 505th. These numbers do not count the number of wounded returned to duty and missing in action returned to duty: 107 and 234 for the 504th and 505th respectively. Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV”, Alexander, M. p. 39.

Once training was completed, the 505th, 504th and their accompanying TCGs were to move back together to the airbases in Sicily prior to the landings of the Allies on the Italian coast on September 9 at Salerno Bay – dubbed Operation AVALANCHE. However, due to bewildering shifts in strategy and subsequent, frequent changes in plans the TCGs were re-stationed from North Africa to Sicily on August 31 before coordinated jump training in the TCG C-47s and the paratroopers was completed. Five days later on September 5 the same C-47s flew back to Africa to move  the 504th  (minus the 3rd Battalion) and all of the 505th to their new bases in Sicily.

“Gone was the opportunity for any real air-ground training. It was impossible to parachute, rescue parachutes and repack them in time for the impending operation. However, because of its vital necessity, a week of such training was scheduled and some four days of same executed to a fairly satisfactory degree. The Division was only able to place the jumpmaster in each plane and have the ‘sticks’ of parachutists represented by a few replacements who had not had a night jump.” Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Alexander, M. p. 44.

A few days after the arrival of the paratroopers in Sicily, Operation AVALANCHE would proceed on September 9 under General Mark Clark. Clark’s Fifth Army would make a seaborne landing in the Gulf of Salerno, push up the coast and take Naples.  The 82nd Airborne Division would be at General Clark’s  disposal for the operation.

In the first of several versions of the Airborne component of the plan, the 82nd Division would be used to block the passes around Nocera and Sarno so that the seaborne force would be protected from German forces trying to reach the Allied landing beaches in the Gulf of Salerno. However, to do this would require a moon lit night jump at altitudes of 4,500 – 6, 00 feet in the Nocera Pass on the Sorrento Ridge – some very rugged mountainous terrain. The plan was fraught with danger  from anti-aircraft gun positions and the possibility of German fighter attacks on the C-47s carrying the paratroopers. Source: “On to Berlin”, Gavin, J., 1978, p. 55-56

Map of the First Version of Operation AVALANCHE

View Operation AVALANCHE (1st Version) in a larger map

Note click on the blue place markers and line in the map for information

This first planned version of the Airborne component of AVALANCHE was scrapped on August 12 in favor of a new plan called Operation GIANT I put forth on August 18. It called for the 82nd Airborne Division to be dropped, 40 miles away from the 5th Army landing beaches in the Gulf of Salerno, in the vicinity of the Volturno River. Their mission would be to destroy the  river crossings on the Volturno from the town of Tiflisco all the way to the ocean, then occupy the area preventing the Germans from moving across the river. The plan included a seaborne landing of troops on beaches at the mouth of the Volturno. However, the US  Navy ruled that out stating that the beaches in that area were unsuitable for landing. Source: Ibid.

GIANT I was still on despite this set back. An elaborate plan to resupply the 82nd from the air was drawn up. The resupply plan was tenuous at best. Night supply drops with random flight schedules would be a necessity to avoid enemy fighters. Making air transport even more vulnerable, the area was beyond the range of Allied fighter cover. Moreover, aerial resupply would need to work for the planned five days it would take for the British 46th Division to fight their way from the beaches in Salerno to reach and reinforce the paratroopers at the Volturno. If those forces were late in coming, or the air resupply plan didn’t work accordingly (which was becoming more likely), things could take a dire turn for the 82nd. In Africa and in Sicily the Germans had  proved they were a fierce and determined enemy. A scenario where the 82nd Airborne was trapped on the Volturno would mean its destruction. Source: “On to Berlin”, Gavin, J., 1978, p. 56-57

To complicate matters further, intelligence confirmed that thousands of Allied POWs were being held in the Volturno River area around the towns of Capua and Caserta. Once liberated these prisoners would need food, clothing, shelter and medical attention. This compounded the resupply effort needed and would take away time, effort and resources needed for the 82nd to achieve their primary mission of blocking a German counter-attack launched from across the Volturno. Source: Ibid.

Map of Operation GIANT I

View Operation GIANT I in a larger map

Note click on the blue place markers in the map for information

Remarkably, yet naturally, none of these glaring faults in the GIANT I plan seemed to matter to the individual 82nd Airborne troopers. According to the then Colonel Gavin of the 505th PIR:

“It was also of the highest interest to the troopers of the 82nd that the rear echelons of the German 1st Parachute Division and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division were bivouacked near our proposed area of operations. Word was going around that if the Hermann Goering outfit had anything left after Sicily, it was about to lose it now. And every man was curious about the 1st Parachute Division and more than willing to meet it.” Source: “On to Berlin”, Gavin, J., 1978, p. 57

On August 31, during a meeting on Operation AVALANCHE, General Eisenhower decided to all but cancel the Volturno River operation. It was cut down to a two battalion operation of securing the bridges and capture of Capua. General Ridgeway assigned the mission to the 504th. Source: “On to Berlin”, Gavin, J., 1978, p. 58

The demise of GIANT I was finally met when the menace of enemy fighter squadrons was fully realized. According to Colonel Gavin:

“Still in the minds of all the pilots was the recent interception of a German air transport column on the way to North Africa with badly needed supplies for the beleaguered troops of General Jurgen von Arnim. Seventy-five transports were shot down in not many more seconds. Air Chief Marshal Tedder and General Clark decided in the end that the possible gain from our Volturno  mission would not be worth the probable losses. The mission was called off, and thus ended GIANT I.” Source: “On to Berlin”, Gavin, J., 1978, p. 57

Operation GIANT II – Airborne Capture of Rome

On September 2, General Matthew Ridgway, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, was notified of yet a new mission for the 82nd Airborne; one that would work in tandem with Operation AVALANCHE. This one was named Operation GIANT II -  the capture of Rome set for execution over successive nights of September 8 and 9.  It was an audacious plan calling for the landing of the largest airborne force possible on four airfields to the east and northeast of Rome until the Italian capitol was securely in Allied hands. As in GIANT I, seaborne troops – this time from the 82nd Airborne, would land at the mouth of the Tiber River and fight their way to reinforce their Airborne brethren. The flying distance to Rome meant that the C47’s would need to take off from airfields in Sicily. While the transports could make the trip, they would be out of fighter escort range at that time period of the war. The paratroopers would face the same danger that led to the final cancellation of GIANT I – enemy fighters.

“Right from the start, Ridgway had the greatest misgivings about the ‘Rome job’ [as General Eisenhower had come to refer to GIANT II] . He thought it was a ‘hare-brained scheme.’” Source: Clay Blair “Ridgway’s Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II” 1956, p. 132.

 

General Matthew Ridgway, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division

Source: Wikipedia Commons

Besides the danger of enemy fighters, General Ridgway and all of his senior staff saw that GIANT II suffered from serious problems. First, the proposed airfields were small and rough making them less than suitable for landing transport and supply aircraft at the rate needed to achieve success.

Second,  the cooperation of the Italian military forces was paramount to success. While such cooperation had already been secured during meetings between Italian and Allied representatives in August, 1943, nagging doubts persisted. During GIANT II the Italian military were to assist significantly with the operation. The transports were to land at night. The Italians would light the airfields, assist with the disbursement of men and materiale to safe locations, take out German antiaircraft positions, make safe the beach landing zones and the passage up Tiber River and so on.

However, by this time the German’s didn’t trust the Italian military, and were in the process of confiscating most of their their gasoline and ammunition. This is something the Allied soldiers eventually saw with their own eyes when they fought in Salerno during Operation AVALANCHE.

After the August talks the Allies came away thinking it was possible the Italian military would be unable to assist the Allies in liberation of Italy. Despite the potential problems planning went ahead hastily. In an all night strategy session on September 5, the details of GIANT II were hammered out 48 hours before the operation would begin. Normally this was a process that took three or four weeks.

The plan was approved by General Alexander, commander of the 15th Army group tasked with the invasion of Italy. However, none of the 82nd Airborne Division senior staff were comfortable with the operation:

“Neither Taylor nor his superior officers were wholly satisfied, however, that the help they were to get from the Italians was of a responsible sort, to be fully depended on. They were planning to risk an entire division of specially selected men , the best and most carefully trained soldiers in the American Army. Without absolute certainty of support when they had made their drops, the plan would fail. And the slightest false move by the Italians in making their preparations for assistance would, naturally, have betrayed the scheme to the Germans, and the division would fall into a trap where they would  probably be annihilated.” Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV”, Alexander, M. p. 61.

Something had to be done to cancel GIANT II, and fast, or the 82nd Airborne was headed for a suicide mission. Following the all night session it was decided that Brigadier General Maxwell Taylor, second in command of the 82nd Airborne Division and Colonel William Tudor Gardiner of the US Army Air Force would go to Rome and assess the situation and send back their recommendations for a go or no go on the operation via coded radio message.

All of what happened next is encompassed by the third sentence in Bill’s letter.

“…our General who had went through the lines and worked his way to Rome Sent a message to cancel the jump.”

On the morning of September 7th the two officers set out for Rome having only some 48 hours to journey there, assess the situation, and radio back their message in sufficient time for the Army’s administrative machinery to arrive at and implement a decision. 

It was with the a large measure of good fortune, and the tenacious investigation at great personal risk to Taylor and Gardiner, that disaster was averted by the narrowest of margins. Scroll down to see the map below entitled “Map of Taylor’s and Gardiner’s Journey to Rome”.

A gripping account (and one well worth reading) of Taylor’s and Gardner’s journey to Rome and the result can be found in the 82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV pages 60 – 71 (downloadable for free from The Combined Arms Research Library: Digital Library)

(Direct link: http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/103/rec/1)

General Maxwell Taylor, Second in Command, 82nd Airborne Division

Source: Wikipedia Commons

Taylor and Gardiner boarded a British PT boat in Sicily at 4:00AM on September 7th, and arrived off the coast of a small island named Utisca, 40 miles off the north western tip of Sicily. There they boarded an Italian corvette which bore them across to the Italian mainland port of Gaeta some 75 miles away from Rome. They were disguised as captured airmen shot down and taken prisoner. They were dressed in their uniforms so that if caught would have a better chance of not being shot as spies. They also decided to carry side arms for personal protection. Once on land they were transferred to car and then when out of sight were transferred to a small delivery truck or ambulance (depending on which source you read) which carried them to Rome via the Appian Way.

In the city’s outskirts they saw evidence of many German troop deployments. They arrived at General  Carboni’s residence – the head of Italian forces in Rome – after dark and were rushed inside and hidden in comfortable quarters. They were offered good food and wine for dinner and told that they would be received in the morning for discussions. Shocked, Taylor immediately demanded to see General Carboni. At that time there was only 30 hours remaining before the parachute drops would begin.

 

General Carboni, Commander of Italian Armed forces in Rome 

Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy”, Garland, A. etal., 1993 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-2.html

Soon after Taylor’s request, Carboni arrived. At the outset the Italian General expressed his doubt of GIANT II’s viability:

“General Carboni took a most pessimistic view of the whole situation. Numbers of fresh German troops had been moved into the Rome area since the Armistice negotiations had got under way, and the problem looked far more difficult if not impossible. He thought that any announcement of the Armistice  [which was due to occur just before GIANT II began] just then would be highly undesirable and would result in the immediate occupation of Rome by the Germans. The airborne operation, he said finally, would be disastrous.” Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV”, Alexander, M. p. 64.

When asked why he didn’t think the operation would succeed, Carboni’s reasons for his pessimism were:

“His Rome troops, which were to have been counted on for help, were in an almost defenseless condition. The Germans had been keeping a close grip on supplies of ammunition and fuel in the area and doling it out to the Italian Army in the smallest possible rations. His soldiers had only enough ammunition for a few hours of combat. They had almost no petrol to ensure their mobility. They could not put their hands on the supplies needed to provide hidden stockpiles for the American parachute division. The Germans were alert, suspicious. They would come in and slaughter both his Italian soldiers and the Americans dropping from the skies.” Source: Ibid.

Alarmed by Carboni’s assessment, Taylor knew now that the operation was doomed to failure. He realized that to stop it in time would require not only his assessment of the situation, but also a statement to the same effect from the head of the Italian military establishment – Marshal Badoglio.

 

Marshal Badoglio, Commander of all Italian Forces and Interim Head of Government, following the death of Benito Mussolini 

Source: Wikipedia Commons

Again it took a determined effort on the American’s part to convince the Italians to let them speak with Badoglio at once. They eventually were able to meet with him. Badoglio’s English was bad. Taylor’s and Gardiner’s Italian was not good enough for conversation. The only language they all were fluent in was French. The discussions began in earnest. Taylor took the lead while Gardiner took notes. The Marshal’s main concern was retaliation by the Germans on Rome once the armistice was announced. If he were to write the letter Taylor wanted, the armistice announcement would need to be postponed. After a time they were able to help Badoglio write a letter advising cancellation of the drop, but with a stated desire on the part of Badoglio to delay announcement of the armistice. Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV”, Alexander, M. p. 67 – 68.

The coded message was sent via radio after Taylor signed it at 1:21AM , but due to atmospheric interference it didn’t arrive at Allied headquarters until 6:00AM September 8, the GIANT II D-day. It was not received by Eisenhower's headquarters until hours later where his staff immediately began working on it.

As a precaution, because no confirmation of the original message had been received , Taylor sent a follow-up message at 11:35AM which read “Situation innocuous”. It was a predetermined message which was agreed upon prior to his and Gardiner's mission.

If any message with the word innocuous was received, GIANT II was to be halted. Like the original message receipt of this one was also delayed. As it was, Taylor’s original message was acted upon at about 11:00AM, but the airborne troop command didn’t receive it until 4:30PM. At that time the Pathfinders of the 504th had already taken off along with the 504th 1st Battalion. Plane loads of other 504 paratroopers were already onboard their C47’s awaiting take off. The pathfinder's and the 1st battalion planes were ordered to return to base. The Paratroopers were naturally disappointed:

“…the order to stop the operation came as a blow to them, and they grumbled some as they stowed their kit back in their tents. ‘Why couldn't So-and-So Generals make up their minds?’ they wondered , as they tramped disconsolately away from the assembly area. They could not know that they had just been saved from dropping into what at the moment looked like the jaws of certain death.” Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV”, Alexander, M. p. 67 – 68.

But it wasn’t over yet for Taylor and Gardiner. In making their escape from Rome, they had to make a risky trip to a nearby German occupied airfield in an ambulance, where they were secreted onto an Italian military plane and flown out of Rome at 5:00PM. The flight to their destination in Tunis took about 2 hours. They arrived a little after 7:00PM. Announcement of the Armistice between the Italians and the Allies was made by General Eisenhower at 6:30PM, while they were still in flight. They had just made it out by the skin of their teeth. Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV”, Alexander, M. p. 70.

Map of Taylor’s and Gardiner’s Journey to Rome 

View Journey to Rome in a larger map

Note click on the blue place markers and lines in the map for information

Later that day, some of the top 82nd Airborne brass had a different reaction to that of the paratroops as revealed by this memoir of the events by Ralph (Doc) Eaton, 82nd Airborne Chief of Staff :

“Doc Eaton recalled: ‘That night after it was all over, I went back to my tent and sat on my cot. I was trembling, thinking that if Ridgway hadn't  fought that thing tooth and nail we’d have gone in and it would have been a disaster. Who should come into my tent but Matt [General Ridgway]. He was not a drinker – not a drunkard – but of all things he had a bottle of whiskey. We each took a drink – and then he began to cry. And so did I. It was so close and we felt so deeply about it and we were both exhausted. I sat there thinking that I owed him my life.” Source: as quoted in Clay Blair “Ridgway’s Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II” 1956, p. 141 based on an interview by the author with Ralph P. Eaton 82nd Airborne Chief of Staff from 8/15/1942 – 6/6/1944.

British Prime Minster, Winston Churchill had this to say in a speech he later gave to the House of Commons:

“We offered and prepared to land an American airborne division in Rome at the same time as the Armistice was declared,” the Prime Minister told the house, “in order to fight off the two armoured divisions which were massed outside it to help the Italians, but owing to the German investment of the Rome airfields which took place in the last day or two before the announcement of the Armistice, of which investment the Italian Government warned us, it was not possible to carry out this part of the plan, which was, I think a pretty daring plan – cheers – to cast this powerful force there in Rome in conditions which no one could measure, which might have led to its complete destruction, but were quite ready to do it. But at the last moment the warning came, ‘The airfields are not in our control.’” (Winston Churchill House of Commons Speech, September 21, 1943.) Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy, Section IV”, Alexander, M. p. 60.

The second sentence of Bill’s letter states:

“We were loaded in planes there to jump in the outskirts of Rome. Two hours before take off time…” William A. Clark, June 13, 1945

As a rigger Bill was rotated on jumps. He had already jumped in Sicily so he possibly was not rostered to jump in Italy. In any case, he stated that he volunteered for the Italian jump. After losing his friend in Sicily Bill, full of vengeance,  wanted to fight the Germans very badly.

When Bill volunteered for the Italian jump, I think he was assigned to jump with the 504th PIR. I think he was jumping with the 504 because in his letter supports that conclusion:

“We were loaded in planes there to jump in the outskirts of Rome. Two hours before take off time our General who had went through the lines and worked his way to Rome Sent a message to cancel the jump. Because 5 German Panzer Divisions had moved into our “drop zone”.

The 505th PIR was not loaded on planes when the GIANT II jump was cancelled. They were scheduled to jump on the second night of September 9. The 504, however, was scheduled to jump the first night on September 8.

According to General Gavin in his 1947 book Airborne Warfare:

“The leading assault regiment, the 504th Parachute Infantry was to land on the Fubara and Cerveteri airfields near the seacoast. From there they were to push inland towards Rome. The regiment jumped on the second night, the 505th Parachute Infantry, would land on Guidonia, Littorio, and Centocelle airfields, all of which are considerably nearer the center of the city of Rome.” Source Gavin, J., “Airborne Warfare” 1947, p. 27

Writing about GIANT II Gerard Devlin, author of Paratrooper! states:

“The final plan, codenamed Giant Two, can be best described as being very ambitious. It called for the entire 82nd Airborne Division to be delivered into Rome on two successive nights. The signal to start Giant Two would be given at 6:30 on the evening of September 8. At that time, General Eisenhower would start reading the armistice announcement, live, over Radio Algiers. Upon hearing the sound of Ike’s voice broadcasting in from Africa, Colonel Tucker’s 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment would start taking off in order to jump on Cerveteri and Fubara airfields after dark. Both of these airfields are located on the northern outskirts of Rome, were well beyond the city’s antiaircraft defensive belt. Colonel Gavin’s 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment was to jump the following night on Littoria, Glidonia, and Centocelle airfields, all inside this antiaircraft belt and closer to the center of Rome.” Source: Paratrooper!” Devlin, G., 1979 p. 292

Map of Operation GIANT II – Airborne Capture of Rome

View Operation GIANT II in a larger map

   Note click on the blue place markers and lines in the map for information

Later Devlin writes:

“…hundreds of paratroopers began boarding their planes for take off. At precisely 6:30pm, the signal to launch Giant Two was given when Ike began reading the armistice announcement over Radio Algiers…From scattered airfields on Sicily, fully loaded C-47s had been taking off for Rome while Ike was reading the armistice announcement…Sixty-two planes already in the air on their way to Rome had to be called back to land.” Source: Ibid., p. 297

From these accounts, and Bill’s one testimony he must have been assigned to the 504 and not the 505. But which 504 battalion was Bill assigned to?

Bill was not among 1st Battalion 504 since it was already in the air by the time GIANT II was cancelled:

“Our 1st Battalion aircraft were in the air and forming up to fly to Italy when jeeps came screaming onto the tarmac among the 2nd Battalion taxiing aircraft…The Rome operation was canceled. A sigh of relief was felt but the bravado talk began: ‘I was ready for that jump!’ ‘Too bad, I’d’ve really been hell on wheels!’ ‘let’s go anyway! I’m ready, I’m ready!’ And so forth. But while chuting up and taxiing there wasn’t a word. Just each man tending to his equipment keeping his thoughts to himself. The noise was unbearable. The aircraft already airborne returned to the airfield and everyone went back to their bivouacs. The next morning we learned the Germans didn’t trust Badoglio so several panzer units had [been] ordered in and were manning our proposed drop zone.” Source: “Beyond Valor” O'Donnell, P. 2001, p. 66 Excerpt of account by Joe Watts Company F, 504th PIR on the cancelled GIANT II jump on Rome.

Bill couldn’t have been assigned to jump with the 3rd battalion since:

“Due to the limited transport, only one regiment could be lifted per night, so as scheduled, the 504 (minus its 3rd battalion) would be dropped on the night of September 8th and the 505 on the night of September 9th…” Source: “Ready: A World War II History of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment” Langdon A., 1986, p. 30

All of the 3rd Battalion 504, except company H was at the time in Bizerte, Tunisia. The single company H was part of a larger mix of units to land via LCIs and LCT sat the mouth of the Tiber River in support of the GIANT II jump. This attack force  had already left Bizerte and while en-route to the Tiber was first diverted to the Gulf of Salerno and then to Maiori, to support Colonel Darby’s Rangers who were tasked with opening and securing the passes leading to Naples. Source: “The Sword of St. Michael: The 82nd Airborne Division in World War II”, LoFaro, G., 2011, pp. 137 – 138.

It was only later on September 13, the rest of the 3rd Battalion 504 having been transported from Bizerte to Licata, Sicily was loaded onto LCIs bound for the mouth of the Volurno River. Source: “More Than Courage: THe Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordike P.,Langdon A., 2008, p. 77

That leaves only one possibility and that is that Bill was jumping with the 2nd Battalion f504 or GIANT II. With Operation AVALANCHE set to begin in the early hours of September 9 the whole of the 82nd Airborne Division was in a state of readiness, so it is unlikely that changes would be made to assignments of individual paratroopers at this late stage. It follows that Bill jumped into Salerno as part of the 2nd Battalion, 504.

How Bill came to jump with the 504 instead of the 505 is a mystery to me. His superiors may have been looking for volunteers from those who were jump qualified and had jumped a night mission. The replacements for the 504 and 505 had not made a night jump before. It’s possible that experienced volunteers were sought as a way to reassure the new paratroopers and build their confidence for the upcoming GIANT II night jump. With some 1,000 replacements assigned across the 504th and 505th after Sicily, and no time to train them in jumping at night it is possible there was a need for experienced volunteers. Perhaps there was a need for his experience in the 504 since they had lost some 86 more men than the 505. It is known that:

“Officers were shifted around to fill vacancies created by causalities.” Source: “Four Stars of Valor”. Nordyke, P., 2006, p. 99

If officers were shifted around, then why not other personnel such as riggers who were rotated on combat jumps.

Over the next few posts we’ll explore what happened to Bill and the men of the 504 - “Those Devils in Baggy Pants” in a place which has often been called “Bloody Salerno”.

Below is a news reel covering some of the events leading up to Italy’s Surrender on September 8, 1943.

 

Source: National Archives and Records Administration - ARC 38975, LI 208-UN-68 - ITALY SURRENDERS - DVD Copied by Thomas Gideon. Series: Motion Picture Films from "United News" Newsreels, compiled 1942 - 1945. Public  Domain.

 

 

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2012 All Rights Reserved.

Bill’s Purple Heart

Attack on the Aid Station

As we know, Bill injured his knees in the Sicily jump. In his letter to Doris, dated June 13, 1945 he writes:

“First the men with 85 points go home the 25^th of this month, I have 84 but still might make it a little later on. What’s left of the division after these men go will move to Berlin to do occupational duty and reform a new or almost new 82^nd. Most all the old men have enough points to get out. There are only two of us in this company who came overseas with this outfit and don’t have enough points to be discharged. I really have 89 points but my service record is messed up. Received a “Purple Heart” in Sicily, which was recorded on a medical record. The First Aid Station received a direct hit from an 88m.m. shell shortly after I left it so the records were destroyed. I think I can still get it though, but it will take a long time. I thought it was on my service records, but recently found out it wasn’t.”  Source: “Letter to his sister Doris Clark”, William Clark June 13, 1945 page 1

In an annotation to the letter Doris relates some more information about the aid station as told to her by Bill. She writes:

“He explained that he hurt his knee in the jump and later went to the Aid Station. They attended his knee and he was supposed to stay until he was released, but he had a strong feeling that he should get out of there and started to leave. A couple of orderlies tried to hold him, but he broke away and got up to the top of a nearby hill as quickly as he could and sat down to rest. As he watched there was a direct hit on the Aid Station and all of the occupants were killed.” Source: Doris (Clark) Orr, date unknown

On November 4, 2005, I interviewed Bill’s brother Henry Clark about the incident and he confirmed that Bill had told him the same thing as was documented in Doris’ annotation to the letter. In my last interview with Bill himself on  March 22, 2006, I asked him if he knew where the aid station was. He tried to tell me. Unfortunately, despite all his efforts he was unable to form any words that would help in positioning the site in time or location.

Operation and Organization of Aid Stations at the time of the Sicily Invasion

To obtain a better contextual understanding of the aid station incident, it is useful to review the operational and organizational practices of the Army Medical Department at the time of Operation HUSKY and then compare them to Bill’s own recollections of the incident. These practices can be found in the:

Medical Field Manual: Mobile Units of the Medical Department (FM 8-5). published by the War Dept. on January 12, 1942.

Medical Field Manual: Medical Service of Field Units (FM 8-10) published by the War Dept. on March 28, 1942; and

Location of an Aid Station

The FM 8-10 manual describes the policy for locating a suitable position of an aid station:

“b. Location.- Because of the greater importance of other requirements the physical features of the site of an aid station will vary from a comfortable building to a few square yards of ground without shelter from the elements.
(1) Desirable features.- It will rarely be possible to find site that satisfies all requirements but the following features are desirable in an aid station site:
(a) Protection from direct enemy fire.
(b) Convenience to, troops served.
(c) Economy in litter carry,
(d) Accessibility to supporting medical troops.
(e) Proximity to natural lines of drift of wounded.
(f) Facility of future movement of the station to front or rear.
(g) Proximity to water.
(h) Protection from the elements.

(2) Undesirable features.- The following features are highly undesirable, and are to be avoided whenever possible.
(a) Exposure to direct enemy fire.
(b) Proximity to terrain features or military establishments that invite enemy fire or air action, such as prom marks, bridges, fords, important road intersections, positions of artillery and heavy weapons, ammunition and other Contributing points.
(c) Proximity to an exposed flank.” Source: “MEDICAL FIELD MANUAL - FM8-10 Medical Service of Field Units March 28, 1942” pp. 42 – 45 Retrieved on May 11, 2011 from http://www.90thidpg.us/Reference/Manuals/FM%208-10.pdf

(3) Type location.-The location of an aid station within wide limits, depending upon the situation. No definite rules can, or should, be laid down, but the following may be offered as a general statement of the type location aid station of an infantry battalion in the front centrally located site, from 3 to 800 yards in rear of the front line combining as few undesirable features with as many desirable features (listed above) as can be had in the terrain available.” Source: Ibid.

Figure 1: Illustration of an Aid Station Location

Source: “MEDICAL FIELD MANUAL - FM8-10 Medical Service of Field Units March 28, 1942” p. 44Retrieved on December 9, 2011 from http://www.90thidpg.us/Reference/Manuals/FM%208-10.pdf

Procedures and Organization of an Aid Station

The FM 8-10 manual goes on to explain the procedures and organization of an aid station:

“d. General procedures of operation.-

(1) The aid station of a unit is established only when movement of the unit is unsteady, very slow, or halted altogether (see (3) below).

(2) An aid station must keep at all times in contact with the unit it is supporting. It must be moved, by echelon if necessary, as soon as movement of the combat elements makes its location unsuitable.

(3) Only such part of an aid station is established as immediate circumstances require, or for which need can be foreseen. Rapid forward movement of combat elements is usually associated with small losses, and casualties can be collected by litter squads into small groups along the axis of advance and given first aid. Such casualties can be evacuated promptly by the medical unit in close support, thus relieving the need for an established aid station and permitting the medical section to keep up with the combat troops.

(4) An aid station is not the proper place for the initiation of elaborate treatment. Such measures will retard the flow of casualties to the rear and immobilize the station.

e. Organization.-

The organization of an aid station will depend upon the unit and the situation. In general, the functions of recording, examination, sorting, treatment, and disposition must be provided for in every situation. These will require one or more medical officers, assisted by non-commissioned officers and enlisted technicians. The allocation of personnel to these functions is a responsibility of the section commander.” Source: “MEDICAL FIELD MANUAL - FM8-10 Medical Service of Field Units March 28, 1942” pp. 42 – 45 Retrieved on May 11, 2011 from http://www.90thidpg.us/Reference/Manuals/FM%208-10.pdf

Types and Numbers of Personnel in an Aid Station

As is explained in the following excerpt from the FM 8-5 manual the aid stations themselves were comprised of a varying number of personnel:

“33. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF AID STATION - The functions of an aid station are relatively constant, and the functional organization will depend largely upon the size of the aid station group among which the duties must be distributed.

a. Type functional organization. - As a type, the following functional organization of a battalion aid station is suggested. With the assignment of 5 medical and 3 surgical technicians as company aid men, and 12 unrated privates, first class, or privates as litter bearers, the following personnel remain for the aid station group: 2 officers, 1 staff sergeant, 1 Corporal, 1 unrated private, first class, or private, and 4 chauffeurs. In case the latter for any reason are not available, the bearer group is a possible source of station personnel. In any event, the following distribution of station duties is suggested:

(1) Officers (2).-(a) One commands section; battalion surgeon; in charge of aid station; first-aid treatment, sorting, and preparation of walking wounded for evacuation.

(b) One is general assistant to section commander; first-aid treatment and preparation of litter wounded for evacuation.

(2) Staff sergeant (1).- Section sergeant; general super-vision of all enlisted personnel; supply; assists the section commander in his technical functions.

(3) Corporal (1).-Assists the officer in charge of the litter wounded; in absence of trained technician, performs shock nursing, sterilizes instruments, and administers hypodermic medication.

(4) Private, first class, or private, unrated (1).-Casualty records.

(5) Chauffeurs (4).-Utilized when available for assistant in litter wounded department; assistant in walking wounded department; property exchange; drinking water; hot liquid nourishment for patients; shock nursing; sterilization of instruments; hypodermic medication.

b. Operations.-(1) Casualties from front line units normally arrive at an aid station by one of two ways, walking with or without assistance, or carried by the litter squads of the battalion section. In other units casualties May arrive via ambulance or other transport.” Source: “MEDICAL FIELD MANUAL – FM 8-5 Medical Field Manual: Mobile Units of the Medical Department March 28, 1942” pp. 41 - 42 Retrieved December 9, 2011, from http://www.90thidpg.us/Reference/Manuals/FM%208-5%201942.pdf

Figure 1 below shows how the medical operation during an invasion was organized and the place of the aid station in the process of treating and transporting wounded from a battle zone.

Figure 2: Layout of Medical Field Operations in the Mediterranean Theater

Source: “The Chain of Evacuation” AMMI - THE DEFINITIVE 20TH CENTURY MILITARY MEDICAL HISTORY SITE! Retrieved on May 11, 2011 from http://web.archive.bibalex.org/web/20060212063007/http://www.ww2medicine.org/chain.html

FM 8-5 describes what happened to a wounded soldier when he arrived at a battalion aid station:

“(2) The casualty is examined and necessary first-aid treatment given either to enable him to return at once to duty or to prepare him for further evacuation. Such treatment is limited to the arresting of hemorrhage, immobilization of fractures, sterilization of wounds (so far as practicable under the conditions), application of sterile dressings to prevent further infection, and the administration of sera and other necessary preventive or palliative medication. If possible, the patient is sheltered from the elements and given a hot drink to relieve exhaustion and prevent or control shock. The necessary entries are made on his EMT, and he is either turned over, at the aid station, to the medical unit in direct support or returned to his organization.” Source: FM8-5 - Medical Field Manual Mobile Units of the Medical Department January 12, 1942 page 42. Retrieved on May 11, 2011 from http://www.90thidpg.us/Reference/Manuals/FM%208-5%201942.pdf

Note: an EMT is an Emergency Medical Tag.

Examples of how an aid station was organized are shown in Figures 2 and 3 below:

Figure 3: Example Layout of Aid Station

Source: “MEDICAL FIELD MANUAL - FM8-10 Medical Service of Field Units March 28, 1942” p. 43. Retrieved on December 9, 2011 from http://www.90thidpg.us/Reference/Manuals/FM%208-10.pdf

 

Figure 4: Another perspective of an Aid Station Layout

Source: “MEDICAL FIELD MANUAL – FM 8-5 Medical Field Manual: Mobile Units of the Medical Department  March 28, 1942” p. 40. Retrieved December 9, 2011, from http://www.90thidpg.us/Reference/Manuals/FM%208-5%201942.pdf

Observations and Deductions

From this information some important observations can be made. First, it was possible for an aid station to be very close to the front lines, anywhere between 3 and 800 yards, certainly close enough to be shelled by enemy artillery including 88mm canon fire.

Second, wherever possible, aid stations would set fractures, sterilize wounds, change dressings, and treat victims of shock and exhaustion by retaining soldiers inside the boundary of the aid station and providing them with hot drinks. Aid stations were composed of several personnel including doctors, orderlies, nurses etc. The numbers and compositions of these personnel would vary depending on battle field events.

Doris Orr states in her foot note to Bill’s letter that orderlies from the aid station tried to restrain him after his knee was treated and that Bill broke away from them and climbed a nearby hill to rest. Perhaps the aid station doctor or an orderly thought he was suffering from exhaustion or shock and requested that he stay at the aid station, sip a hot drink and recover his strength. The fact that Bill climbed a nearby hill and sat down to rest would support the assertion that Bill needed to rest. 

Third, the aid station was probably stable and established, not moving forward quickly, possibly indicating a situation where the combat troops in front of the aid station were making slow headway or were dug-in in a defensive posture such as during an enemy counter attack, or while awaiting reinforcements. Doris’ foot note states that orderlies were present and his wound was treated. Bill’s letter mentions that a medical record was kept. Therefore the aid station was large enough to have a doctor or medic present to treat his injury and probably orderlies to record information on causalities and treat shock victims. This would support the case that the aid station was in a stable location.

Fourth, aid stations kept records of the wounded besides the Emergency Medical Tag (EMT). The EMT is physically attached to the wounded soldier. It contains the soldier’s name, unit, description of wound and treatment administered. The EMT remains with the patient until he is ready for duty or reaches a fixed hospital. Aid station personnel also kept records about specific casualties that passed through the aid station. Source: “WWII MEDICAL DETACHMENT attached to Infantry Regiment” Alain Batens March 19^th 2002 Retrieved May 11, 2011 from  http://www.mtaofnj.org/content/WWII%20Combat%20Medic%20-%20Dave%20Steinert/WWIIMedicalDetachment.htm

It was necessary to keep information other than the EMT because some soldiers would be treated and sent back to their unit to continue duty. In these cases the aid station was the only point of contact that a medical detachment had with a soldier and therefore the only source that could verify that a particular soldier sought medical attention. Furthermore, personnel in aid stations had been known to recommend Purple Heart awards to soldiers, as in the case when Col. Gavin visited an aid station after the battle of Biazza Ridge to receive treatment for shrapnel wounds. The personnel at that aid station said they would put Gavin down for a Purple Heart award. Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, 1978, pp. 42-43.

As Bill said in his letter to Doris, he received a Purple Heart in Sicily, which he said was recorded on a medical record.  Figure 5 below is a copy of a Company Morning Report for Service Company 505th PIR from Sicily dated July 21, 1943. It contains information originally recorded on  a medical report at an Aid Station on July 14, 1943. I am told these Morning Reports should indicate if a Purple Heart was recommended. Even if the record of Bill’s Purple Heart recommendation wasn’t destroyed, Figure 5 demonstrates how much information is often incomplete regarding  injured personnel. In the first entry for Ernest Seitz the hospital he was treated at is listed as unknown. In the case of the second entry, James Nelson it states: “Information not available as to the extent of injuries and whether or not hospitalized or evacuated.”

 

Image Source: National Archives

There are two possibilities given Bill’s recollections, US Army medical practice, and his likely location during the invasion that would explain the aid station incident:

1. An aid station belonging to a medical unit attached or organic to the 45^th Infantry Division at 2:40 hours on July 10;
2. The clearing station set up by the 307^th Medical Company, organic to the 505^th PIR or another nearby aid station on July 11.

Let’s now explore each of these possibilities.

Possibility 1: A 45^th Division Medical Unit

At the location and time of Bill’s jump, there were no aid stations. He landed in hostile territory, behind enemy lines. As explained above, aid stations were set up between 3 and 800 meters behind front lines. Some of the troopers in Bill’s serial did link up with units of the 45^th Division, one example being Col. Gavin’s group that linked up with the 45^th at 2:40hours. Source: “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy” page 22.

The CENT force of the invasion was comprised of units of the 45^th division. These forces landed on the beaches east of the town of Scoglitti (See Map 2:View The German Counter Offensive July 10 - 11th). Medical units of the CENT force included the 120^th Medical Battalion organic to the 45^th, the 54^th Medical Battalion; a platoon of the 11^th Field Hospital; and seven teams of the 3^rd Auxiliary Surgical Group. Each medical unit went ashore with their assigned combat units. Within the first two hours of the landings, battalion aid stations were set up between one half and one miles inland Source: “Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theater”, Wiltse C., 1967, pages 152 -153

After his jump, Bill could have visited an aid station set up by the 120^th Medical Battalion. Since the 120^th Med. was organic to the 45^th Division it’s likely that they would have been in the same general location and at the same time as the groups of paratroopers that linked up with the 45^th Division. The 120^th Med. set up aid stations behind the 45^th front lines. Doris Orr states in her footnote that Bill visited an aid station after he landed. Bill’s first opportunity to do so would have been the aid stations supporting the 45^th and would have been the 120^th Med.

The 45^th was under fire for several hours during and after the landings. Due to enemy resistance, it wasn’t until 4:00pm on July 10 that the 120^th Med. was able to set up a clearing station some three miles inland. Source: Ibid

Given this, it is possible that Bill visited an aid station of the 120^th Med. early on the morning of July 10 at around 2:30am – 3:00am. The 45^th Division was being shelled by enemy artillery at this time and was unable to make head way until several hours later. These were the conditions during which aid stations were typically set up with multiple types of personnel including doctors, nurses as well as orderlies who were charged with documenting medical records.

During the invasion, the policy was to set up aid stations close to the front lines. Bill came from a location behind enemy lines. The nearest aid station to him run by the 120^th Med. would naturally be one that was close to the front lines. The terrain around the front lines at this time was hilly, which would allow Bill to climb a hill after he left the aid station.

At this point, I have been unable to find a report of an aid station that was hit by a shell killing its occupants and destroying the records. I am in the process of asking the Medical Dept of the Army for information that corroborates Bill’s recollections. Despite this, all of the policies and practices of medical units at the time of HUSKY do corroborate all of Bill’s recollections as recorded in his letter to Doris Orr and Doris’ footnotes to his letter. Therefore, I believe that this is the most likely location and time of the aid station shelling.

Possibility 2: The 307^th Medical Company

The first medical clearing station to be established by the 505 was on Biazza Ridge on July 11. The 307 Medical Company set it up while under fire, so that the wounded could be given triage before evacuation to the coast. The clearing station was constantly under fire during the battle from German artillery, tanks, and small arms. Over the course of the day there were many wounded coming in to the clearing station, and it’s doubtful that Bill would have had his knee examined when so many seriously injured men needed attention. The clearing station was in a field behind the lines. In his letter, Bill states that his medical record was destroyed when a First Aid Station was hit by an 88mm shell. It is possible that this clearing station may have been maintaining medical records, including recommendations for awards of Purple Hearts. However, nothing is recorded about an 88mm shell hitting the 307 clearing station and the after action reports make no mention of any personnel at the clearing station being killed. The clearing station was behind Biazza Ridge. Biazza Ridge could look like a hill. It’s unlikely that Bill would have climbed it during the battle in order to rest, as it was itself under heavy fire from the Germans. In this immediate area Biazza Ridge is the only nearby hill so it is unlikely that Bill had his knee treated at Biazza Ridge.

There were other medical stations including aid stations in the Vittoria area. Perhaps Bill visited one of these other aid stations on his way to the battle at Biazza Ridge or sometime during the day of July 11 and an 88mm shell hit it.

One was set up in a house near the ridge where the Vittoria – Gela road crossed the railroad. It served as the living quarters for the Sicilian man who operated the boom gate at the railway crossing. On July 11, a medical team had set up an aid station in the building to perform emergency operations. Thinking it was the paratrooper’s command post; it was strafed and bombed by Luftwaffe ME 109 fighters. In fact, Col. Gavin had set up his command post in a mere slit trench on Biazza Ridge. The medical team had to vacate the structure and subsequently relocated to a farm house one quarter miles away Source: “Drop Zone Sicily”, Breurer, 1983, P. 140.

Bill’s Purple Heart

Initially, Bill wasn’t too worried about not receiving the Purple Heart, a fact that Henry Clark attested to during an interview on November 4, 2005.

Doris Orr also corroborates this:

“I doubt if he tried very hard to correct the record because I have heard that according to the Paratrooper code they thought that it was wimpy to get the purple heart.” Source: Doris (Clark) Orr 24 June 2005 page 7

Col. Gavin himself confirmed this sentiment. After the battle of Biazza Ridge he explained that the Purple Heart was shunned among members of the 505:

“My trouser leg was slightly torn, and my shinbone was red, swollen, and cut a bit. I must have been nipped by a mortar fragment the day before. I went to the nearest aid station; they put on some sulfa power and I was as good as new. They said they would put me in for a Purple Heart. I said nothing about it – I had already learned that among twenty-four hour veterans only goof-offs got Purple Hearts.” Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, 1978, pp. 42-43.

While Bill didn’t want the award at the time, later on in the war he was strongly motivated to get his Purple Heart instated as he indicated in his letter to his sister. A Purple Heart contributed five points towards the number needed to be discharged. Without it at the end of the war he was just one point short of earning the magic number of 85 points needed to avoid being assigned to dangerous occupational duty in post war Berlin.

One of the main reasons behind the 505 troopers’ attitude toward the Purple Heart was they felt it was given out too liberally.  Col. Gavin’s case is a good example. In his own opinion his minor injuries didn’t warrant the award. At the time, the ease with which the Purple Heart was awarded devalued the US armed forces most important medal. Being killed or wounded is the greatest sacrifice a soldier can make. Those who receive the Purple Heart should be duly honored and respected.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.

504th PIR Friendly Fire Tragedy in Sicily

On the night of July 11 after the Battle of Biazza Ridge, many men of the 505 bore witness to a horrifying incident involving the 504th PIR. Bill recorded what he saw in a letter to his sister:

“[On July 11 at night]…our own navy… shot down 27 transport planes killing 410 paratroopers, who were coming in to reinforce us.” Source: William Clark, letter dated June 13, 1945

Years later, in an interview after the War Bill told his  friend, Herd Bennett about the incident:

“He was lying in a fox hole watching the 504^th make the jump. He states that he laid on the ground and saw many of the C-47 transport planes (they were bringing the paratroops in) blasted out of the air by American artillery that thought they were German airplanes.” Source: Herd L. Bennett as told to him by William Clark, August 19, 1999.

For Bill, the worst thing next to witnessing his friend’s death, was the shooting down of planes from 504 by the US navy. Bill had seen a lot of good men and close friends die that day, but the SNAFU by his own forces was overwhelming. It could have been avoided in his opinion, and now Bill was to watch as they needlessly died.

These were sentiments shared by other troopers who occupied his position on the ridge that night:

“Sergeant Raymond Hart, with Company H, and his men watching from Biazzo Ridge could see ‘troopers jumping out of burning planes. Needless to say, we felt like we had lost the war. More than one man cried that night.’” Source: “Four Stars of Valor: The Combat History of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II”, Nordyke, P.,  2006 p. 91

General Gavin was also on Biazza Ridge and remembered what he saw:

“It must have been ten o’clock at night when all hell broke loose in the direction of the beaches. Antiaircraft fire was exploding like fireworks on the Forth of July, tracers were whipping through the sky, and as we were observing the phenomena, the low, steady drone of airplanes could be heard. They seemed to be flying through the flak and coming in our direction. Everyone began to grasp their weapons to be ready to shoot at them. A few of us cautioned the troopers to take it easy until we understood what was going on. Suddenly at about 600 feet the silhouettes of American C-47s appeared against the sky – our own parachute troops! Some seemed to be burning, and they continued directly overhead in the direction of Gela. From the damaged planes some troopers jumped or fell, and at daylight we found some of them dead in front of our positions.” Source: “On to Berlin”, Gavin, J., 1978, p. 42

“Later we learned that it was the 504^th Parachute Infantry that was being flown to a drop zone near Gela to reinforce the 1^st Infantry Division. General Ridgway had been there to meet them. Unfortunately, the Germans had sent in parachute reinforcements on the British front to the east the same night. In addition, there had been German air attacks on our Navy, so when the parachute transports showed up, our ships fired at them, and twenty-three were shot down and many damaged.” Source: Ibid.

Major Mark Alexander commander of 505th PIR 2nd Battalion had been  misdropped along with his troops far too the southeast of Gela. On the night of July 11 was perfectly placed to see the shooting:

“After dark when we hit the coast road again, we could see the invasion armada in the water off Gela. From our strung-out position along the coast road, we saw two German bombers fly in, bomb the fleet and fly off. I’d say about two minutes behind them came 48 C-47s carrying the rest of the 504th paratroopers. They came in at roughly the same altitude and from the same direction as the German bombers.

“The navy opened fire. From where I was, I could see the planes were our own, but the navy got excited and just kept shooting. Finally they stopped, but they had knocked down 23 planes. Some of them were able to make a hard landing on Sicily, but a whole bunch of men were killed. Even the 45th Division got in on the shooting. They thought the Germans were attacking.” Source: “Jump Commander” Alexander, M. and Sparry J, 2010 pp. 86-87

504^th PIR Paratroopers aboard their C-47 Sent to Reinforce the 505^th PIR, July 11, 1943

Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland 
A., etal., 1993, page 137 retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

The cost of the friendly fire incident to the 504th was 81 killed, 16 missing, and 132 wounded. Source: “Four Stars of Valor: The Combat History of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II”, Nordyke, P.,  2006 p. 91

The 52^nd Wing of the Army Air force was flying the 504^th troopers. They suffered 7 men killed, 53 missing, 30 wounded and 23 C-47s lost. Source: “Valor Without Arms: A History of the 316th Troop Carrier Group, 1942 – 1945”. Ingrisano, M. 1991 p. 23

In Bill’s 1945 letter he states that 27 planes were shot down and 410 paratroopers. He wasn’t far off on his estimation of the number of planes lost. Given the date of his letter and his ability to get accurate information, his estimate of the number of men killed wasn’t too bad either.

As Major Alexander noted, minutes before the C-47s appeared, the Navy’s ships were attacked by Luftwaffe bombers. Furthermore, the Navy had been under attack all day. Messerschmitt ME 109 fighters had strafed some ships, while others had been bombed by Junkers Ju 88 medium bombers and Heinkel He 111 heavy bombers. The navy fired on the C-47s because they thought they were under another attack.

“The persistent enemy air attacks had one unintended result, namely the predisposition of Navy gunners to fire at any aircraft, frequently before identifying them.” Source: “Operation Husky:  The Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943” Nutter, T. 2003 http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/husky/naval1.aspx?p=7

 

American Ships Under Air Attack off Gela During the Day of July 11

Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland  A., etal., 1993, page 167 retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-8.html

C-47 Crew Perspective

The paratrooper perspective on the ground was of harrowing disbelief. But what was experienced by the men in the C-47 aircraft was far worse.  Michael Ingrisano, a C-47 pilot quotes the 316th Troop Carrier Consolidated Mission Report of Husky 2 about their experience:

“All went well until the airplanes began to enter the designated corridor. There shore batteries opened fire on the airplanes and the entire corridor became alive with deadly machine gun fire and heavy flak. The fire became so intense that the formations broke up, each airplane seeking openings through the heavy curtain of fire. The situation became more acute as the planes approached the area of the DZ. By that time there was sufficient dispersion among the aircraft that some airplanes were able to drop their troops in comparatively calm territory, one airplane dropping 3 miles from the DZ; another 7 miles; another 10 miles from the DZ; others dropped the paratroopers as close to the DZ as possible despite the intense fire, some of them making two passes, others 3 passes over the field before being able to identify the drop points through the heavy bursts of fire.

Six of the planes failed to drop their paratroopers. They felt it suicide to drop them through such concentrated fire. One ship made 3 attempts to approach the drop zone but could not because of the impenetrability of the anti-aircraft fire. Another plane, trying to escape hostile fire, was going at such an excessive speed that it could not jump its troops.

All the airplanes that were able to survive the intense accurate fire dived through the barrage and headed out to sea, over the coast in the
vicinity of Gela and Licata. There another tragedy confronted them: Our own Navy.

As rapidly as they passed over one vessel, the next one took up the fire, and so it continued some 20 miles out to sea. In desperation, the pilots expended their pyrotechnics signals, but it only aided the massacre. For some it outlined the silhouette of the airplanes in the air; to others, the flare looked like another burst of flame hitting the target. Several of the C-47s were shot down in the sea. The survivors, in most instances, were saved and taken aboard naval vessels.

There they learned to some satisfaction that there were explanations for the tragedies seemingly unnecessarily committed. Just 10 minutes before the C-47s arrived at the DZ the Germans had been dropping bombs, the 14th raid of the day. The captain of one vessel told them that inter-boat communications system had just announced ‘All planes in the immediate vicinity are friendly,’ when suddenly a 500 pound bomb
burst within 200 yards of the destroyer. The reaction was in the form of active retaliation. Into this the C-47s flew. One pilot, 1st Lt. Ray E. Everhart, further reports ‘The crew on the destroyer seemed to know about as little about aircraft identification as I did about battleship identification.’ A very good example of this: The skipper called back at one time, ‘Gentlemen, you see a beautiful formation of B-17s going to
Sicily to bomb Italians.’ Actually they were British Halifaxes.

Survivors who crash landed in Sicily were told that one officer was going to be relieved because he had announced over the radio and in the clear the fact that American paratroopers were expected in the vicinity between 2200 and 2400. Yet, 2nd Lt. George S.[John J.] Hoye [44th], one of the survivors states: ‘Ground troops reported that they had not been warned that friendly airplanes would be over our area and had assumed planes were hostile.’

The mission was costly to the 316th Group: F/O Anderson and co-pilot Lt. Harpster [45th] concluded: ‘Something should be done about
friendly naval craft firing on us. Also something should be done about flights constantly losing formations. On the whole the mission was extremely dangerous and costly whereas it had [no] reason to be. Evidently the safest place for us tonight while over Sicily would have been over enemy territory.” Source: “Consolidated Mission Report, 316th Troop Carrier Group, A-2 Section, Husky No. 2”, Aug. 5, 1943. As quoted in: “Valor Without Arms: A History of the 316th Troop Carrier Group, 1942 – 1945”. Ingrisano, M. 1991 p. 21

Wreckage of a Douglas C-47 which crashed about 4 miles north of Palermo airfield, Sicily on October 24, 1943

(Gives an idea of what a C-47 crash looks like)
Source: fold3.com

504th PIR Perspective

The paratroopers of the 504 had their own horrendous stories to tell about the disaster. Here’s one from Lt. A. C. Drew of Company F, 504:

“The pilot of my plane gave me the warning twenty minutes out from the DZ. After the red light came on, he had to give me the green light in about one minute, due to the plane being on fire.

“We jumped into a steady stream of antiaircraft fire, and not knowing that they were friendly troops. About seventy-five yards from where I landed , plane No. 915 was hit and burned. To my knowledge only the pilot and three men got out. The pilot was thrown through the window. Another plane was shot down on the beach and another plane was burning about one thousand yards to my front.

There were four men killed and four wounded from my platoon.Three of these men were hit coming down and one was killed on the ground because he had the wrong password. After landing, we found out this had been changed to ‘Think’ – ‘Quickly’. The antiaircraft fire we jumped into was the 180th Infantry of the 45th Division. They were not told we were coming.

“We tried to reorganize, but found we didn’t have but forty–four men, including three officers. We searched all night for the rest of the men. After accounting for them we took care of the dead and wounded and started toward our objective. We arrived at the 504th CP at 2:00, July 12, 1943.” Source: “All American All the Way: The Combat History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2005 pp. 84 – 85. 

Post War Conspiracy Theory of Friendly Fire Cover-up

This newspaper clipping is from Bill’s sister’s scrapbook of the Sicilian invasion.

The article praises the ability of the Army, Navy, and Army Air force to work well together as an effective team. It’s an analysis of the post invasion success, and was published on July 12 or 13 1943.

To quote the article:

“Co-ordination of the three arms in the invasion appears to have been masterfully planned and executed” .

Interestingly none of the newspaper articles in her collection say anything about the friendly fire attack. Even if the press did know about it, it’s logical that they wouldn't report it.

For obvious reasons, the enemy didn’t need to know about a disaster of this magnitude. Not to mention the demoralizing effect it would have had on morale for the Allied forces fighting around the world, and the populations on the home fronts. This is especially true given that Operation HUSKY was at the time the largest sea and airborne invasion ever attempted and the first successful major joint US-British attack on Hitler’s “Fortress Europe”.

Articles like these one would be tantalizing fuel for proponents of the alleged cover up of the friendly fire disaster. Allegations of a cover up sprang up once the American public became aware of the incident, which wasn’t until sometime after the war was over.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Newspaper Article Analyzing the Successful Coordination Between the Army, Army Air force, and Navy .

Source: Dayton Herald, circa July 12-13, 1943

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.

Bill’s Friend Who Died at Biazza Ridge

Today is Veteran’s Day in America, 11/11/2011. The 11th of November is also Remembrance Day in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Many other countries also observe this day as a special day of war remembrance.

For this Veteran’s Day I would like to focus on Bill’s friend who perished in the Battle of Biazza Ridge, Sicily 1943 and all of those men who died in that horrible battle.

Below is a picture of Bill with his best friend before the 82nd Airborne left America for Casablanca. I have not been able to discover his name, but I believe that he is the same friend who died at Biazza Ridge.

Figure 1:  Bill with his Buddy

Source: Author’s Collection

Figure 2: Ponte Dirillo Memorial to the men who fought and died in the area around Ponte Dirillo, the bridge over the Acate River,  including Biazza Ridge, Sicily July 9 - 11

Click on this link to download a readable list of the honor roll.

Source: Image courtesy of the United States Navy, Credits U.S. Navy photo by Journalist 2nd Class Stephen P. Weaver,  US Naval Air Station at Sigonella, Sicily during a remembrance ceremony in 2003 Retrieved May 2, 2011  from http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=16204
Bill’s friend is most likely among those named on this memorial. Unfortunately, I have been unable to conclusively tell which name it is.

The Search for Bill’s Friend

The last time I interviewed Bill was on March 22 2006, between 2:00pm – 4:00pm at his Miamisburg rest home in Ohio. Six weeks prior to this I had finished writing the chapter in the book dealing with Sicily. My intention was to take this opportunity to read to him what I had written, get his reaction and perhaps evoke from him some buried memories. It was a long shot and my expectations upon seeing him were low. Some months earlier Bill suffered a stroke which left his speech and motor functions severely impaired. When I entered the room he was lying in bed seemingly immobile staring blankly into nothingness. I had my doubts as to whether he could be reached because he didn’t respond to anything I said by way of greeting or description of my purpose for visiting him.

Getting nowhere with small talk, I decided to begin reading the chapter. After page nine Bill’s eyes began to focus and he turned his head toward the manuscript and looked at it. The more I read the more alert he became. An hour later I finished reading the chapter.

Bill now appeared to be compos mentis. His eyes were clear and expressed interest. I asked him if he wanted me to read it to him again. This time he responded with an affirmative nod. As I read he listened intently with his unique focused expression. It’s a look he got when he was particularly interested in something. Anyone who knew him would have instantly recognized it. With that look on his face I knew he was with me. I permitted myself the luxury of a small measure of hope.

When I reached the section on my account of his participation in the battle of Biazza Ridge he lifted his head off his pillow and I saw his eyes moving from left to right across the page. He was actually reading the material for himself! I held the book up for him to read more, which he did for a time before losing strength. I asked him if he wanted me to read the section on Biazza Ridge again. He nodded, yes. As I read he became more animated, time and again looking lucidly at me then back at the manuscript.

Once I finished that portion I asked him “Were you at Biazza Ridge?” To my surprise he spoke clearly responding with “Yes.” I could hardly believe my ears as he had been unable to speak for months. I looked up from the book at him and he was staring back at me with a dark, frightened expression on his face. The unexpected stark look shocked me.

Gathering myself I ignored the stare and pressed my advantage asking him “Did you have a good friend who died in the War?” Again he responded “Yes.” I asked “Did he die at Biazza Ridge?” Bill nodded affirmative. “Did he die in a Tiger tank attack?” Again he nodded affirmative. “Or did he die in another campaign?” He shook his head – no.

I showed him the list of names of the men who died  on the Ponte Dirillo memorial in Figure 2 above. I asked him “If I read out the names of the men who died at Biazza Ridge could you tell me the name of your friend?” There was no response, so I continued by holding up Figure 2 closer to his face. I repeated “This is a picture of the memorial to those who died at Biazza Ridge.” I took his hand in mine and told him again “I am going to read you the names on this list. If I say the name of your friend, you squeeze my hand”. He returned his gaze to look at the list.

I took this as a sign that he understood, so I proceeded to read the names to him. He seemed to react when I reached the positions in the list around the names of “Aloysius Boncyk”, “Stephen Vidumsky”, and “Alfred Glascock”. To my dismay he did not squeeze my hand, but became very excited and began trying to form words. I read the list again and got the same reaction at about the same places in the list. Bill was trying with all his might to tell me the name. Given the timing of his reaction, I couldn’t tell for certain which name in the list he was reacting to. I tried a third time, focusing on the following names one at a time: “Aloysius Boncyk”, “Stephen Vidumsky”, and “Alfred Glascock”. Whenever I mentioned any of these names he reacted strongly by trying to form words.

He looked up at me, frustrated before turning his gaze back to Figure 2. His eyes were moving from left to right across the page. He was reading the names. As he read his face became very sad and a tear formed in the corner of his right eye. By the time he was part way through the list more tears were forming. He continued reading until he finished. Then he turned his head away and gazed out his window.

In his condition my bringing up the past was obviously hard on him. I tried to console him. I told him what he did in the War was a tremendous cost for any one man to bear. I said we are grateful that he fought in Sicily and the rest of Europe so that we could be free today. I said that his sacrifice was a debt we as his family could not repay. I told him that he had made all the difference in our lives, opening for us opportunities for achievement that would never have otherwise been obtainable. I said without his sacrifice his brother James Clark would not have been able to become the success he was. The mention of his brother lifted Bill’s mood. He had once told me that that James Clark was the best that Preble County High had ever produced. Although he would never admit it, in some way he must have known that he was in at least a small part responsible for James’ success in academe and business.

Bill’s attention went back to the manuscript again, so I asked him if he wanted me to continue reading to him. He nodded his head, yes, so I read it to him one more time. At the end I asked him “So what do you think? Do you like it?” He responded “Yes” and nodded his head. I told him how I was going to write the rest of the book starting with Salerno and going through the battles and the good times he had in England, Ireland and continental Europe, ending with the occupation of Berlin. I asked “How do you like the plan?” A smile came across his face as he responded “It’s good.”

I am presently researching how Aloysius Boncyk, Stephen Vidumsky, and Alfred Glascock died.  These names and the other names listed in the table below are the most probable. All were members of 3^rd Battalion Headquarters Company, Company G or Regimental Headquarters Company.  To the best of my knowledge all of the men in the table fought and died at Biazza Ridge.

There is another reason some of these names are strong possibilities. During my interview with Bill’s brother Henry Clark Jr. he was fairly sure  that the man’s name had the letter G in it, or was somehow associated with that letter. He also thought that the man might have come from Ohio and that was one reason for their friendship.

The one name on the list which satisfies all of these criteria is Aloysius Boncyk. Aloysius was from Mahoning county, Ohio.

Other strong possibilities are John McGuigan of RHQ and therefore flew in Bill’s serial,  and Alfred Glascock  as well as  the other men from G Company named below. Note that some names listed on the monument in Figure 2 are not listed below since they did not fit Bill’s story for valid reasons. Either they later died of wounds, or were from 1st battalion and died in the battles around Ponte Dirillo (not at Biazza Ridge), or their deaths were already explicitly explained in existing histories by eye witnesses and they did not die in the manner explained by Bill.

Table 1: Possible Names of Bill’s Friend Who Died in the Battle of Biazza Ridge 

Name	Rank	Company	Status	Place	Date	County, State	Serial #
Boncyk Aloysius	PFC	G	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Mahoning, OH	15072250
McGuigan John,  J	PVT	Reg HQ	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Queens, NY	32012829
Glascock Alfred	PVT	G	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Loudoun, VA	33183948
Myrhow Harold,  L	PFC	G	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Spokane, WA	19096523
Angelo Dominic, T	PVT	G	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Philadelphia, PA	33314899
Meile Carroll , W	PVT	G	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Baltimore, MD	20343348
Barnett Walter, M	PVT	G	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Pottawattamie, Iowa	20743494
Moynihan Cornelius, J Jr	CPL	G	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Kings County, NY	12063157
Knight Vernon, F	PVT	HQ/3 Bat	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Multnomah, OR	39317596
Vidumsky Stephen, W	PVT	HQ/3 Bat	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Northampton, PA	33183338
* Fiske Raymond, E	PVT	HQ/3 Bat	KIA	Biazza Ridge	7/11/1943	Hampden, MA	11061719

Sources:
Special Forces Roll of Honor, US Paratroopers of World War Two http://www.specialforcesroh.com/rolllist-68.html

Phil Nordyke’s 82nd Airborne in World War II website “All American All the Way” http://allamerican82nd.com (which has been down since March 2011), but almost all of the 82nd Airborne rosters from the site are available through Bibliotheca Alexandrina’s “Wayback Machine” Internet Archive at http://web.archive.bibalex.org/web/*/http://allamerican82nd.com.

I also have private copies of all of the 82nd Airborne rosters from World War II.

* Note:- Raymond Fiske’s photograph (located at http://www.specialforcesroh.com/gallery.php?action=view_image&id=8698) does not match the photo of Bill’s friend in Figure 1 above and so may not be the person in question.

If anyone has more information or photographs of any of these men, please contact me.

Please take a moment to honor all of our veterans this Veteran’s Day, 2011.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.

Into Hell & History

 

Source: “Saga of the All American: History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II”, Dawson, F., 1946 p. 197

With what is known about the battle and all of the discoveries made from interviews with Bill’s siblings as well as letters he and his brother Henry wrote home during the war, it is possible to reconstruct his personal battle with the Hermann Goring Panzer Division at Biazza Ridge. What follows is my attempt to do just that. Hopefully, this fact based reconstruction will serve to honor the unbelievably horrendous sacrifices made by the 505 veterans of that bloody battle .

Bill probably arrived at Biazza Ridge in the morning of July 11, and definitely before or during one of the Tiger tank attacks on 3^rd Battalion’s positions on the western slope of the ridge. Perhaps he was there from the beginning and was one of the Regimental Headquarters Company (RHQ) serial troopers who stormed the ridge with Company G routing the Germans from their positions and driving them down the western slope. Maybe he arrived while Company H counter attacked with bayonets and helped drive the Germans from the ridge the second time. He might have come later perhaps in one of the smaller groups that arrived during the day. It’s improbable that he came as one of the 50 troopers that arrived with Lt. Swingler of Service Company, because that isn’t consistent with the story Bill told his brother Henry. In that story Bill was clearly fighting Tiger tanks by firing his weapon at their glass viewfinders. He would have needed enough light to do that. Not only had Lt. Swingler arrived after the tanks had been driven off by the naval bombardment, but the final attack that his men had fought in occurred at sunset which was 8:30pm on July 11, 1943. Moreover, Bill recalled being present to see the howitzers firing almost vertically at the Tigers and that happened before Lt. Swingler arrived.

When he got there he probably met with his close friend – his buddy, who’s a member of G, H, RHQ Company, or Service Company. Bill and this man are very good friends and they’re glad to see one another. They’re both relieved to have made it through the jump and subsequent journey to the ridge, but there’s no time to exchange much of anything else. An officer sends them directly to the front line, telling them to take up a position on a gap in the line. They see that German infantry and tanks are advancing on the 505’s position on the ridge. It’s during one of the German counter attacks. Someone shouts out information about the Tigers, or perhaps they recognize from their training that these tanks are heavy Mark VI Tiger tanks mounted with 88mm cannons. They can shoot the infantry, but there is nothing that their 30 caliber M1 Garand rifles can do against the heavily armored Tiger’s. They run or crawl part way down the western slope of the ridge to their position in the line of advancing tanks and infantry. Bullets zip by and mortar shells explode around them killing other troopers. Like many other men, they may not have slept since the night of July 8. Thankfully, adrenaline begins to course through them reinforcing their skills learned from their intense training as paratroopers.

Laying low in a depression or a slit trench previously dug into the shallow shale of the ridge, they survey their position. They see the Tigers advancing in front of the infantry. They shoot at the enemy soldiers and provide covering fire for the bazooka teams who risk their lives at close range to fire bazookas at the tanks. Part of the developing strategy is to aim their M1 rifles at the view finders on the Tigers in an attempt to hit or at least harass the enemy inside the tanks. Perhaps this will distract the tank crews and buy the bazooka teams time to fire their weapons.

 

Tiger Mark VI Captured in Tunis 1943.

Source: Wikipedia Commons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:TigerITankTunis.jpg 

Note the view finding slit on the hull (just right of tanks center front) underneath the 88mm cannon. This is the slit the 505 troopers were firing into with rifles

To their dismay, Bill and his buddy realize that the bazookas cannot penetrate the heavy over 4 inch thick iron steel armor of the Mark VI Tigers. Far worse, to their horror, they see the tanks firing their 88mm cannons at individual troopers. The men are blown into pieces or disappear in the cloud of the exploding 88mm shells. They are now bearing firsthand witness to the Hermann Goring Division’s brutality. They see tanks getting very close to other men who try and disable the Tigers by placing gammon grenades in their tracks. This isn’t successful and more often it ends in the death of yet another trooper. As the morning wears on more troopers arrive taking the place of those who died and to expand the 505’s postion. During the attacks, Tigers repeatedly run low on ammunition and need to pull back and reload. When they do, Bill’s mind feels some respite, but his stomach doesn’t. It ambushes him with a sharp burning sensation, clutching with the realization that the attacks will continue relentlessly, until he and his fellow paratroopers are all destroyed.

It’s during one of these attacks, that personal tragedy strikes. Bill and his friend are in a forward position firing their rifles to shoot into the viewfinder on a Tiger that’s close by. They are supporting a trooper who’s placing a gammon grenade in the tank’s track. Unexpectedly, the tank crew spots them in their slit trench. It swings it huge cannon in their direction. Quickly they decide to split up, diving and running out of the way. Bill is able to run a short distance, and lands into another trench, this one deeper, more protected than the one he previously occupied. Turning over to take stock of his situation, he sees his friend scouring around, desperately trying to find cover. He’s unable to find anything and while he’s looking, the Tiger takes aim. Bill tries to get his attention, waving for him to come his way, but in the roar of the battle, and the confusion of his situation his buddy doesn’t hear. Helpless, in despair, Bill watches as the awful cannon fires. He hopes with all his heart that it will miss. But it doesn’t. The 88mm shell explodes with a direct hit on his friend. He disappears becoming a pink cloud, almost indistinguishable from the huge ball of smoke and pieces of shale thrown up by the explosion. Bill is devastated. His stomach retches dry at the sight. Later, he will have time slip into a long dark depression, but for now all of his senses are keyed on his survival.

Hunched down in is trench, Bill chances a glance at the Tiger and can’t believe what his eyes see. The tank has changed course and is now moving toward him. Its turret has swung around in his direction. He quickly dips his head down desperately hoping he wasn’t spotted. With luck he thinks it will pass him by. But it doesn’t go away. Instead he can hear it moving up and down, scouring the terrain, as if it’s looking for him. A stark realization dawns on Bill. The Tiger is hunting him. As the seconds tick by it is getting closer. Now it is very close. Close enough that he can hear voices of the men inside. Suddenly it stops. Above the grumbling engine a weird electrical motorized whining noise startles him. The sound is emanating from the machine’s turret as it robotically jerks left and right making adjustments in its aim. Bill scurries 20 feet or so down the trench away from the sounds. The trench opens up into a deeper natural ditch, offering better cover. This new position in the ditch affords Bill a safer view of the tank. From here he can see it stopped almost on top of his previous position. He thinks about making a run for it, but decides against it. The terrain is too open for that. He stays put instead.

After a few seconds the lid of the turret clangs open. A German tank crewman’s head and torso pops out. The German combs the area around Bill, looking for him among the terrain, relaying the information through his headset to the others inside. Unexpectedly an odd calm swiftly descends over Bill. With his weapon he takes careful aim at the German’s head and cocks the trigger. Retribution for his friend is now at hand. Should he fire? He hesitates. He’s an exceptional shot. Missing isn’t the issue. He had seen the two MG 34s mounted on the Tiger’s turret and hull make meal out of other men earlier that day. He is too close. To fire now would mean certain death. Reluctantly he quells his fury and lowers the gun. Vengeance will have to wait another day. Abruptly, the German lowers himself back down and the lid slams shut. The tank turns and heads back on its way up the ridge.

Bill watches for a few minutes as the Tiger crawls relentlessly on, blowing away other troopers with its hellish 88mm cannon, grinding them up with its dreadful MG 34 792mm caliber machine guns. Appalled, enraged, he soon turns away. A fresh charge of adrenaline surges through him, shocking his body back into the reality of the battle. He returns to the fight.

Soon after, the putrid Tiger begins to hunger for more fuel and ammunition. It’s a hideous abomination. The brainchild of some engineering genius detached from the sorrow it would pour out onto the world. Cutting a vivid image from some ghastly nightmare, gurgling and growling it lurches back to a German support crew to slurp up a fresh meal of gasoline, bullets, and more of those gruesome 88mm shells. Once sated, it guns its thunderous engine to signal its rage at those brave, stubborn, but stupid little men hopelessly defending the ridge and its delight in anticipation of the carnage it will soon inflict upon them.

Bill somehow finds the strength to fight on, teaming up with other troopers. He fights through the day. Later in the afternoon he hears of Gavin’s command that the 505 will stay and fight, that there will be no retreat. If the Tigers overrun their position, they will hold their ground and attack the German infantry. At hearing the order from his beloved colonel, Bill’s resolve is now galvanized. He will stay and fight. He will avenge his friend. If he dies, then so be it.

In the afternoon, while firing at German infantry from his foxhole Bill watches a Tiger that has broken through the 505^ths thin line. He sees troopers die in rapid succession as the immortal tank sprays its bullets at the men with its heavy machine guns. He witnesses the howitzer shoot multiple rounds at the monster and feels retribution as it retreats in the clouds of dust. His voice is among those who cheer at this small victory.

The day is now growing old. Glancing at the sky Bill can see that the scorching Sicilian sun is getting lower, but it won’t set until 8:30pm. Over the past hour the German attacks have become more determined. Like his fellow men, Bill’s ammunition is running low. Now he must make every bullet count. There are holes appearing in the 505^’s defensive line making it easier for the Germans to take more and more ground from the paratroopers. Bill’s been fighting all day. He’s drained. He’s feels spent. He is forced to retreat to a position further up the ridge. The Germans now make a very powerful push and are within 50 yards of Gavin’s command post, only a few yards away from Bill’s new fox hole. Just when he thinks his luck has run out he hears the howl of artillery fire followed by earsplitting explosions. The artillery is gratefully coming down on the German positions. He cheers, but can’t hear the sound of his own voice. The navy’s 155mm artillery shells decimate the Germans and in the face of this justice, the menacing Tigers are at last forced to retreat from the ridge. Bill can see them regrouping about a mile away.

It’s impossible for us to comprehend how Bill has gotten this far, let alone understand where he got his strength to participate in Gavin’s final counter attack at 8:30pm. Gavin rallies every man present for this final charge. They all line up on the ridge awaiting the order. Where Bill’s standing, a thick cloud of dust and smoke from the navy shelling has settled with no wind to blow it away. Bill’s local visibility is at best 30 yards. When the command is given, the paratroopers charge screaming and yelling down the western side of Biazza Ridge. Among them, Bill’s gaunt silhouette can be seen momentarily before it vanishes into the haze. Halfway down the slope he reappears barreling down the hill with the other paratroopers. Running out on to the plain they soon encounter machine gun fire, explosions from mortars, and 88mm shells from the Tigers. Bill sees that some men have been unlucky enough to run into Tigers. Through sheer numbers they overwhelm the tanks setting C-4 explosives in their tracks and turrets, disabling them. He pursues the retreating German infantry, who are now running for their lives just ahead of him. He sees a group of three who appear to want to stay and fight. They fire at him with their bolt action Karak 98b rifles. Fuming with vengeance, Bill dispatches them in fluid motions with his M1 Garand. As the Germans flee into the distance Bill hears the call to cease the assault and regroup at the bottom of the ridge. The Germans for now at least have been driven away. Bill sees them off in the distance milling about in confusion.

Walking back up the ridge Bill and a few other men are ordered to form a team to supervise German POWs as they collect the bodies of fallen paratroopers for temporary burial. It’s thankless grisly work and he’s glad to leave when they’ve finished. As he turns around to go he is surprised to see Col. Gavin nearby, looking at the graves. Bill watches him briefly. Gavin, with tears in his eyes, seems to be looking through rather than at markers. He quietly walks away leaving him to grieve in piece.

Bill virtually collapses upon reaching an empty foxhole. For the first time finally there’s a moment to rest. Nothing occupies his mind except a blank dull sense of loss, the feeling of an empty victory, punctuated by flashes of horror. He tries sleeping, but that proves difficult. No one knows for sure if the Germans would regroup and attack again during the night. When he does drop off, the nightmares are unspeakable.

The day of July 11, 1943 never really ended for those troopers who fought at Biazza Ridge. They were doomed to relive it again and again, every day, for the rest of their lives. They would go through all the usual symptoms of trauma victims after the initial shock wore off. They felt anger at the Germans and this fueled a desire to kill more of them.

For Bill it lead directly to his decision to volunteer for the Salerno jump. He would feel guilt for not doing something to save his friend and suffer remorse for not being the one who died. Later, a profound sadness would pervade his mind and stay with him as a constant companion. As is often reported for people in this situation, Bill never befriended another man while he was in the Army. Bill’s sister, Doris said that he purposely never made a close friend in the service after seeing his friend die. She said her father understood why. He had fought in WWI and he had experienced his own close friends perish in war.

Below is a picture of Bill with his buddy before they left for Casablanca.

Bill with his Buddy

The next post will document the progress in discovering the name of the man in this picture. It’s quite probable that he is the same friend who died at Biazza Ridge.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.