Memorial Day Remembrance

As we commemorate those soldiers who died in war since the U.S. Civil War on this upcoming Memorial Day of May 30, 2011, I want to share a poem entitled “Just Folks”, possibly authored by Edgar A. Guest. I found it among some news paper clippings from 1943, kept by Bill’s family when he and his brother Henry went off to fight in World War Two.

It’s a touching poem which to me exquisitely captures the essence of the sacrifices made by those from both sides of  war – on the home front and in the multiple theaters of operations around the world.

 

 

Although this poem is entitled “Just Folks” the actual poem with that title written by Guest is completely different. There is a public domain book by the same title and author which can be found at Project Gutenberg. “Just Folks” is the first poem in the book, but the words of the above poem cannot be found anywhere in the volume. Furthermore, nowhere can I find a Guest poem by the title “Do This”. It is possible that the news paper erroneously attributed the work. Whether or not this is a Guest poem is a mystery to me.

Here are some links for more about Edgar A. Guest and his wonderful poetry:

Sofine's Edgar Guest Collection http://sofinesjoyfulmoments.com/quotes/edguest.htm

Academy of American Poets http://www.poets.org/poet.php/prmPID/731 

Project Gutenberg http://www.gutenberg.org/browse/authors/g#a182

Establishing Bill’s Presence at Biazza Ridge

 

“The ALLIED airborne operation in Sicily was decisive despite widely scattered drops which must be expected in a night landing. It is my opinion that if it had not been for the allied airborne  forces (82nd) blocking the Herman Goering Armored Division from reaching the beachhead, that Division would have driven the initial seaborne forces back into the sea. I attribute the entire success of the Allied Sicilian Operation to the delaying of German Reserves (by the 82nd Airborne Division) until sufficient forces had been landed by sea to resist the counterattacks by our defending forces (the strength of which had been held in mobile reserve).”

Kurt Student General der Flieger Troops

“[Foot note:-] The above opinion was rendered at the Nuremburg Trials by General Kurt Student  foremost authority in the German army on Airborne Operations. Student commanded the German Airborne Operation on Crete and was Chief of Staff of all German Paratroops from 1943 until his capture by allied forces after the German collapse.” Source: “Saga of the All American: History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II”, Dawson, F., 1946 page 92

 

 

General Kurt Student

Source: Wikipedia commons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1979-128-26,_Bernhard-Hermann_Ramcke,_Kurt_Student_crop.jpg

Bill never talked directly about Biazza Ridge after the war to anyone I know of until near the end of his life. At times I tried to ask him about it, but he always shifted the discussion in other directions. There was one conversation we had when I was 11 years old which I later discovered was related to the battle. My family was visiting the Clark farm in Ohio. During a large family gathering at the farm house, Bill studied me from a distance. He noticed I was alone and bored –  there were no other kids my age around. He approached me and asked if I wanted to go for a drive to see the covered bridges in Preble County. Feeling left out, I gladly accepted.

Bill drove me around to several bridges, all of which were impressive to say the least. We pulled over inside one of them to get out and take a closer look. He really loved those bridges. Bill explained how they were constructed, their immense age, associated maintenance issues, and what a treasure they were to the local community. He told me that he would often go out to one and just sit there to relax and reflect.

After that he fell silent and his eyes drifted. Out of nowhere he started talking anxiously and quickly as if verbalizing an “always on” continuous stream of conscious thought. He spoke mainly of rifle bullets and explosives. He described what a bullet from a 306 rifle can do to a man even from long distances. He gave graphic, detailed descriptions of what can happen to somebody when hit by a high explosive round from a German 88mm gun at close range. It was all stunning to hear. Seeing the torment on his face, I wanted to say something to help ease his pain. Having no way to relate to him, I just quietly listened. Years later the realization dawned that that was exactly what he wanted. I remember feeling deeply saddened for him. To see a person instantaneously turn into a “pink cloud” as Bill put it,  is too great a burden for any man to bear and retain his sanity – which by some miracle he was able to do.

His letter to his sister Doris gives a tantalizing clue that Bill might have fought in the Biazza Ridge battle. From it, we can at least tell that his battalion was in the battle and that therefore, he could have been there. The battalion Bill refers to was sometimes called the 505th Regimental Headquarters Battalion which included the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Service Company, and the Medical Detachment. Personnel from that unit fought at Biazza Ridge. We already know that his steps can be traced from where he actually landed to the direction of his original drop zone, which cuts through Biazza Ridge. But the question remains: was he there?

On November 4, 2005, I interviewed Bill’s older brother, Henry Clark about Bill’s war time experiences. Henry served with the US army air corps 47^th Liaison Squadron as a mechanic stationed in England, France, and Germany, so he was nearby Bill’s unit in 1944 and 1945. The brothers took advantage of several opportunities to meet one another on recreational leave. During these furloughs, Bill told Henry much of his experiences.

After Bill came back to England from Normandy, Henry wrote a letter home dated 23 July, 1944 concerning Sicily. He wrote from his station at the 47^th Liaison Squadron at Heston Aerodrome outside of London, England. Bill had come over from the 505 base at nearby Quorn to visit Henry on a six day furlough. This letter is the most revealing of all Henry’s letters concerning what Bill went through in Sicily and provides further evidence that Bill was at Biazza Ridge.

In one of the interviews with Henry I focused on a good friend of Bill’s – his best buddy – who died during the war. I asked Henry where Bill’s friend had died. Henry told me that his buddy died in Sicily during a battle with tanks:

“Did I tell you what precipitated the tank attack on those guys? A tank has got a glass thing where you can look through made of pretty heavy stuff. These guys were shooting the glass visors out of those German tanks. They [the Germans] got tired of that. All they had to do was put another one in, but they probably got tired of doing that, so they just took after them guys. Bill said that they used an 88 on his buddy [an .88mm gun mounted on the tank]. They had separated, so the guy [tank driver] has to turn around and hunt him, so Bill had a chance. He had an out there. That’s living on the edge. These were Tiger tanks too. They were heavy duty jobs. You couldn’t just shoot them down with anything. You about needed an armor piercing 88 I guess. I used to know that guy’s name because Bill liked him pretty much. It was a big shock for Bill. Bill told me it a couple times – the guy’s name.” Source: Interview with Henry Clark Jr. November 4, 2005

After the interview I handed Henry a list of names of men who died in Sicily and asked him if the man’s name was on the list. Henry couldn’t remember the friend’s name or even if it might be one of the people on the list.

 

Captured Mark VI Tiger I Tank in Tunisia, North Africa, 1943

The viewer Henry Clark talked about is a slit located opposite the machine gun and underneath the 88mm gun

Source: Wikipedia Commons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:TigerITankTunis.jpg

As Henry talked my understanding of what actually happened to Bill’s friend was startling because it pointed to Bill’s presence at the Battle of Biazza Ridge. Henry’s memories also concur with the letter mentioned above which he wrote home summarizing Bill’s experiences during Operation HUSKY.

Henry Clark Jr. Letter Home Dated 23 July 1944

 

 

---

Transcript of Henry’s Letter

Pvt. Henry Clark Jr. 15195205

47^th Liaison Sqdn APO 6A6

C/O Postmaster New York, New York

Post marked 28 July 1944

Dear folks, [Internal date] July 23^rd 1944

You are probably wondering what has become of me as you haven’t been hearing from me very often lately.

I wont try to make any excuses for not writing.

Bill dropped in to see me since I last wrote. He had a six day furlough so he spent five days down here with me.

We had quite a time an a lot of time to talk. Won’t try to tell you everything as it would take a book for that.

He’s still the same guy. The only difference I could see was a “G.I. Haircut”

He has done a lot of fighting in the “E.T.O.” an has three stars in his ribbon plus the “Purple Heart” which he doesn’t wear.

That magazine clipping I sent home outlines his story very well. He says it was the worst for him in Sicily. He hurt his knee there an also lost his gun on the jump, but according to his story he soon got another gun an had some stiff engagements with some of Jerrys panzers. He really has some stories to tell, some of them are amusing an some are not so amusing.

He is definitely a soldier an a good one with a lot of experience behind him. All of this helps out. He says “The first engagement is the hardest.” Bet Pap can vouch for that. Bill will have plenty of stories to tell when he gets home.” [The letter continues, but talks of activities and events concerning the latter part of the war]

As ever.

                                             Junior

---

Henry’s 1944 letter and Bill’s own letter written to his sister in 1945 are proof that Bill was at Biazza Ridge. The only other tank battles fought by the 505 in Sicily occurred nearby west of Biazza Ridge where 1^st Battalion 505 was engaging the western kampgruppe of the Hermann Goring Division. Those men fought the smaller, but no less powerful Mark IV Tigers. Bill is clear in his letter to Doris that his battalion fought the larger Mark VI Tigers – the same ones that Col. Gavin’s mixed units (consisting of personnel from Company B of the 307th Combat Engineers, Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Service Company, as well as G and H Companies) fought at Biazza Ridge.

It’s certain that Bill was there and fought in the battle. From what we now know, the battle can be reconstructed from Bill’s perspective – the subject of the next post.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.

The Battle of Biazza Ridge

Operation Husky: Axis Forces in Sicily

In July 1943, the defenses of Sicily were as follows: there were between 200,000 and 300,000 Italian troops; and about 30,000 Germans on the island. The Italian forces were comprised of several divisions with troops spread thinly over the island’s coastal defenses, but they were poorly equipped and suffered from low morale. Most would surrender due to their hatred of the War and Mussolini. The supreme Axis commander for Sicily was General Alfredo Guzzoni. The Axis troops made up the Italian VI Army. It is widely recognized that although the German forces were part of the Italian VI Army, they were firmly under the control of Field Marshall Kesselring the top German commander in Sicily who reported directly to the German high command in Berlin.

 

Italian General Guzzoni

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 77. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-4.html

The German defenses were comprised of the 15^th Panzer Grenadier Division, stationed near Marsala and Trapani in the Western tip of Sicily and the Hermann Goring Panzer Division which was deployed inland behind the Gela beaches around Niscemi in the east and Biscari (now named Acate) in the west. See Map 1 below.

 

Map 1: Distribution of Axis and Allied Forces July 10, 1943

Source: “Sicily Campaign”, Birtle, Andrew J., 1993 U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved May 2, 2011, from http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/map1.JPG.

The Axis strategists knew they didn’t have enough armed forces to win against an Allied invasion of Sicily and realized that their only hope was to stop an invasion early by pushing the Allies back into the sea before they could gain any foot hold. There were two perceived landing areas, one on the beaches around Gela and the other in the West, near Marsala and Trapani. Field Marshall Kesselring saw the potential of an Allied landing near Marsala and shortly before the invasion convinced General Guzzoni to transfer the 15^th Panzer Grenadier’s from Gela to that area. Source: “Sicily Campaign”, Birtle, Andrew J., 1993, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Retrieved May 2, 2011, from http://www.45thdivision.org/CampaignsBattles/sicily.htm.

German Field Marshal Kesselring

Source: “United States Army in World War II European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command”, Pogue F. 1954, Page 212. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-11.html 

The 15^th Panzer Division was at full strength, and if they stayed near Gela the outcome could have been very different for the Allies. A “panzer” division is German for an armored division being composed of armored tanks, personnel carriers, infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft units, and signal corps, etc. Designed for Blitzkrieg, (which translates to “lightning war” in English) its units were mobile and mechanized.

The other main German force on Sicily, the Hermann Goring Panzer Division, had its roots as a Nazi police battalion created in 1933 by the then Minister of the Interior, Hermann Goring. It notoriously took part in part in the purge of Hitler’s enemies during the Night of Long Knifes, between June 30 and July 2, 1934. In 1935 it was designated the Regiment General Goring, a component of the Luftwaffe where it trained and served primarily as an anti-aircraft flak unit. In 1942 it was transformed into the Hermann Goring Division, which was composed of 5000 paratroops; the remains of several parachute outfits from campaigns fought on the Eastern Front and Crete. It was sent to Tunisia where after fighting with distinction, it surrendered in May 1943 with scant members escaping to Sicily. At the time of Operation HUSKY, the Hermann Goring Division was re-designated “Panzer-Division Hermann Goring” and was in the process of growing to the size of a true panzer division. Source: “Axis History Facebook”, M. Wendel, 2009. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=233

Later during the Italian campaign, the Hermann Goring Division was found to have committed atrocities:

“Evidence has been found to show that a large number of the atrocities in Italy was committed by the Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Division. Notable offenders also were l Parachute Division, 16 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and 114 Light Division.” Source: “Report of British War Crimes Section of Allied Force Headquarters on German Reprisals for Partisan Activities in Italy” Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VIII. USGPO, Washington, 1946/pp.572-582 S. Stein 1999. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/partisans1.htm.

Later in the War,  The Hermann Goring Division was sent to Poland where on August 4, 1944, it fought in Warsaw as one of the units carrying out  Hitler's orders to destroy the city:

“The Hermann Goering Armored Division advanced into the center of the city, driving civilians in front of its tanks as a protective shield and for the purpose of disassembling the barricades.” Source:  “For over two months...” Gessing, P., 2000, Polish Academic Information Center, University at Buffalo. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from http://info-poland.buffalo.edu/classroom/uprising.html.

Even if it had yet to commit these atrocities, one could reasonably surmise that the Division would be expected to be tough and ruthless with its roots as a Nazi police battalion bearing the name of one of the worst Nazi criminals of the War. After HUSKY, the name “Hermann Goring Division” was tantamount to describing a malevolent brutality that would endlessly sear the hearts and torment the minds of the men in the 505 who fought them at Biazza Ridge.

In June of 1943, the Division was being reorganized under the command of General Paul Conrath – the same man who led them in Tunisia. During HUSKY, its reorganization was still in progress so it was under strength and included some unproven personnel. Despite this the division was an inarguably powerful force, being composed approximately of:

• Over 100 tanks including a company of 17 Mark VI Tiger I heavy tanks from the 215th Tank Battalion,
• Mobile units of anti tank, anti aircraft, and artillery,
• Reconnaissance units,
• 2 infantry battalions, and the
• 3^rd and 4^th Fallschirmjager regiments from the 1st Parachute Division.

Sources: “On to Berlin” Gavin, J pp 36 – 38, 1978 and “Comando Supremo: Italy at War” (sic), Heddlesten, J. Retrieved May 2, 2011, from http://www.comandosupremo.com/Sicily.html

As reported in an earlier blog post, Preparing for Operation HUSKY – Invasion of Sicily the 505 leaders, except for General Omar Bradley  had no idea that the Hermann Goring Division was in the area.

 

General Paul Conrath Commander of the Herman Goring Division

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 80. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-4.html

Operation Husky: Allied Forces

An early plan called for the invasion of Sicily at two points simultaneously, one in the northwest corner around Marsala and Trapani and the other in the southeast corner of the island around Gela and Syracuse (see Map 1 above). In these locations there was a natural combination of good landing beaches, ports, and airfields. The Axis opposition to the invasion was expected to be strong because German troops had proved worthy opponents in Tunisia, and this would be the first time the Italians would be defending their own country. This led to General Eisenhower adopting a conservative plan which called for an invasion of Sicily at the Island’s southeastern corner.

The invasion would consist of seaborne landing troops supported by airborne infantry. The British 8^th Army under Montgomery was to land on beaches starting at the Pachino Peninsula and ending to the south near Syracuse. The British objectives included capturing the cities of Augusta, Catania, an airfield at Gerbini, and then Messina.

The US 7^th Army of which the 82^nd Airborne Division was a part was made up of 200,000 men under General Patton. It would land on beaches in the Gulf of Gela. The US 1^st Division would land on the beaches directly around Gela. Its job was to capture the adjacent airfields, then move into Niscemi. The 45^th Infantry Division would land to the right of the 1^st Division on the beaches west of Scoglitti. It was to capture Comiso and Ragusa where it would meet up with the British 8^th Army. The 82^nd Airborne Division's 505^th PIR and 504^th PIR 3^rd battalion objective was to take and hold the high ground north of the beaches in front of the 1^st Division. They were also to take and block the road leading south from Niscemi and the intersection at Piano Lupo called the “Y”. The 3^rd Division would land on the beaches around Licata. It was charged with the security of the left flank of the 1^st Division. The seaborne Allied invasion forces were to land simultaneously at 02:45am, July 10^th 1943. Source: “Sicily 1943”, Birtle A. J. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm

 

Gela Beach Looking East toward Scoglitti

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 90. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-4.html

 

The Sicilian Coastline looking West from Scoglitti

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 140. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

Upon reaching the early objectives of the invasion, the US forces were given somewhat ambiguous orders to support the British push toward Messina. The British general Alexander was the chief planner for the invasion, and he had chosen to leave the details of how to take the rest of the island until after early invasion objectives were reached. When it came time to make these decisions, the US forces were ordered to halt at Highway 124. It was deemed that this road was needed so that the British 8^th Army could drive up through the middle of the island. This would make the US 7^th Army defunct, a fact that upset the US brass, and in particular General Patton, who had assumed that once successful the US forces would continue to advance along side the British all the way to Messina. Unfortunately for Montgomery, Patton decided to take advantage of the situation by using some of his forces to attack the Germans in the north and west of the British, taking Trapani, Palermo and pushing on to liberate Messina, ultimately reaching the city before Montgomery.

The Axis Response

General Paul Conrath, with his Hermann Goring Panzer Division was in the best possible position to push Patton’s 7^th Army invasion force back into the sea on the night of July 9^th – 10^th. Recognizing the importance of the beaches around Gela and Scoglitti to an Allied invasion he had already deployed his division about 25 miles inland from the invasion beaches (See Map 1 above and Map 2 below). His forces were far enough back to be out of reach from naval guns, but close enough to strike quickly in the event of an amphibious invasion. There was also a road network which gave him two separate approaches to the invasion beaches. One was to the west leading from Niscemi to the beaches where the 1^st division was to land. The other was in the east and led from Biscari (Now named Acate) to the beaches where the 45^th division would land. Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978, pp. 35-36

Conrath took advantage of the road network and its close proximity to the beaches by dividing his forces into two battle groups, each one was called a “Kampfgruppe”. In the event of an Allied amphibious invasion, the Western Kampfgruppe would attack the beaches around Gela via the Niscemi road, while the Eastern Kampfgruppe would attack the beaches around Scoglitti via Biscari (now named Acate). On its way down to the beaches, the eastern group would pass through Biazza Ridge. Source: Ibid, page 35-36

Map 2:View The German Counter Offensive July 10 - 11th in a larger map

(Click on the lines and other icons for information about troop concentrations, positions, and movements.)

 News of the imminent  invasion had already reached General Guzzoni in his Axis 6^th Army Headquarters before any Allied troops landed. As soon as word reached General Conrath he wasted no time and at 10:00pm on July 9 while Bill’s C-47 was still over the Mediterranean, he alerted his command of the possible Allied invasion around Gela and Scoglitti. However, he quickly ran into problems. By the time subsequent communications were made, Bill had jumped and his fellow paratroopers from the 505 and 3^rd battalion of the 504^th PIR had cut the communication lines during the night of July 9 and early morning of the 10. Conrath was unable to communicate with any Axis forces including his own, resulting in failure of his units to receive orders. In addition, the 3^rd battalion of 504 had landed near its assigned DZ and was attacking columns of Conrath’s Western Kampfgruppe causing confusion and panic. Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978, pp. 35-36

The Axis counter offensive had suffered badly. In part because of the communications failure they missed their opportunity to reach the beaches and stop the landings at Gela. By 2:45am on July 10 the landings by the 1^st Infantry Division around Gela and those of the 45^th Division were well underway. The landings were a success due in large part to the heroic efforts of the troopers from 1st Battalion, 505. They were able to stop the advance of the counter attacks of the Western Kampfgruppe consisting of Mark IV Tiger tanks and other armor moving along the road from Niscemi towards the beaches around Gela. They also captured the “Y” - a vital road intersection allowing access to the beaches between Niscemi and Gela. Source: Ibid, page 38-41

The “Y” Road Junction Leading to the Invasion Beaches from Niscemi and Vittoria

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 137. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

 

Ponto Drillo, the Causeway over the Acate River – 5 miles from the “Y”. Seized by the 505 on July 10

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 118. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

Finally, Field Marshall Kesselring was able to get through to the 6^th Army, who relayed the orders for the Hermann Goring Division to continue their attack early on the morning of July 11.  As a result the final attack from the Western Kampfgruppe consisting of German tanks and armor was launched that morning from the Ponte Olivo airfield  - west and out of range of the formidable paratrooper positions - across open flat country toward the invasion beaches. It was stopped on the outskirts of Gela by the veteran 1st Infantry Division. Source: Ibid, page 38-41

Wrecked German Tanks on the Gela Plain after Their Defeat by the 1st Infantry Division

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 171. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

 

Typical Axis Defensive Positions on the Coast Road East of Licata

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 134. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

By the afternoon of July 10, the Eastern Kampfgruppe of the Herman Goring Division moved south toward the left and right flanks of the US 45^th division beachhead. The force consisted of the 1^st panzer Grenadier Regiment (consisting of 2 battalions), one armored artillery battalion, and one heavy panzer company, consisting of 17 Mark VI Tiger I heavy tanks each weighing sixty tons and mounting an 88mm main gun. Source: Ibid, page 35-36

This force amounted to 700 infantry, a battalion of self-propelled artillery, and a company of Tiger tanks. Source: “Sicily 1943”, Birtle A. J., U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm

By the early morning of July 11, the eastern Kampfgruppe was at Biazza Ridge as can be seen in Map 2 above. This is the force that Gavin was going to attack.

 The Battle of Biazza Ridge

Biazza Ridge is a place of honor, a place of respect. In Fort Bragg, there’s a housing development that bears it’s name. This is the place where the famous battle between the Hermann Goring Panzer Division and elements of the 505 took place.

After making a long trek from his actual drop zone, Col. Gavin arrived in Vittoria early on the morning of July 11, where he heard reports that there were paratroopers a few miles to the west. He headed in that direction to find the 3^rd Battalion getting organized. Col. Krause, the 3^rd Battalion commander, told Gavin that there were Germans between their position and Gela, where the 45^th Division was engaging them. Gavin took a platoon of 307^th combat engineers and headed west on the highway leading from Vittoria to Gela. Soon he heard gun fire and continued down the road. At this time it was about 8:30am. He reached a point where a railway crossed the road and saw Biazza Ridge in front of him about half a mile away and 100 feet high with a gradual slope to the east. The firing he had heard earlier was coming from the ridge and its intensity was increasing. The firing was from Germans of the Hermann Goring Division and the 180^th US Infantry. They had engaged each other on the west side of the ridge south of the highway. The Germans were occupying the ridge. Gavin deployed his platoon of engineers ordering them to take the ridge. He then sent for 3^rd battalion and they came. Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978 page 28

505 Troopers Advancing on Biazza Ridge, Morning July 11

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 166. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

“As Company G, 505^th, leading the 3^rd Battalion, swept across the ground in front of the ridge, pinned down engineers and headquarters troopers jumped to their feet and joined in the assault up the Eastern slope.” Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005, page 74

The ridge was soon captured because the German’s pulled back in front of the Company G attack that contained troopers from Regimental Headquarters Company. Source: Ibid page 74. Several riggers were also present in the initial attack and Bill could well have been one of them:

“The American Parachutists, a hodgepodge collection of engineers, cooks, orderlies, riggers, clerks, and riflemen, had no field guns, antitank guns or tanks and would be vastly outnumbered in the looming confrontation.”  Source: Breurer, W., “Drop Zone Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike, July 1943”, 1983, page 138

 

505 Troopers on top of Biazza Ridge, July 11

Image Source: The U.S. Army Military History Institute. Retrieved May 2, 2011 from  http://www.carlisle.army.mil/AHEC/mediagallery/photoGallery.cfm?id=50

Credit: WWII Army Signal Corps

The troopers pushed the Germans over the top and down the western slope of the ridge. Fire intensified with mortars, artillery and machine guns. The Germans swiftly counterattacked, and the troopers were forced back over the ridge’s crest. At that point Company H took over the attack from Company G. They were ordered to fix bayonets and then charged over the ridge engaging the Germans in bloody hand to hand combat, killing many of them and forcing a German retreat. Sometime at this point the men on the ridge first heard the German tanks. The troopers on the ridge chased the Germans down the western side. The Germans counterattacked again, using tanks in addition to the infantry. The tanks were Mark VI Tiger tanks each equipped with an 88mm cannon. There were 17 of them. The tanks began firing at individual troopers with their 88mm cannons. Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005, page 74 - 75

“Sergeant Bill Bishop, with Company G, hadn’t had enough time to dig a slit trench, when one of the Mark VI tanks came up the gentle slope toward him, suddenly stopping close by. ‘Me and a fellow named Duke Boswell were laying within two or three feet from the tank treads in a small ditch. They would shoot at a single man with the 88’s they had on those tanks. They killed a bunch of people with that 88. They ran over one man’s legs. Of course he died from shock. His name was [Sergeant] Gerald Ludlam.’” Source: Ibid Page 76

Col. Gavin later commented on the power of a Tiger tank:

“A Tiger tank is an awesome thing to encounter in combat. Weighing more than 60 tons, armed with an 88 mm. gun and machine guns, it was far more formidable than anything we had ever seen, and we had nothing in our own armored forces to compare with it.” Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978 page  31

Mark VI “Tiger I” Heavy Battle Tank in Sicily, 1943

Source: Wikipedia Commons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J14953,_Sizilien,_Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg

A review of the Tiger VI technical specifications reveals its terrible power. The PzKpfw, Mark VI Tiger I Heavy Battle Tank, coded by the German Army as the “SdKfz 181”, commonly known as a “Tiger I” had a crew of 5 and was in service from 1942 - 1945. Boasting a 88mm gun mounted on its swiveling turret, the Tigers must have seemed like mobile artillery to the men of the Allied units who encountered them. They had two MG 34 792mm machine guns, one in the turret and the other on the front of the hull. The tank’s defensive armor was 1.02” thick (26mm) at its minimum and 4.33” (100mm) at its maximum. At 27 feet long (8.25m), 12’3” (3.73 m) wide, and 9’4” (2.85m) tall, the Tiger Mark VI was one of the most massive tanks of the entire war.

It weighed an enormous 121,253 lb (55,000 Kg) yielding a ground pressure of 14.8 lb/in² (1.04 Kg/cm²). But for all of its weight, the Tiger I was fast enough and had a long range. It boasted road speeds of 24 MPH (38 KM/h), cross country speeds of 12 MPH (20KM/h) and a maximum range of 62 miles (100 KM). The tank’s field agility was equally impressive, as it was able to drive over any reinforced vertical obstacle standing 2’7” (80cm high) and move through trenches as deep as 5’11” (1.8m). Its fording depth was 4’ (1.2m). Rounding out its agility, the weapon could tackle gradients as steep as 35 degrees. All these reasons made the  Tiger I one of the most fearsome Blitzkrieg weapons in the German arsenal. After the “King Tiger” manufactured in 1944 for the Russian Front it was the most powerful tank of WWII. It’s easy to see why the German tank crews driving them felt invincible. Source: “Tanks of the World”, Miller D., 2000, pp. 121-122

The 505 troopers were using bazooka teams to try and take out the tanks. A bazooka team consisted of two men. One loaded the shell into the bazooka and the other man took aim and fired. The operation took time to perform. From the time a bazooka team got into their position, loaded, aimed, and fired, they were exposed and vulnerable. The tanks took advantage of this by turning their 88mm cannons on the bazooka teams and blowing them away. The Tigers also had machine guns mounted and would use these with devastating effect on the pinned down troopers. Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005, pp. 76-77

At this point the German tanks and infantry couldn’t break through the 505 line. The tanks would run low of ammunition and needed to periodically fall back to supply teams to replenish. Moreover, the 505 held the high ground on the ridge making it difficult for the German infantry to take the hill even with the tank support.

As the battle progressed, wounded troopers were arriving in increasing numbers all telling of how the Tigers were firing at individuals with their 88s. German prisoners were coming back too:

“They said they were from the Hermann Goring Parachute Panzer Division. I remember one of them asking if we had fought with the Japanese in the Pacific; he said he asked because the paratroopers had fought so hard.” Source: “Onto Berlin” Gavin, J., 1978, page 30

The Tiger supported infantry attacks continued until the afternoon of July 11. During the day small groups of troopers were arriving and as they came in they were sent to the front line to reinforce the men on the ridge.  Even with all the new arrivals, it wasn’t going to be enough because the 505 didn’t have any heavy weapons to deal with the Tigers and infantry alone couldn’t destroy them. Gavin was determined to hold the ridge. He resolved that if the tanks overran their position, they would remain on the ridge and engage the German infantry. The tanks would have continued on to the beach in an attempt to push the 45^th Division back into the sea. Source: Ibid page 77-78

In the letter to his sister, Bill writes:

“This all took place on one of those dark days that my battalion was fighting 13 “Mark 6” or “tiger tanks” with 30 caliber rifles an two 75 m.m Howitzers.” Source: William Clark, Letter to his Sister, Doris Clark, June 13^th 1945, page 2-3

Gavin had insisted on parachuting with two pack 75mm howitzers. These were the same weapons that Bill mentioned in his letter. At this point, Col. Gavin got the howitzers and placed them in camouflaged positions just underneath the eastern side of the ridge. When the tanks got to the top of the ridge they would have their softer undersides exposed. This is when the howitzers would open fire aiming at their underside, hopefully taking them out.

By the time the howitzers were in place, one tank had broken through the lines and was chewing up the troopers. One of the howitzer teams took shots at it, and it retreated. Due to the smoke and dust from the howitzer attack, it was unclear what, if any damage was sustained by the retreating Tiger.

A little later at about 4:00pm, the Tigers were advancing and had come to within 50 yards of Gavin’s command post. It looked like they were going to crest the ridge and overrun the 505 entirely. At that moment, Gavin’s men were able communicate with the Navy and they called in an artillery barrage from the 155 mm Naval guns. Following the intense bombardment, the Germans withdrew and regrouped about a mile away. By about 6:00pm word came that reinforcements were coming. They arrived around 7:00pm consisting of Sherman tanks from the 45^th Infantry Division and about 50 more paratroopers from Regimental Headquarters Company led by Lt. Swingler of the Service Company.

With the additional troopers and heavy artillery, Gavin decided to counterattack in order to strengthen their position in the event that the Germans decided to attack again. At around 8:30pm the 505 attacked with everyone that was present including:

“….regimental clerks, cooks, truck drivers, everyone who could carry a rifle or carbine was in the attack.” Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005 page 81

Although the troopers were under fierce fire from the Tigers, machine guns, mortars and small arms the attack was successful, and the Germans retreated thus ending the battle of Biazza Ridge. During the fight, Lt. Swingler came upon a Tiger sitting in the road with its crew outside. He dropped a grenade among them and the explosion killed all of them. It was the first Tiger captured during the battle.

In the aftermath, men were picked to dig graves and the fallen paratroopers were temporarily buried.

“Head bowed in prayer, Capt. Al Ireland peeked at the resolute regimental commander who stood looking down at the graves. There were tears in Colonel Gavin’s eyes.” Source: Breurer, W., “Drop Zone Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike, July 1943”, 1983, page 139

Col. Gavin (Right) at Biazza Ridge Morning of July 11

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy” Garland
A., etal., 1993, page 169. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from  http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Sicily/USA-MTO-Sicily-6.html

 

Below is a newspaper article from my collection that gives a good summary of the participation of paratroopers in the Sicily invasion. The way it reads, it’s certainly recounting the actions of the 505. The team commander referred to is Col. Gavin.

 

Newspaper Article summarizing the paratroopers’ participation in the invasion.

Source: Dayton Herald, circa July 12 1943

 

The next post will focus on establishing Bill’s presence and reconstructing his participation in the battle of Biazza Ridge.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.

Journey to the Collection Point

Bill’s firefight at the pill box on the night of July 9 through the morning of July 10 in my last blog post is a typical account of the type of engagements reported in a document entitled “82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy” which contains a section entitled “505^th Parachute Infantry Reports”, dated August 14, 1943. Anyone researching the 505’s movements during the Sicilian and Italian campaigns will find this source very useful.

Source: 82^nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy

It can be downloaded for free from the Combined Arms Research Library (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/contentdm/home.htm) of the Command and General Staff College (http://carl.army.mil/)

After the mis-drop and as they made their way to their collection point, the report states on page 22, that small groups of Headquarters serial troopers attacked pill-boxes and enemy strong points throughout the night and morning on July 10. They were true to Colonel Gavin’s order regarding the enemy to “attack him wherever found”. One of these groups was led by Gavin himself, and it moved south in the direction of the beach to provide support to the 45^th Infantry Division which had made its landing during the night. Gavin’s group joined with units of the 45^th at 2:40am on July 10.

Another Headquarters serial group commanded by Lt. Swingler of Service Company held the high ground on the main road leading in from the beach that was to be used by the 45^th Division coming in to relieve the paratroopers after establishing a beachhead. Swingler’s group destroyed an armored vehicle attempting to move to the beach. They also prevented the movement of enemy from the beach to the interior once the 45^th Division had made their landing. They captured five officers and 96 men in this operation and large caches of material including enemy machine guns as well as taking out several pill boxes.

It is noted that after sunrise on July 10, Lt. Swingler’s group was located:

…..“at a crossroads pillbox, (by then abandoned) where Swingler conducted a brief service while we buried (temporarily) three Regimental Headquarters Company men KIA, probably during the night in front of that pillbox. Those three were [Private David J. Jr.] McKeown, [Private First Class Thomas D.] Adams, and [Private William J.] Kerrigan. This was south of Vittoria, probably in the vicinity of Santa Croce Camerina”. (Nordyke, “All American All the Way” 2005 p. 58)

On page 30 of the 505^th Parachute Infantry Report, it states that:

“The Headquarters serial …. was dropped between St. Croce Camerina and Vittoria”

The position of this part of the Headquarters serial after jumping, their movements and objectives is consistent with a letter Bill wrote to his sister dated June 13, 1945 recollecting the events of July 9 – 12, 1943:

“We were about 4 miles inland, near the village of “Santa Crousa” [sic] a few miles from Gela our job was to attack the Italian and German coastal defenses from the rear which was far from a picnic” (William Clark, Letter to Doris Clark June 13, 1945 p. 3)

From these sources, it’s clear that Bill was among the men from the Headquarters serial attacking pill boxes in area of Vittoria and St. Croce Camerina during the night and morning of July 10. (See Map 1, repeated below from my last blog post). The map shows Bill’s actual Drop Zone (shaded area in bottom right), the planned Drop Zone and collection point for his company (shaded area in the top left corner), and the direction of his trek to the collection point (line connecting shaded areas).

Map 1: View Bill's Actual and Planned Drop Zones in a larger map

 

As noted above, Pvt. David J. McKeown was one of the soldiers found dead by Lt. Swingler’s group in front of the cross roads pill box on the morning of July 10. Early in my research, I ran across an article containing interviews of some paratroopers before takeoff for the invasion. David McKeown of the 505 Regimental Headquarters Company was among those interviewed. Read the article below for what he had to say before the jump:

Source: Dayton Herald, July 12, 1943

“I’m rarin’ to go – I’m all on edge and my nickname is Dandy Dan.”

– David McKeown July 9, 1943.

A few hours later, David was to die in the pill box battle. His death was tragic given the almost playful exuberance he expressed on boarding his C-47. An exuberance which takes on a distinct grotesque quality when you realize that he had to will himself to think unimaginable and unmentionable thoughts in order to feel prepared, even eager, to plunge into a battle where the only outcome was one of either his life or his death. All the paratroopers who jumped that night would have to make similar mental gyrations to get right with what they were about to do and what might happen to them.

Friendly Fire from the Navy

After his own pill box battle, Bill eventually joined up with some fellow troopers headed toward the collection point in the top left of Map 1 above. By the evening of July 10, the group stopped to dig fox holes and rest before moving further. They had a frightening experience that night during an Allied naval bombardment of the Sicilian coast line. In 1999, Bill related the incident in an interview with his friend Herd Bennett:

“Bill states that the U.S. navy had shelled the island on his first night after the jump [night of July 10] and that the navy was shelling him and his fellow members of the 505^th by mistake. The reason for this was that ‘The German Air Force went in just ahead of us and the Navy was trying to take out those planes and was, in the process, hitting us’. He indicates that a large U.S. naval shell hit the rocks 10 feet from where he was lying, but failed to explode. He states that if it had exploded, he would have never known what hit him. The next day, he found the shell lying several feet away from where it had initially hit. Bill states that he was in the process of trying to dig a fox hole when this shell landed. Bill also stated that after he found the shell, ‘The clowns who were with me began picking at it with sticks and I had to tell them that they were crazy and to just leave it where it was.’” Herd L. Bennett as told to him by William Clark, August 19, 1999.

He also made mention of the shelling in a letter to his sister:

“To make things worse the night before [ night of July 10] our own navy shelled us for a few hours…” (William Clark, Letter to Doris Clark June 13, 1945 p. 3)

Other accounts indicate that another reason for this was Allied ships were bombing pre-designated targets on the Island. The 505 were in the same areas where the shelling took place. It was unknown to the Navy that the paratroopers had been mis-dropped and were in fact in the zones assigned for bombardment.

The next morning,  on July 11, Bill’s group set out again toward their destination, but they would never make it. As shown in map 2 below, while moving to the collection point they would have to pass through a region that would become infamously known as “Biazza Ridge” (indicated by the line intersecting the original route).

 

Map 2: View Regimental Serial Movements in a larger map

 

Neither Bill or his compatriots had any clue they were headed straight into hell and history.

 

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2011 All Rights Reserved.

Bill’s First Combat Jump

The date of today’s post is Veteran’s Day here in the United States – November 11, 2010 . I want to take this opportunity and thank all of our veterans, past and present for their sacrifices made for our freedom and to keep our country safe from harm.

The Jump

The 40 mile an hour winds recorded by the C-47 crews over the Mediterranean Sea persisted over the Sicilian coastline and the Drop Zone (DZ) at the jump altitude of 400 feet. During training, the jumps were canceled if the wind exceeded 15 miles an hour because of a much higher likelihood of injury in stronger winds.

Only a few of the seasoned paratroopers had ever jumped in winds above 25 miles an hour. Despite these impossible conditions, when the jump light indicator changed from RED to GREEN, the order to stand up and hook up was given. Bill shuffled toward the rear of the aircraft burdened by his heavy load. His feet followed the heals of the man in front until no more floor was left. The howling dark wind was punctuated by beautiful terrifying flashes of light from thundering munitions. Whipping ropes of anti-aircraft tracers streamed up from the ground, occasionally exploding nearby and rocking the aircraft. Taking a deep breath of the suicidal gale, and with a hefty measure of faith, Bill hurled himself out of the door.

Bill had a terrifying experience on this, his first combat jump. From the reports of C-47 pilots and his own recollections, we gain an insight into the conditions facing the men in the Headquarters Company serial. At 400 feet when Bill left the relative safety of his aircraft, he could hear the explosions, the ack-ack of anti-aircraft fire, the sirens wailing, the burps of German MG 42 machine guns, and the pops and cracks from small arms fire. Perhaps, he heard the wind blown voices of the enemy below.

He had almost certainly never jumped in such high winds before, and due to the wind, he couldn’t have been sure from which direction the sounds emanated. Were they directly below him? Or were they off to the left? Maybe the right? Perhaps they were behind him? He probably could see the flames of Gela burning to the north west, circled by the tracer fire from the anti-aircraft batteries that surrounded the city. Other fires could likely be seen burning far off and much closer to him. His long distance vision would have been obscured by the haze from the pre-invasion Allied air attack. He probably smelled the cordite from explosions, and the wood and oil smoke from the fires. In the poorly lit conditions, he was unsure of the terrain. His eyes strained while his hands vainly pulled on his risers hopefully heading for a favorable patch of dirt.

The ground was especially rocky on Sicily and jumping at a low altitude of 400 feet many troopers were injured with broken legs, ankles, bad sprains, and so on. Bill was among these men. He landed hard, badly jarring his knees. Full of adrenalin he said he didn’t even notice the pain in his knees until later. Bill would suffer the pain until he had a chance to visit an aid station later in the invasion possibly in the early morning of July 10^th.

The Post Jump Firefight

During a visit with Bill in 1996, he told me about his jump into Sicily. He said that after he jumped he hit the ground landing roughly on solid bedrock. Bill felt for his Tommy gun, but it wasn’t there. The jump winds were so strong that they snapped the cord which connected his primary weapon to his jumpsuit and had sent it hurtling away from him. Now his only weapon was the combat bayonet sheathed in his boot. Using his switchblade jump knife, he hurriedly cut though his jump gear and took off his parachute harness. Looking around he found that he was alone.

He did his best to hide his chute in the sparse countryside and took out his compass and silk invasion map. He knew he landed short of the drop zone. From his vantage point of about 200 meters, he could see the glow of Gela burning far away to the north west. He decided to cut across country towards the Headquarters Company planned collection point.

The Headquarters serial actual DZ is shown in the bottom right hand corner of the map below. It’s in an area about 30 miles from the planned DZ and collection point which is located in the top left hand corner of the map. The north west direction Bill set out in is also shown on the map as a blue line.

View Bill's Actual and Planned Drop Zones in a larger map

 

Not far into his trek, Bill came across a pill box complex like the one pictured below.

 

A German Pill Box in the area around Vittoria

Source: Author’s Collection

 

Same Pill Box Obscured by Grass

Source: Author’s Collection

He heard the voices of maybe two or three enemy soldiers outside the pill box. They were moving around in the dark apparently on a perimeter patrol looking for paratroopers. They were unaware of his presence. He quietly lay motionless in some grass as one moved toward his position.  He waited for him to pass, then rose, grabbed him from behind and using his bayonet blade, stabbed him to death. The man was a German soldier armed with an MP-40 submachine gun. Bill took the MP-40, rolled away several feet and then lay low on the ground.

The other enemy soldiers heard the attack and ran back into the pill box complex shouting. Very soon after, enemy troops began pouring out of the entrance. They too were Germans. He said that they were coming out of the pill box like a bunch of angry bees out of a hive. He said he shot them as they ran out and kept firing until no more came out.  He didn’t say if there were other troopers with him. There must have been others because he said the pill box was taken during the fight.

After it was over he picked up a Lugar pistol from a dead German officer and kept it as a souvenir. He sat down briefly to take stock when an unexpected wave of self disgust surged through him at the realization of how many men had died at his hands.

When he recovered he continued the trek to the Headquarters collection point, in the vicinity of the planned DZ in the map above.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2009 - 2010 All Rights Reserved.

Flight to the Sicily Drop Zone

For Operation HUSKY everyone in the 505^th PIR jumped because the gliders which usually brought in Service Company personnel (besides the jumping riggers and other personnel) couldn’t land on the Island’s rocky volcanic terrain in the Drop Zone (DZ) around the Gela area. The Service Company was under the command of Regimental Headquarters commander Col. William Ekman, so they flew in the Regimental Headquarters Serial during combat jumps. This is significant, because it allows Bill’s movements before, during and after a combat jump to be traced.

In total, the 82^nd Airborne Division’s portion of the Allied airborne invasion included 226 C-47’s separated into 5 serials flown by the troop carrier groups assigned to the 52^nd Troop Carrier Wing (TCW) of the US Army Air Corps. From the 505^th PIR, the Headquarters battalion serial was flown by the 316^th Group, 1^st battalion by the 313^th Group, 2^nd battalion by the 61^st Group, and 3^rd battalion by the 314^th Group. 

Planes started to leave the aerodromes nearby the Kairouan base at 8:10pm on July 9^th and continued until 9:16pm. For the 505^th PIR, the first serial included 3^rd Battalion while 1^st battalion was carried in the second serial . The third serial carried Regimental Headquarters, with 2^nd battalion in the forth. (After Action Report: Operation HUSKY)

Bill’s Headquarters serial was comprised of 33 planes and contained Headquarters Personnel, the Headquarters Service and Demolition Squad, the 307^th Engineers, the 456^th Artillery, and the 307^th Medical Corps. The first plane from this serial took off at 8:35pm on July 9^th from the Enfidaville aerodrome. It was the lead plane carrying Col. Gavin. Planes took off in groups of three at 30 second intervals. After take off each group of three planes formed a V shape and then joined to form a larger group, ideally consisting of nine planes in a series of Vs as depicted in Figure 1. Each nine plane group was separated by a flying time of six to 10 minutes. Source: Ingrisano, M., 1991, “Valor Without Arms: A History of the 316^th Troop Carrier Group 1942 – 1945”, Merriam Press: Vermont, Page 18.

Figure 1: Nine C-47 aircraft formation comprising a part of a serial

The planned flight path for Operation HUSKY is shown in Figure 2. Bill was to fly over the Mediterranean for 40 miles to a point (due west from Cape Bon)east of Sousse, Tunisia,  then to turn and head east for 202 miles toward Malta, on the way passing south of the island of Linosa. At Malta, he was to fly for 62 miles in a northeast direction. South of Cape Passero, Sicily he was to turn in a westerly direction for 35 miles, then take a jog to the northwest for 14 miles until his plane crossed the Sicilian coast near Gela and arrived over his drop zone at 11:30pm about 3 hours after take off.

Figure 2: HUSKY Flight Plan

Source: North Africa Air Force: Report of Operations

Figure 3 shows the same (approximate planned flight path) on a Google map:

Figure 3: View HUSKY Planned Flight path in a larger map

 

The actual course of Bill’s serial and that of the entire aerial armada deviated from the plan by flying south and east crossing of the island of Linosa in Figure 4 below. It then disastrously missed the turning point at Malta and instead flew east much farther than planned. It overcompensated for the error by flying too far north west, arriving at a point east of the planned Cape Passero and thereby crossing the Sicilian coast at a point far to the east south east of the planned DZ. A portion of the invasion force splintered and faired even worse by flying all the way to Syracuse (Siracusa).

 

Figure 4: View Husky Actual Flight path in a larger map

It was strong winds and bad visibility which together conspired to send the invasion force off course and over time. Ultimately the planned DZ’s were severely missed. The wind speed for the drop was predicted to be 10 to 15 miles per hour. As the serial crossed the Mediterranean, the air crews became aware that the actual wind speed was between 35 and 40 miles per hour at an altitude of 400 feet. The leading aircraft did not see the guide beacon at the Malta turning point, which led to the serial being 30 minutes late over what they thought was the DZ.  The haze from Allied bombing reduced visibility. To make things worse the light of the moon was gone having set earlier than forecast. In truth the air crews had at best only a general idea of their location.

The serial was hit by flak prior to flying over the DZ. C-47 crews reported that anti-aircraft fire was seen at Licata, Gela, and over Ponte Olivo. Gela was reported to be on fire and was encircled by light anti-aircraft fire. Ground fire was reported as light and erratic.

The scheduled jump time in Figure 2 is shown as 23:30 hours (11:30pm) on July 9^th. Due to the problems encountered, the 316^th was 36 minutes late in dropping troopers from the Headquarters serial. This means that Bill probably jumped into the sky above Sicily at about six minutes after midnight on July 10^th. He had been in his plane for three and a half hours.

After the jump, the planes of the 316^th headed back to their base near Kairouan without incident.

Quoting Michael Ingrisano, a pilot in Bill’s serial, on the success of the mission reveals just how badly they were mis-dropped:

“The 316^th fared worst of all. Deflected by the wind, it missed Linosa; it missed Malta; and it missed the south coast of Sicily.” Three planes, carrying a demolition section dropped their troops south of Syracruse, 65 miles from their objective. “Over Sicily the rest of the 316^th promptly lost their way again, dispersed, dropped their passengers, including task force commander [Gavin], all over southeastern Sicily.” Overall the results were disappointing in that less than a sixth of the paratroopers were delivered on or near the DZ………” (Ingrisano 1991, pg. 18 - 19).

According to the 505^th PIR After Action Report, the Headquarters serial was dropped about 10 miles south of Vittoria and 30 miles from its designated drop zone.

The mis-drop was a critical error and one which would nearly doom the whole invasion. When Bill saw the green jump light turn on in his C-47 he had no idea of the extent of the trouble about to engulf him.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2009 - 2010 All Rights Reserved.