Salerno, Italy. 504 PIR Battles for Altavilla and Hill 424

“…there was plenty of artillery going both ways. But the Americans were gradually losing ground. I didn’t stay but few days but from what I saw Salerno made Normandy look like a picnic.” Source: William Clark, letter dated June 13, 1945

On the evening of September 16,1943 the Allies began to think the Germans might be retreating from the Salerno area. To obtain clues of their intentions and positions the 5th Army had sent out reconnaissance patrols across the Salerno beachhead. Of particular interest to the men in the 504 were the patrols to the strategic hills around Altavilla which returned with reports of intense German artillery, and ominously, 40 panzer tanks on the opposite side of one of the hills. Source: “The operations of the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Capture of Altavilla, Italy 13 September – 19 September, 1943” Lekson, J., 1948, p. 11

As part of their preparation for the mission to retake Altavilla and hills, the 504 PIR planners were briefed on the terrain and German tactics used to defend the area. The men who briefed them were the survivors of the 36th Division, which lost so many lives in the battles to take, defend, and retake those hills:

“On the slopes of the hills were intermittent streams, dry now, that cut deep gullies into the slopes. Numerous additional erosion features such as dips and gullies marred the hillsides. Many of these had steep sides and narrow bottoms. Trails that went from Albanella to Altavilla followed north on noses jutting from the hill mass. These trails dipped through draws and gullies and often formed defiles as they did so. Lining the trails were tress and stone walls. In places, the trails moved along terraced levels with drops on one side and walls on the other. A profusion of minor footpaths and trails joined the main trail.

Cognizant of the terrain and affected by the heavy American artillery, the Germans had adopted as set of peculiar tactics to hold the hills. Occupying only certain features with outposts and observation parties, the enemy would be alerted as American troops entered the hill mass. From their covered positions would come the enemy main force, which after locating the American forces would maneuver through gullies and ditches to hit the American forces from all directions. Often they were not detected until they were on the positions. With these tactics the enemy had driven out the previous 36th Division attackers”. Source: “The operations of the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Capture of Altavilla, Italy 13 September – 19 September, 1943” Lekson, J., 1948, p. 15

The peculiar terrain; the way it favored the defenders – and the way the enemy used it to massacre part of the 36th Division – would make taking Altavilla and the hills around it a  particularly dangerous – even a suicidal – mission. Several hundred lives on both sides had already been taken. The 504 officers planning the attack must have wondered how many of their own men would perish in this insane but absolutely vital assault.

The Germans still had a powerful incentive to hold the hills behind the Salerno plain. They had fought hard up to that point to destroy the invaders. Now, on the defensive, they would fight ferociously to hold on to the village of Altavilla and its strategic hills to prevent their own cutoff and capture by the Allied forces already beginning to advance from their positions on the Salerno plain below. Moreover, they needed time for their retreating forces to reach Rome and to reorganize while constructing the first of several defensive lines across the Italian peninsula before the British 8th Army could reach them.

The German view from Altavilla down to the invasion beaches.

Source: NARA

At 3:00 PM on September 16, 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 504 PIR formed a column and began their approximately 8 mile march toward Altavilla. 1st Battalion was assigned Hill 424 to the northeast behind Altavilla. Bill’s 2nd Battalion was to take Hill 344 to the southeast and an “unnumbered” hill between the two east of Altavilla.

 Click here to view Altavilla & Hills: 16 - 18 September 1943 in a larger map

 

Map 1: The approximate route of 1st and 2nd Battalions 504 PIR from Albanella to the foothills near Altavilla

The day was hot. The pace was necessarily fast. They were targeted by German artillery as they crossed the plain to the higher ground. The column was dispersed by the shelling. These were the best trained soldiers of the US Army; physically fit and conditioned from the harsh climate of North Africa. They were rested after the end of the Sicily campaign. In a testament to the severity of the conditions some men passed out from heat exhaustion while the men with heavy mortar equipment couldn’t keep up with the column.

Their route took them though Albanella, but the Germans had already retreated from there. The men doggedly continued their march climbing into the steep hills toward their objectives. Colonel Tucker had made Albanella his headquarters for the mission. But that was a short lived decision – at least for him. Having tried and failed to raise either battalion by radio, he took troopers from the 504 Regimental Headquarters Company and some stray 505 PIR troopers, and went looking for them. He left behind a contingent of personnel to run the 504 headquarters. At around 11:00 PM he made contact with some of Company C on the northwestern side of the unnumbered hill. He discovered they had become victims of the peculiar terrain the 36th Division had described.

The village of Altavilla from the perspective of the Allies on the Salerno Plain

Source: NARA

After nightfall on the march up into the hills the column broke into fragmented groups of companies and platoons and were unable to reestablish contact with each other. In some cases the cause was men falling asleep while the rest of the column moved on. In others they were attacked by enemy machine guns and became separated. Patrols were sent back and forth to try and reestablish contact. With a paucity of maps these groups became disorientated. Even when some semblance of order was restored, in the rough terrain typified by steep hills, gullies and thick brush, groups in both battalions became confused as to their relative positions. Their disorientation was compounded by an inability to establish radio contact with one another.

When Colonel Tucker eventually found elements of Company C he expected the rest of 1st Battalion to arrive soon. Relying on this expectation, Tucker decided to take Hill 424 with a small force from his Regimental Headquarters Company and the part of Company C he stumbled upon.

The remainder of 1st Battalion had serious problems reaching Hill 424. The illusive key was to find the correct trail, in the dark, which would lead the separated Companies A, B, and the remainder of Company C to Hill 424. The terrain features and lack of maps continued to work against them making reliable  progress all but impossible. By dawn Companies A and B managed to dig in on the slopes on the northwest of the unnumbered hill, while the remainder of Company C moved from their location on that hill to the slopes of their objective – Hill 424.

“…and there was plenty of artillery going both ways.” – William A. Clark , 1945

Bill’s 2nd Battalion movements are documented in the Unit Journal of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry. In numerous places it talks about the extensive use of artillery during the battle at Altavilla. On page 22 it states:

“About 2100, [9:00 PM] we moved slowly to our high ground objective, which we reached about 0200 [2:00 AM], after numerous stops. Artillery fire was directed at our column throughout the night. The battalion dug in on the high ground assigned to us. The 1st Battalion was on the hill north of us. F Company and most of the 81 mm mortar platoon became detached from us in the dark and were somewhere to our rear”. Source: “Unit Journal of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry”. Garrison, C. 1945 p.22.

Shelling in the form of mortar, tank, self propelled gun, and naval gun fire had been frequent and at times a constant presence during the upcoming battle and during the battles for the Hills fought by the 36th Division.

On the way up into the hills Company C trooper, Ross Carter, commented in his must read book, “Those Devils in Baggy Pants”, on the artillery exchanges Bill mentioned in his letter.

“Carey, Lt. Toland, the Arab, and I were lying in a little ditch in a vineyard waiting for the column to move out ahead of us when a shell followed by three others screamed over the hill, hit mere yards from us and exploded, each explosion covering us with dirt and rocks. I’d never known real terror until that moment. The column moved on up the hill under [German] shells moaning high overhead, heading for the beaches….”. Source: “Those Devils in Baggy Pants”, Carter, R., 1951, p. 46

 

504 paratroopers firing mortar shells on German positions, September 1943

Source: Wikipedia Commons

Dawn came as Tucker’s small force dug in on the hill. The devastating effect of German artillery on the 36th Division was shocking to see. The 504 troopers saw first hand this artillery induced carnage. Ross Carter of Company C was on Hill 424 at the time and later recalled the scene:

“Cadavers lay everywhere. Having seen only a few corpses in Sicily, it was a horrible experience for us to see dead men, purpled and blackened by the intense heat, lying scattered all over the hill. The body of a huge man, eyes bloated out of their sockets, who lay dead about twenty yards from me, had swollen and burst. First lieutenant’s bars were on his shoulders. His pistol belt with open compass case and empty binocular case bore witness to the quality of our equipment: the Krauts had looted them. A broken carbine lay by the body.” Source: “Those Devils in Baggy Pants”, Carter, R., 1951, p. 46

While the 504 were reaching or searching for their objectives, the Germans had become aware of their positions on Hill 424 and on the hillside of the unnumbered hill. In the morning they sent out infantry supported by tanks and mobile artillery pieces. They were seen by Company B from their positions in the heights on the unnumbered hill and by the mixed units from 1st battalion on Hill 424. At dawn Company C sent out two patrols from Hill 424 to reconnoiter to the west and to find the rest of 1st Battalion. Both patrols were repelled by German armor and infantry. After a concentrated mortar strike on Hill 424 the German infantry launched their first attack on the hill.

“The Krautheads began counterattacking. Since only a few of our machine guns and automatic rifles had reached us, it was up to the riflemen and tommy gunners to hold off the assault. The boys lay in their foxholes around the top of the hill and calmly squeezed off their shots. A Kraut machine gun would cackle and then a heavy, deliberate trooper’s rifle shot would lay the egg! The machine gun would remain silent. American riflemen were the best in the world, and our legion riflemen [the men of the 504 PIR] were the best in the army. In about thirty minutes the attack was broken up”. Source: “Those Devils in Baggy Pants”, Carter, R., 1951, p. 50

The Germans also began attacking Company B’s position. After dawn Company B saw Germans coming from Altavilla to their positions on the hillside of the unnumbered hill. They let loose mortar fire on them. The German attack slowed and then retaliated with concentrated artillery fire. After that Germans tanks came from Altavilla and started firing on foxholes occupied by men of Companies A and B located on the slopes of the unnumbered hill. The fire was accurate and killed several men even though they were inside their protective holes. A German infantry attack followed but was defeated. At this time, with their ammunition running low, radio contact was reestablished with artillery units on the Salerno plain. They opened fire on the village of Altavilla. The German’s retreated under the Allied bombardment and launched an artillery barrage of their own on the American positions. Source: “The operations of the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Capture of Altavilla, Italy 13 September – 19 September, 1943” Lekson, J., 1948, pp. 27 – 29

At 9:30 AM the small force under Colonel Tucker on Hill 424 saw what looked like friendlies on the unnumbered hill itself. All of them abandoned Hill424 to make contact with the men down there. Upon meeting up with them, Tucker ordered Company A to retake Hill 424 with Company C in support. He gave orders for Company B to occupy the unnumbered hill. Company A advanced on Hill 424 and found the Germans moving up the hill to take it. They fought aggressively, driving the Germans down the hill. Source: “Beyond Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008 p. 94

“…from what I saw Salerno made Normandy look like a picnic” – William A. Clark , 1945

After taking the hill while organizing its defense Company A took stock of the situation. Sergeant Otto Huebner wrote a report on the scene. It mirrors what Ross Carter saw and is perhaps why Bill thought at least in his eyes that Salerno made Normandy look like a picnic.

“The sight on the hill was an unpleasant one. This was the same place that the 1st Battalion of the 142d Infantry, 36th Division, four days previously was finally forced to withdraw after great losses were inflicted on both sides. The hill was infested with scattered dead German and American soldiers, supplies and ammunition. There were machine guns still in their original emplacements, rifles, packs, clothing, ammunition belts, machine gun boxes and stacks of 60 mm mortar shells scattered all over the hill. One machine gun was still manned by two men of the 142d Infantry. The ammunition was gathered up and distributed through the company as soon as possible. Without this ammunition the hill could not have been held. The platoons began digging positions in their sectors. Fox holes dug by the 142d Infantry were improved and used in many cases. Slit trenches were also used in many instances instead of fox holes, because the hard ground made digging difficult.” Source: Huebner, O., “The Operations of Company A, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Defense of Hill 424 Near Altavilla, Italy, 17 – 19 September 1943” 1949 p. 17.

After entrenching themselves Company A came under fire from a lengthy, continuous and extremely accurate tank and artillery attack. Then German infantry tried to take the hill. Company A radioed Company B on the unnumbered hill which managed to call in an artillery strike on the advancing German troops. It stopped the attack, but after a few minutes the Germans resumed the infantry assault. Source: Huebner, O., “The Operations of Company A, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Defense of Hill 424 Near Altavilla, Italy, 17 – 19 September 1943” 1949 p. 18.

“A second counterattack was launched and again the boys picked the Krautheads off like squirrels. Kearny, lying by a thicket, saw some bushes quivering. Covering it with his rifle, he waited. A head stuck up into sight and Kearny shot the left eye out. Schneider, a German-American whose twin brother had been killed in the 9th Division in Africa, had the obsession that if he met enough Krautheads in battle he would at last find the man who killed his brother. He was watching a stretch of ground with another trooper when he saw an enemy machine gun squad advancing to attack. Schneider killed the sergeant and yelled orders in German to the remaining Krautheads. ‘You dumb ********, move to the right, or you’ll all get it.’ They obeyed the orders because they thought one of their own men was giving them. Moreover, in the strain of battle men obey anyone who appears to know what he is doing. Their right now being on the other trooper’s left, he killed three more of them. Schneider then raged out at them again. ‘You dumb sons of *******! I said go to the left. You’re all going to get it if you don’t listen to me.’ They moved to the left in front of Schneider, who killed two more.” Source: “Those Devils in Baggy Pants”, Carter, R., 1951, pp. 51 – 53

The German attack kept coming on despite these efforts. The range was close enough for both sides to use grenades in addition to rifle and small arms fire. Then an unexpected heavy barrage of artillery landed on the German positions and they began to retreat. The Germans lost about 50 men in the fight while the paratroopers lost about 25.

Late in the morning Bill’s 2nd Battalion received orders to move from Hill 344 to the unnumbered hill. According to the 2nd Battalion unit journal:

“At 13:00 the battalion began to move forward to the hill originally assigned to them, but which had been held by the 1st Battalion. We moved out with E Company in the lead, F Company, Battalion CP, Headquarters Company, and D Company. Another climb; it took at least three hours to get everybody there”. Source: “Unit Journal of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry”. Garrison, C., 1945  p.22.

In an interview with his friend Herd Bennett, Bill said the Germans had loud speakers in the trees and from these speakers, in an effort to undermine American morale, the Germans played music such as “Carry Me Back to Old Virginny”. Bill said that “the Germans thought they had us beat,…but the music just made us more determined”. Source: Interview with William Clark by Herd Bennett, January 26, 2000.

Company C came up Hill 424 to reinforce Company A. Small firefights broke out on the hill and there were periods of shelling as the Germans probed the Americans for weak points and to keep them penned down. Then at 3:00 PM they launched a massive counterattack beginning with a heavy artillery barrage for around an hour. After that they used machine gun nests to cover the advance of an estimated force of two infantry companies against the positions occupied by Companies A and C. Source: “The operations of the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Capture of Altavilla, Italy 13 September – 19 September, 1943” Lekson, J., 1948, p. 34 – 35.

The Germans were making good progress up the hill. They broke through the perimeter in places and were close enough to use grenades. The paratroopers responded killing many of them.

The attack went on for two hours. Losses were mounting on both sides. It appeared that the Germans might overrun the hill unless Allied artillery fire could halt the enemy advance. The paratroopers radioed for artillery support, but were only able to receive it from the navy. Due to the close proximity of the Germans to the troopers, the huge naval shells could easily kill men on both sides. The 504 were so desperate, they decided to chance it.

“The word was passed along for the men to get deep down in their holes as the navy began firing. The shell bursts, landing on the northwest slope, seemed to rock the entire hill. The fox holes cracked like class, and the topsoil around sprinkled into the fox holes with every burst. One could hear terror stricken screams coming from the Germans along the slope of the hill, which made one’s backbone quiver.” Source: Huebner, O., “The Operations of Company A, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Defense of Hill 424 Near Altavilla, Italy, 17 – 19 September 1943” 1949 p. 25.

Then massive artillery barrage decimated the Germans and they withdrew.

On the unnumbered hill, Bill’s 2nd Battalion unit journal recalls the bombardment:

“The Artillery became particularly stiff at about 1700 [5:00 PM]. One barrage was constant for 2 minutes. Colonel Tucker set up in our Battalion CP area…many of the regimental staff were casualties. About 1730 [5:30 PM] a messenger came through with information that we were to return to Albanella. This was much to our disgust, as we had the hill and not suffering undue casualties.” Source: “Unit Journal of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry”. Garrison, C., 1945 p.22.

Click on Altavilla & Hills: 16 - 18 September 1943 to view it in a larger map

(Click on the shapes, lines and blue markers for more information)

Map 2: The positions of Companies A, B & C and 2nd Battalion from 16 – 18 September, 1943.

“But the Americans were gradually losing ground.”

The situation was bleak for the paratroopers. The Germans had encircled both battalions cutting them off from any retreat. They had sufficient ammunition from the supplies left by the decimated 36th Division soldiers. There was a water source, but food was almost all consumed and they had no way of evacuating the wounded. The Germans continued to shell 1st Battalion on Hill 424 and 2nd Battalion on the unnumbered hill throughout the night. Source: Huebner, O., “The Operations of Company A, 504th Parachute Infantry in the Defense of Hill 424 Near Altavilla, Italy, 17 – 19 September 1943” 1949 p. 25.

Bill mentioned in his letter that the Americans were slowly losing ground. They had been for days before the 504 PIR arrived and even when they reinforced the beachhead the situation was still unpredictable – at least from his perspective as an army private. When he would have learned that the 504 was cut-off and surrounded it probably still appeared that the Americans were losing ground again and that another German counteroffensive was perhaps underway. General Dawley, under General Clark may have thought this was true too:

“General Mike Dawley, commander of the U.S. VI Corps, had received no information regarding Tucker’s two battalions all day. Fearing the worst, and correctly believing that Tucker and his men were now surrounded, Dawley had sent a runner to Tucker with a message instructing him to try to break out while he could still do so. Colonel Tucker ignored the order to retreat to Albanella; his troopers had captured two hills and they were going to keep them. That night, Headquarters Company wiremen ran a sound – powered phone line to Tucker’s command post and General Dawley was patched through. Tucker explained the situation, and Dawley suggested that his two battalions retreat because they were cut off from other friendly forces. Colonel Tucker replied ‘Retreat hell!’ Send me my 3rd Battalion!” Source: “Beyond Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008 p. 100

Just after mid-night on September 18, Colonel Tucker’s 3rd Battalion (minus Company H which had landed up the coast at Maiori) was assigned to break through to 1st and 2nd Battalions on Hill 424, and the unnumbered Hill. Under very heavy artillery fire from the Germans, Companies G and I traversed the valley from their position of initial attack to the 504 occupied hills. They broke into a run toward the German lines in an effort to get out of range of the artillery.

“After catching our breath and taking count of the men we had left, we moved on Hill 344….Everyone distinguished themselves, knocking out position after position.” Source: “Beyond Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008 p. 102

At around 3:00 AM 3rd Battalion broke through the German lines and seized Hill 344 below the unnumbered hill. They then made contact with 2nd Battalion on the unnumbered hill. Combat patrols in the morning and then again in the afternoon were made by Company A from their position on Hill 424 to Altavilla and the surrounding area to the north. No Germans were encountered. They had in fact retreated. Food arrived via mule train for the beleaguered men of Companies A and C. Security was set up and the men slept the first time in 72 hours. Colonel Tucker was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership and heroism during the battle for Hill 424. Source: “Beyond Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008 pp. 101 – 102

American troops patrol the ruins of Altavilla, September 1943

Source: “SALERNO: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno 9 September - 6 October 1943”. p. 79 1990. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/salerno/sal-pursuing.htm

On the morning of September 19 the 504 was relieved by the 36th Infantry Division. Perhaps at this juncture Bill returned to his Service Company unit in the 505. On Sept 29 the 505th was attached to the British 23rd Armored brigade and moved towards Naples.

“The area in the region of Altavilla for several years had been a firing range for a German artillery school; consequently there was no problem with range, deflection, or prepared concentrations that the enemy had not solved long before the advent of the Americans. Needless to say, hostile artillery and mortar fire were extremely accurate and capable of pinpointing with lethal concentrations such vital features as wells, trails, and draws. During the three days that the 82nd occupied the hills behind Altavilla, approximately 30 paratroopers died, 150 were wounded, and one man was missing in action.

The majority of these casualties were cased by the enemy’s artillery fire. Enemy casualties were, judging from the number of dead left on the field of battle and from information divulged by prisoners, several times those of the troopers. Four separate and distinct attacks by the enemy, launched from the North , east and west of 504 positions were driven back with heavy casualties resulting for the Germans. Capture of Altavilla and Albanella allowed for the Fifth Army to move northward toward Salerno and Naples.” Source: “The Saga of the All American” Dawson, F., 1945 Italy section

“The drop zone at Salerno had already been the scene of action the night before, September 13, when the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 504th had jumped into Italy, their 3rd Battalion arriving on LCIs. The 504 had fought like hell and turned the tide of the battle in favor of the Fifth Army. The beachhead was saved and the Americans were not thrown back into the sea.” Source: “Jump Commander” Alexander M. and Sparry J., 2010 pp. 111 – 112.

“There was still plenty of work to do, however. First they needed to push the Germans back and break out of the beachhead. ‘We organized right away and they marched us up into the mountains to relieve the 504 at Castel San Lorenzo, a little village on the mountainside east of the bay. It looked like they had a hell of a fight. There were dead Germans lying all over the place.’” Source: Jump Commander” Alexander M. and Sparry J., 2010 p. 112.

Below is the Payroll for Service Company 505 September 1 – 30, 1943. Bill’s name appears on line 17. From this it would seem that he was with the 505 during the Salerno battles. To the contrary, and in addition to the evidence in the previous posts, Bill told his friend Herd Bennett that he could have volunteered for Anzio with the 504th, but had decided not to:

“Bill indicates that the 504th Regiment of the 82nd Airborne was still in Italy “at the hell hole known as the ‘Anzio Beachhead’. Bill stated that he could have volunteered to jump at Anzio as he had done at Salerno, but he had not. Bill advises that when the 504th finally joined the 505th Regiment in England, he did not ‘know half a dozen men, because they had all been killed and replaced at Anzio’.” Source: Interview with William Clark by Herd Bennett, January 26, 2000.

In 1996 during my time with Bill he said that he had a lot of good friends in the 504 and it was sad to not see them when they joined the 82nd in England.

 

Payroll for Service Company 505 September 1 – 30, 1943.

 

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2012 All Rights Reserved.

Bill Clark Jumps with the 504 PIR into Salerno September 13, 1943

Today is September 13, 2012 – the 69th anniversary of the 504 PIR jump into Salerno, Italy. In this post and the next, we’ll continue in our analysis of Bill’s June 13, 1945 letter and in the process discover his role during the 82nd Airborne’s jump into Salerno. While most of the specific details have been lost, some surprising deductions can be made about his participation in that historic event.

“So a few days later we went to Salerno which was a “hot spot”. On the way down to the ground it looked like the whole earth was on fire it was really an ammunition dump on fire. Most of us landed in a spot between our lines and German lines...” Source: William Clark, letter dated June 13, 1945

The Invasion in the Bay of Salerno and the lead up to the 82nd Airborne’s Salerno Jump

The American and British forces of Operation AVALANCHE - units of the US VI Corps and the British 10 Corps – landed on the beaches of Salerno Bay, Italy at 3:30 AM on September 9. The American forces under the command of General Mark Clark, consisted primarily of the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions with the 36th spearheading the invasion in the southern American sector.

(Note:- the positions and movements of the British, American, and German units can be seen in Map 1 below. Click here for full resolution.)

Map 1: American VI Corps, British 10 Corps and German 1oth Army Movements/Positions 9 – 13 September, 1943

Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993, p. 73 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-6.html

(Click here to view Map 1 in high resolution )

“The British 10 Corps, with the 46th and 56th Divisions, three Ranger battalions, and two Commando units, was to land north of the Sele River, seize the port of Salerno, capture the Montecorvino airfield, take the little rail and road center of Battipaglia, secure the Sele River bridge fourteen miles inland at Ponte Sele, and gain possession of the mountain passes leading to Naples. The 7th Armoured Division was to follow, beginning to go ashore on the fifth and sixth day of the invasion.

The VI Corps, with the 36th Division, was to land south of the Sele River and protect the Fifth Army right flank by seizing the high ground dominating the Salerno plain from the east and the south--an arc of mountains marked by the villages of Altavilla, Albanella, Rocca d'Aspide, Ogliastro, and Agropoli. After the floating reserve--two regiments of the 45th Division--and the rest of the 45th had landed, the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions, and later the 3d Infantry Division, were to go ashore through the captured port of Naples, which the Allies hoped to have by the thirteenth day of the invasion”. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993, pp. 43 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-4.html

“Anticipating that 39,000 German troops would be near Salerno on D-day and perhaps a total of 100,000 three days later, the [Allied] planners hoped to send about 125,000 Allied troops ashore. However, the Allied build-up to that figure would be progressive and relatively slow compared with the German capability of reinforcing the defenders.

In the [American] zone, the 36th Division, with infantry components 20 percent overstrength, was to land with two regiments abreast, the third in immediate reserve. Each assault regiment, including attachments, had the enormous strength of about 9,000 men, 1,350 vehicles, and 2,000 tons of supplies. Each was to carry in reserve about seven days of all classes of supply, plus a 20-percent safety factor. All vehicles were to be waterproofed, have their gas tanks and radiators full, and carry five quarts of oil and enough gasoline in cans for fifty miles of travel. All units were to carry basic loads of ammunition plus additional ammunition both combat and cargo loaded, which together would provide an estimated three days of fire. Ammunition to accompany the assault troops totaled 240 rounds per 60-mm. mortar, 300 rounds per 81-mm. mortar, 840 rounds per 105-mm. howitzer, 400 rounds per 155-mm. howitzer, and 300 rounds per 155-mm. gun. For the first three days of the landing operations all convoys were to be combat loaded, thereafter convoy loaded for more economical utilization of ship space” Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993, pp. 49-50 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-4.html

The Americans also had two regiments from the 45th Division floating in reserve bringing the total available manpower in their sector to 36,000. Their opposition was elements of the German 10th Army which occupied the Salerno area and was commanded by Colonel-General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, a savvy hardened veteran commander of the Russian Front. At the time of the invasion, the 10th only had one fighting unit active in the Salerno Bay area – the 16th Panzer Division.

Colonel-General Heinrich von Vietinghoff. Commander of the German 10th Army in Italy in 1943

Source: Wikipedia commons

“Meeting the Americans, and the British as well, on the beaches of Salerno were troops of the reconstituted 16th Panzer Division, the only fully equipped armored division in southern Italy. Not quite at full strength, the division had 17,000 men, more than 100 tanks, and 36 assault guns organized into four infantry battalions, one equipped with half-tracks for better support of tank attacks, and three artillery battalions. Morale was good. Shortcomings were lack of combat experience, a shortage of gasoline, which restricted training of tank crews, and a long front of more than twenty miles.” Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993, p. 78 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-6.html

Even with the powerful 16th Panzer Division, and the advantage of occupying a highly defendable territory typified by rugged mountains and deep ravines, on the morning of September 9 the German’s were vastly outnumbered in comparison to the immense Allied invasion fleet. There were a variety of reasons for their predicament.

Two key divisions were denied movement south to Salerno because the German High Command expected other Allied invasions to come further up the coast above Salerno. Units escaping from the south in response to the British Operation Slapstick were expected to arrive in the Salerno area earlier than they did. When they did arrive confusion reined about whether they should stay or move on to Rome as was originally planned. In any case the units which were ordered to move to the Salerno area were understrength or in the process of reorganization from being pounded by losses sustained during the Sicily campaign. The Hermann Goring Division and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division both being cases in point. On top of all this, fuel shortages hampered movement; and communications between General Vietinghoff, General Kesselring (the supreme German commander of Italy based in Rome), and Headquarters in Berlin were intermittent.

The poor communications in particular had a significant impact on General Vietinghoff’s decision making. Upon seeing the size of the Allied armada in the Bay of Salerno early on September 9, he was convinced it was the main Allied invasion. It was so large he surmised that the risk of other Allied invasions up the western Italian coast was low. Unable to contact General Kesselring for any advice on the matter he alone shouldered the decision to pull out and head for Rome, or stay to counterattack. His decision was to stay with the objective of defeating the Allies in what he correctly concluded was their main northern invasion force – the other being the British 8th Army moving up from the southern tip of the Italian peninsula.

The immediate forces at Vietinghoff’s disposal, while depleted, were still formidable. Together the Hermann Goering, 16th Panzer, and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions totaled 45,000 men with some strong artillery forces and significant armored vehicles and Tiger tanks. Vietinghoff knew this might not be enough, so he was counting on the timely arrival of the German 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, scheduled to reach the Salerno vicinity on the evening of September 9. Lead elements of the 26th Panzer Division were anticipated to arrive the next day. Both divisions were evacuating from southern Italy, but unforeseen landings by another set of British forces in the south delayed their departure. They didn’t make it until September 10 and 11, respectively and then only in dribs and drabs of small unorganized groups. It wasn’t until the evening of September 13 that these units were sufficiently organized and of the large enough numbers that Vietinghoff began discussing using them to mount an effective counterattack against the beachheads being established by the Allies.

The combined manpower of the 26th and 29th Divisions was 30,000 – not to mention their tanks, armored vehicles and substantial artillery. The total expected base of manpower when added to the men already deployed in the area would have totaled 75,000. Had the southern German forces arrived in Salerno on time, the eventual outcome of the invasion could have been very different. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993, p. 67 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-5.html

Vietinghoff’s decision to attack was made more risky when the bombing and artillery might of the combined Allied air and naval forces were considered. Both of which were far superior to that of the Germans. Fully aware of this, Vietinghoff believed that if he could gather all his available forces early enough he could overwhelm the Allies in a Blitzkrieg style attack, quickly destroying them before the navy and army air forces could respond.

After news of the invasion armada eventually reached General Kesselring in Rome, he and Vietinghoff asked for two Panzer Divisions to be sent south from their stations in Mantua, northern Italy to help repel the invasion. German High Command in Berlin denied the request. Had they actually been sent, it is almost a foregone conclusion that the outcome of the Salerno campaign would have meant annihilation for the Allies.

While waiting for the southern reinforcements, the 16th Panzer Division had earlier mined the invasion area and placed obstacles such as barbed wire. They also used psychological warfare methods (AKA PSYOPs) in the form of load speakers in the Paestum beach landing area declaring “Come on in and give up. We have you covered.” The men of the 36th Division ignored them, but there were other instances of PSYOPs used. For instance, the Germans played “Deep in the heart of Texas” when the Texas based 36th Division fought further inland.

 

Troops of the 36th Division landing on the invasion beaches

Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993 p. 89 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-6.html

At 7:00 AM on September 9, the 16th Panzer Division attacked the Allied landing beaches in both the British and American zones with tanks and infantry, but were beaten back by the then untested, yet effective US 36th Infantry Division and the seasoned British 46th and 56th Divisions fighting to their left. Click on Map 1 above to see these details in high resolution.

If the Germans were experiencing problems organizing their retreating and depleted divisions into a worthy adversarial force, the Allies were having their own. Right from the beginning there was seven mile gap between the American positions to the south and the British forces invading on their left flank in the north. The gap opened because while moving toward their respective objectives, the British forces had gone to the northeast to engage the Germans in their sector while the US 36th Division had advanced east to do the same in theirs. Due to the slow build up on shore of the Allied forces there was insufficient men and machines to maintain a continuous front across both Allied sectors.

Over September 10 and 11 General Vietinghoff scrambled to assemble a force strong enough to slam the Allied invasion and annihilate it’s forces on the beaches before the survivors could escape by sea. Eventually he was able to cobble together an attack group consisting of units from the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division retreating from the south. He used them to reinforce the 16th Panzer Division around the towns of Battipaglia and Eboli.

To the north in the British sector he used the Hermann Goring Division and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to attack the British who in the face of the onslaught were entirely committed to holding onto their own gains.

Meanwhile on September 10 the Allied forces were making good progress inland. The beachhead around the landing zones continued to be established inland positions expanded. Some nine miles west of Salerno, H Company of the 504th PIR and US Ranger units made a landing on the beaches around Maiori on the north side of the bay. Company H and seized the high ground around the Chiunzi Pass.

Plans were ready to be implemented for further gains in Salerno Bay area:

“The VI Corps plan for 11 September envisaged three separate but related attacks. On the left, the [45th Division’s] 157th Infantry was to cross the Sele River downstream from its junction with the Calore and attack north to Eboli. Seizure of Eboli, about eight miles from the Sele, would strike the German flank and rear and perhaps pry loose the German hold on Battipaglia; it would also facilitate 10 Corps' capture of the heights immediately overlooking the Montecorvino airfield. In the center, the [45th Division’s] 179th Infantry was to enter the Sele-Calore corridor near the juncture of the two rivers. Covering the right flank of the 157th, the 179th was to drive seven miles northeast across the flood plain to seize a bridge, Ponte Sele, and cut Highway 19, a good lateral route still open to the Germans. On the right of the low ground, a regiment of the 36th Division was to secure Hill 424 near Altavilla and deprive the Germans of a commanding view over much of the beachhead, as well as the flood plain, the valleys of the upper Sele and Calore Rivers, and portions of Highways 19 and 91”. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993 p. 104 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-7.html

On September 11, the 142nd Regimental Combat Team of 36th Division which was spearheading the US part of the invasion had penetrated as far inland as Altavilla, passing the town, to take Hill 424, the strategic high ground in the area. They seized the town of Albanella in the south. At that time and to the left of the 36th Division’s 142nd Infantry, the 45th Division’s 179th Infantry, facing heavy German resistance, had pushed from the town of Persano and were making their way toward the Ponte Sele – the bridge over the Sele river. The 179th’s rear was exposed in the event of a German counterattack, so the 157th Infantry of the 45th Division was brought forward from reserve to secure the crossings west of the Sele river around Persano to prevent any German attack.

Despite these reinforcements made by the 45th Division a gap between the British and the Americans fluctuated in size, but persisted throughout the operation. The area of the gap and the troop deployments as of September 11 are shown in Map 2 below.

Map 2: Troop positions & gap between British and American forces  on 11 September, 1943

Adapted from Source: “SALERNO: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno 9 September - 6 October 1943”. P. 48 1990. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/salerno/map07.jpg

A key strategic point in the area was a combination of a patch of higher ground offering the best visibility of the surrounding terrain and the network of roads leading up through the Sele Calore river area. The patch of higher ground was centered around collection of five buildings constituting a tobacco factory and a nearby farmhouse to the north. The force occupying the factory area would more easily hold the Sele and Calore river crossings, and would control access to the roads used for German advance, supply and if necessary, escape. Intimately aware of all the strategic locations in the area, the Germans naturally occupied the tobacco factory and surrounds from the moment the invasion began.

 

The tobacco factory; a key strategic location on high ground near vital road junctions and river crossings

Source:  “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993 p. 104 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-7.html

What the Germans may or may not have known at this time was that this strategic point also happened to be in the location of the gap between the US and British lines. On September 11, the American 157th Infantry tried but - in the face of intense German resistance - failed to take the factory. Control of the factory was vital since it would mean the 142nd Infantry’s rear would be protected in the event of an anticipated German counterattack. The tobacco factory changed hands several times in the afternoon of September 12 with the American 157th Infantry finally holding it at the end of the day.

What the Germans did know is the strategic importance of retaking Hill 424 (now in possession of the 36th Division) with its commanding views of almost the entire invasion area. Hill 424 was the most valuable piece of real estate in the American part of the invasion zone. Once it was in German hands, the positions and movements of all the American units could easily be observed.

Elements of the 29th Panzer Division began to arrive from the south on September 10 and the 26th Panzer on September 11. While he waited for more units from these divisions, Vietinghoff decided to the throw the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division against the US 36th Division occupying Hill 424.  See Map 3 Below.

“During the night of 11/12 September enemy units of the 2d Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, began to infiltrate around Hill 424. At daybreak on the 12th our troops received fire from so many directions that the enemy seemed to be everywhere. Our artillery, lacking definite targets on Hill 424, fired concentrations on enemy troops and tanks between the Sele and Calore rivers. Enemy artillery was also active, and fired for 2½ hours on Hill 424, beginning at 1100 [11:00 AM]. Communications were severed; no amount of work could keep the lines open.” Source: “SALERNO: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno 9 September - 6 October 1943”. p. 54 1990. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/salerno/sal-germancntr.htm

The 15th Panzer Grenadier attack on 1st battalion 142nd Infantry (36th Division) occupying Hill 424 and in the village of Altavilla  killed or captured over 500 men. There were 260 survivors who became encircled before making their way out under cover of darkness to friendly lines.

At around 6:00 AM, on September 13 (AKA Black Monday to Salerno veterans) three Battalions from the 36th Division attempted to retake Altavilla and Hill 424. The 3rd Battalion, 143rd reached the town and its Company K held it. The remainder of the battalion decided to try and advance on Hill 424, but was driven off by swift and savage assaults of extremely accurate artillery barrages and small arms fire from the 15th Panzer Grenadier’s. The battalion retreated. Company K became trapped in Altavilla and couldn’t escape for another day. The other battalion (3rd Battalion, 142nd) fought up the slopes to the summit of Hill 424. The 260 remaining men from 1st Battalion 142nd Infantry were sent to reinforce the attack. They didn’t make it because they were shelled so badly by artillery that a mere 60 men were left to fight. 3rd Battalion 142nd were penned down by artillery, then without the reinforcements from 1st Battalion, were  thrown back by fierce German counterattacks and forced to retreat. Source: “SALERNO: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno 9 September - 6 October 1943”. p. 60 1990. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/salerno/sal-germancntr.htm

The German response was a new and unexpected experience for the 36th Division. It marked a change in their tactics from mainly defensive probes to decisive attacks designed to rapidly overwhelm and defeat their opponents.

 

Map 3: German Attacks and American Retreats at Altavilla 13 September, 1943

Source: “SALERNO: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno 9 September - 6 October 1943”. P. 59 1990. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/salerno/map07.jpg

Around the Eboli area by the morning of September 13 enough units of the 26th and 29th Panzer Divisions had arrived to convince Vietinghoff that by September 14 sufficient German armor and men would be available for a massive counterattack striking down from Altavilla through the Sele-Calore river corridor, then pursuing the Americans across the Salerno plain towards the invasion beaches at Paestum where any remaining pockets of resistance would be destroyed.

At about the same time, from the newly acquired observation posts on the hills behind Altavilla, the Germans – for the first time – saw the gap between the British and American positions.

“With some astonishment he [Vietinghoff] inferred that the Allies had voluntarily ‘split themselves into two sections’. To Vietinghoff this meant that the Allies were planning to evacuate their beachhead, and he seized eagerly upon that conclusion. The arrival of additional ships off the Salerno beaches he construed as those necessary for the evacuation. The Allied use of smoke near Battipaglia he regarded as a measure designed to cover a retreat. The translation of an intercepted radio message, which seemed to indicate an Allied intention to withdraw, made him certain that the Allies had been unable to withstand the heavy and constant German pressure and were in fact about to abandon their beachhead. He interpreted German propaganda broadcasts claiming another Dunkerque as support for his conviction.

Sensing victory, Vietinghoff wanted all the more to launch a massive attack, no longer to drive the Allies from the beaches but now to prevent their escape. More and more pressure, he urged his subordinates.

Shortly after midday on 13 September……elements of the 29th Panzer Grenadier and 16th Panzer Divisions struck from Battipaglia, Eboli, and Altavilla. Not long afterward the corps commander, Herr, reported his troops in pursuit of the enemy.” Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993. pp. 112– 113 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-7.html

What came next was nothing short of a berserker like attack aiming at total annihilation of the Americans. Based on their earlier assessment the German’s believed they were in pursuit of an evacuating American force. Vietinghoff seized on this belief and ordered all available forces to attack south of Eboli vowing that no Americans would leave Salerno. At 3:30 PM September 13, a column of over 20 panzers supporting 1st Battalion 79th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division attacked down the Eboli road. They and broke through the 45th Division’s 157th Infantry lines overruning the tobacco factory and killing or capturing 0ver 500 men. The Germans blasted through the American positions reaching a bridge over the Sele River near Persano.

 

Map 4: German Attacks and American Retreats 13 September, 1943

Source: “SALERNO: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno 9 September - 6 October 1943”. P. 64 1990. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/salerno/map07.jpg

The 36th Division’s 2nd Battalion, 143rd Infantry was next in the the path of this juggernaut as it veered left and headed east toward them. The 2nd Battalion was sandwiched between them and a 29th Panzer Division force attacking from the opposite direction. Their positions were quickly overun and 500 of its men were lost, most taken prisoner. About 400 men did manage to retreat to relative safety.

The lightning German attack continued unabated.

“By 1715 [5:15 PM] a sizable force of German tanks and infantry was in the corridor unopposed, and by 1800 [6:00 PM] enemy artillery was emplaced around Persano. Soon afterward, fifteen German tanks headed straight toward the juncture of the Sele and Calore Rivers. Their advance was accompanied by a display of fireworks--an extensive use of Very pistols, pyrotechnics, and smoke--intended either to create the appearance of larger numbers or to denote the attainment of local objectives. By 1830 [6:30 PM] German tanks and infantry were at the north bank of the Calore.

Between them and the sea stood only a few Americans, mainly the 189th and 158th Field Artillery Battalions. In positions on a gentle slope overlooking the base of the corridor, the batteries of these battalions opened fire at point-blank range across the Calore and into heavy growth along the north bank of the river. At General Walker's command, a few tank destroyers of the 636th Battalion coming ashore that afternoon hastened to the juncture of the rivers to augment the artillery. Howitzers of other battalions and tanks in the area added their fires where possible.

Immediately behind the artillery pieces, only a few hundred yards away, was the Fifth Army command post. While miscellaneous headquarters troops--cooks, clerks, and drivers--hastily built up a firing line on the south bank of the Calore, others hurriedly moved parts of the command post to the rear. The spear that General Clark had visualized poised at the center of the beachhead had struck.” Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993. pp. 115 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-7.html

In the face of the inexorable assault, and as imagined by Vietinghoff , General Clark seriously did consider an evacuation. Hasty plans had drawn up for a variety of evacuation procedures. One called for an evacuation of American headquarters to an offshore location:

“Finding the situation ‘extremely critical,’ facing squarely the possibility ‘that the American forces may sustain a severe defeat in this area,’ General Clark arranged to evacuate his headquarters on ten minutes' notice and take a PT boat to the 10 Corps zone, where the conditions were better for maintaining what he called a ‘clawhold’ on Italian soil”. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993. pp. 115 - 116 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-7.html

Indeed while some of the German commanders didn’t think the Allies were evacuating, Kesselring and Vietinghoff were both convinced of it.

“To Vietinghoff, German success seemed to be within grasp. He was so sure of victory by 1730 [5:30 PM] that he sent a triumphant telegram to Kesselring. ‘After a defensive battle lasting four days,’ he announced, ‘enemy resistance is collapsing. Tenth Army pursuing on wide front. Heavy fighting still in progress near Salerno and Altavilla. Maneuver in process to cut off the retreating enemy from Paestum.’” Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993. pp. 116 - 117 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-7.html

By the evening of September 13, a German 10th Army diary entry read “ The battle of Salerno, appears to be over”. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino”, Blumenson, M., 1993. p. 117 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-7.html

They had retaken not only Persano, but Altavilla, Hill 424, Albanella and all of the roads connecting those towns. From this commanding position it would be easy for Vietinghoff to achieve his objective.

However, the German units were within naval artillery range, so US and British ships attacked with devastating barrages from their huge guns. The situation was still precarious, however since the German forces had penetrated very close to the beaches.

“So a few days later we went to Salerno which was a ‘hot spot’”. – William A. Clark , 1945

General Clark felt that the whole operation was in danger of becoming another Dunkirk. He turned to his Airborne adviser, Bill Yarborough who put together an Airborne plan to drop around 1,200 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne into the area. The plan would boost morale of the shattered 36th and 45th Infantry as well as plug the hole in the gap between the 45th and British forces.

At about 12:00 noon on September 13, General Clark wrote a letter to General Ridgway requesting the urgent drop of paratroopers into Salerno. A fighter pilot volunteered to deliver the message and took off for Licata airfield where General Ridgway was stationed. Ridgway received the letter after some drama and expense of valuable time since the pilot was ordered by Clark to give the letter to Ridgway and no one else.

This was an emergency situation. In a scaled back version of GIANT I, The 505th was at the time preparing for their drop on Capua to secure the bridgeheads on the Volturno River, so using them was out of the question. Instead Ridgway chose Colonel Reuben Tucker’s 504th PIR for the jump.

Fears of another Sicily like friendly fire attack were very real. While the route for GIANT II had been set up to eliminate the possibility of Allied friendly fire, there was no time to plan and implement similar measures for this impromptu mission. To reduce the chances of a repeat of the July 11 tragedy, Ridgway ignored the chain of command – General Alexander, in particular – by radioing Clark’s headquarters directly. His message asked Clark to order all Allied forces to withhold firing on any aircraft from 9:00 PM onwards unless ordered otherwise. Clark complied, giving instructions to his staff accordingly to inform all such forces not to fire on aircraft. Source: “Ridgway’s Paratroopers” Blair, C. Carter, R., 1956, p.150

Troop Carrier Command rushed to inform those antiaircraft batteries stationed in Sicily about the flight. Source: “Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945” USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 P. 61

The plan was implemented all too quickly. C-47’s from the 61st, 313th and 314th Troop Carrier Groups were moved about to the airfields of Trapani and Cosimo where Tucker’s 1st and 2nd Battalions were to take off. Colonel Gavin of the 505th was sent to meet with with Tucker and his officers at their bivouac and in short order informed them of the plan. source: Source: “All American All the Way” Nordyke, P., 2005, page 106

 504 PIR Paratroopers loading for equipment packs delivery via parachute late in the day September 13, 1943

Source: Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945 USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 P. 63

Just before the 1st battalion 504 was loaded onto the planes to make the Salerno jump Colonel Tucker, in the short time available, made a notable motivational speech to his troops.

“A jeep drove up. Colonel Reuben Tucker, the regimental commander, was standing up in it, his flushed, be mustached intense face set in deep lines. He halted at every plane and yelled ‘Men, it’s open season on Krautheads. You know what to do!” Source: “Those Devils in Baggy Pants” Carter, R., 1951, p.44

Colonel Ruben “Rube” Tucker Commander of the 504th PIR

Source: Wikipedia Commons

Tucker’s attitude was something he very effectively instilled in his troops, from his officers down through all of his personnel. Here’s a quote from one of his platoon leaders before the Salerno jump:

“Men here’s the [****]. Those goddamned Krauts are kicking the hell out of our straight-legs [non paratroopers] over at Salerno. Mark Clark wants us to rescue his boys. When the green light comes on, jump. When you hit the ground, be ready for anything. We’re supposed to drop behind our own lines – but the krauts might be on the DZ when we get there. Any questions?” Source: “Geronimo!: American Paratroopers in WWII” Breuer W., 1989, p. 127

According to Gerard Delvin in his book Paratrooper!:

“Paratroop company commanders were given only sketchy information to pass on to their platoon leaders. By the time the work got passed down to the infantry squad level, the briefings went something like this: ‘The Krauts are kicking the [expletive] out of our boys at Salerno. We’re going to jump into the beachhead tonight and rescue them. Put on your parachutes and get on the plane – we’re taking off in a few minutes for the gates of hell.’” Source: Paratrooper!” Devlin, G., 1979 p. 301

The troop carrier pilots were just as quickly informed of the mission:

“There, while the men of the 504th were climbing aboard the planes, the troop carrier personnel were briefed “by the light of a few flashlights and maps held up against the side of a plane” Source: “Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945” USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 P. 61

There were serious omissions on the mission’s specifics including a lack of aerial photographs and a reliance on oral instructions which caused much confusion amongst the pilots. It seems miraculous that no serious errors were made.

Troop carrier pilots attending a hasty impromptu flight briefing using flashlights and map on a dark C -47

Source: Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945 USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 P. 64

 

Just to make sure that the mission did not succumb to antiaircraft attack, the planes flew up from the south hugging the east coast of Italy after rendezvousing off the northeastern tip of Sicily.

 

Map 5: Proposed and Actual 82nd Airborne Missions

Note: - Actual Mission hugs the coast of Italy and ends at the drop zones (DZ) around Salerno

Source: Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945 USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 p. 55

This jump was the first time Airborne Pathfinders were used in combat. They left ahead of the main armada and dropped successfully setting up their equipment which would guide the rest of the planes to the correct drop zone.

 

“On the way down to the ground it looked like the whole earth was on fire it was really an ammunition dump on fire.” – William A. Clark , 1945

The Bay of Salerno looking down from the north.

Note: The C-47s flew in from the south – the opposite perspective from this photograph

Source: National Archives http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/naples/72-17.htm

The 1st Battalion took off from Cosimo airfield, Sicily on planes from the 61st and 314th Troop Carrier Groups. As part of the 2nd battalion, Bill’s C-47 took off at around 8:40 PM on September 13 from Trapani/Milo Airfield, Sicily where the 313th Troop Carrier Group was based. The 313th carried all of 2nd Battalion 504th PIR into Salerno in 36 planes. Two planes had to turn back due to mechanical trouble. There was one spare plane back at the airfield and into this C-47 one stick of troopers climbed aboard. It quickly caught up with the rest of the 313th. At around 11:26 PM on September 13, Bill jumped at an altitude of 800 feet along with the other 35 planeloads of paratroopers from 2nd Battalion. Source: Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945 USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 pp. 61-62

Bill wrote that when he jumped he saw an ammunition dump on fire. I can’t find a reference to this in any of the documents on the jump. One can reasonably assume that there were ammunition dumps aflame in places since there were many precarious battles being fought at the time. The German’s were still executing their massive counterstrike. Artillery and air raids were continuous. Fires were burning in many locations.

On the ground a large T Half a mile long and wide  marked the drop zone which was made of drums of sand soaked in gasoline and lit when the planes were in range. The jump was a success with most of the troopers landed within 200 yards of the DZ and all of them within 1 mile of it. Source: “Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945” USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 P. 62

 

Map 6: 504 PIR Drop Zone (DZ) on the night of 13 (and early morning of 14) September, 1943

Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations Salerno to Cassino.” Blumenson M., 1993, page 128. Retrieved December 14, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-8.html

Due to mechanical problems with some of the 51 planes assigned to fly the 1st Battalion and the Regimental Headquarters Battalion, Colonel Tucker’s serial was late in taking off. The 2nd Battalion serial commanded by Dan Danielson decided not to wait at the rendezvous site for 1st Battalion. Because of radio silence, the decision could not be relayed to Tucker, nor General Clark or anyone else. Source: “Geronimo!: American Paratroopers in WWII” Breuer W., 1989, p. 130

“Tucker paced about like a tiger in a cage, became impatient, and ordered his C-47’s to lift off solo, in pairs and in small groups.” Source: “Geronimo!: American Paratroopers in WWII” Breuer W., 1989, p. 130

The 1st Battalion serial flew in a disorganized fashion, not properly formed in a V of V formation and was dispersed over 300 miles. General Clark’s staff were becoming increasingly worried about the fate of the Colonel and the rest of his men. The first planes from the serial arrived at around 2:30 AM. Subsequently 1st Battalion was late in arriving at the DZ. Source: “Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean 1942 – 1945” USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955 P. 62

At 4:30 AM on September 13 Colonel Tucker reported to General Dawley “‘How soon can you assemble your regiment?’ the corps commander asked. ‘They are assembled now and ready for action.”’ the colonel replied. Source: “Geronimo!: American Paratroopers in WWII” Breuer W., 1989, p. 131

Seventy-six men were injured and 120 troopers from Company B were missing. The missing troopers were to rejoin the force later. Source: “Geronimo!: American Paratroopers in WWII” Breuer W., 1989, p. 131

“With daylight, a curious phenomenon swept through the ranks of the beleaguered and weary GIs and Tommies on the fireswept and shrinking bridgehead. Scores of them had stood in their fox holes and cheered lustily when they had seen Tucker’s men bailing out. Word that 1,300 tough American paratroopers had leaped onto the battlefield, like lightening from the black sky, infected haggard and demoralized men with a new sense of confidence, even buoyancy. The spiraling boost to sagging Allied spirits was grossly disproportionate to the relatively small number of parachutists involved. This was the ‘psychological reinforcement’ about which Bill Yarborough had spoken to General Clark.” Source: “Geronimo!: American Paratroopers in WWII” Breuer W., 1989, p. 131

“Most of us landed in a spot between our lines and German lines…” – William A. Clark , 1945

In his letter Bill stated that most of the paratroopers landed in a place between the Allied and enemy lines. On September 13th the lines were as pictured in Map 6 above. What he is referring to is the gap between the British and US forces which was being exploited by the advancing Germans.

After Colonel Tucker arrived he and his key staff had a briefing of the situation and were assigned their objective. They were told of the situation at Altavilla and the German’s advance through the gap between the lines where they had overrun the 36th and 45th Divisions positions and movement towards the American landing beaches at Paestum. The 504’s mission was to fill that gap.

Tucker gave orders for 2nd Battalion to deploy in the gap. He assigned 1st Battalion to their right of this area, on the slopes of Mt. Soprano. Source: “All American All the Way: The Combat History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2005, p. 107

They were to “hold to the last man and last round”. Source: “More Than Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008, p. 80

The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 504 were assembled within an hour of landing. They were placed on trucks, driven part way, then marched the rest of the way to their positions about eight miles from the drop zone near Mt. Soprano. On arrival they began digging in and were finished by 3:00 AM on September 14th. Source: “More Than Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008, p. 80 – 82

“Word was passed to expect an attack later that morning. In the predawn darkness, the two battalions put out listening posts and patrols toward Albanella in order to gain advanced warning of any German assaults.” Source: “More Than Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008, p. 83

C Company 504th paratrooper, Ross Carter, in his poignant book, “Those Devils in Baggy Pants”, writes:

“It was three o’clock in the morning of September 14, 1943. We didn’t know where we were on the beachhead and few of us ever learned much about it except that we had jumped at a place called Paestum, just south of Salerno. All next day, hidden in a small valley we listened to a terrific battle taking place a couple of miles away. We were in position to repel the attack if it reached us, but it never did. That night we put out guards and finished digging foxholes.” Source: “Those Devils in Baggy Pants” Carter, R., 1951, p. 45

In the morning of September 14 it was discovered that the enemy appeared to be massing for a drive through the line held by Bill’s 2nd Battalion and units of the 45th Division. General Veitinghoff had ordered everything thrown at the Allies to finish them off. He still believed they were evacuating. At 8:00 AM tanks and infantry from the 16th Panzer and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, attacked from their positions south of the Sele River. They were met by infantry from 45th Division’s 179th Infantry deployed to the left of Bill’s battalion. Unaware of the new US reinforcements effectively plugging the gap, the Germans found themselves in a pitched battle. Artillery strikes from land and sea were called in destroying several of the tanks, causing the infantry to retreat. The artillery deterred the Germans from making a decisive thrust through the US lines. However, during the day the Germans made further exploratory attacks against the 504 2nd Battalion and German artillery fell on their positions. The Germans were probing, trying to find a weakness in the line through which they could make a panzer led Blitzkrieg strike to the landing beaches where reinforcement troops and supplies were still being unloaded. Source: “More Than Courage: The Combat History of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II” Nordyke, P., 2008, p. 84 Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations Salerno to Cassino.” Blumenson M., 1993, page 129. Retrieved December 14, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-8.html

Throughout the day the Germans launched more attacks. The fine dirt of the Salerno plain thrown up by German armored vehicle movements and the enemy’s use of smoke camouflage easily gave away their positions. Allied superiority in land based artillery and naval gun fire proved to be effective against any German advancement.

On the evening of September 14 the situation seemed to be under control – at least from the viewpoint of securing the beachhead. The line had held despite continued exploratory attacks by the Germans. In an effort to gain vital intelligence on enemy movements and intentions, Tuckers two 504 battalions were sending patrols up to 3 miles in front of their lines.

In the meantime more reinforcements were arriving. The 325th Glider Infantry Division with all but their Company H had landed on the Paestum beaches. The 45th Division’s, 180th Infantry was moved from floating reserve and deployed near Mount Soprano. During the night of 14/15 September the 505 PIR parachuted into the DZ at Paestum with and additional 2,100 paratroopers. Now the Americans had several thousand more men to throw into the fight.

At Kesseling’s headquarters in Rome, on September 14, it was becoming more apparent that the Allies were not evacuating. However, he still wanted Vietinghoff to attack with the aim of destroying the Allied beachhead in order to gain favor with the German High Command in Berlin. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations Salerno to Cassino.” Blumenson M., 1993, page 131. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-8.html

For the Germans, with the forces they had, the Allied naval and air bombardments proved too powerful to make a strike at the beach successful. On September 15 Kesselring advised Vietinghoff to attack in the hills above the bay out of range of the naval guns. Attacks that day against Allied positions on the Salerno plain were small and insubstantial. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations Salerno to Cassino.” Blumenson M., 1993, page 133. Retrieved from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-9.html

The Germans began pulling out towards the Sele-Calore river junction. By the end of September 15, the Allies began to understand the Germans were retreating. Vietinghoff got approval from Kesseling to withdraw from the battle due to the overpowering might of the naval artillery and the threat posed by the British approaching from the south now a mere 50 miles away of Paestum. Source: “United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations Salerno to Cassino.” Blumenson M., 1993, page 134. Retrieved from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Salerno/USA-MTO-Salerno-9.html

On the American side there was less concern that the beachhead was vulnerable. Plans for an evacuation were abandoned. General Clark congratulated the men. The Allies began thinking of the next steps. The first was an attack on Altavilla to retake the strategic high ground of Hill 424.

The mission of taking Hill 424 and its commanding views of the invasion beaches now fell to the 504 PIR. It was to be a costly one.

© Copyright Jeffrey Clark 2012 All Rights Reserved.